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 A bstract 
 
This study is set out to describe the nature of China’s welfare regime. After carefully 
reviewing current literature, this study develops a thorough theoretical framework which 
contains three dimensions. They are: we lfare mix, welfare outcomes and historical 
development. Moreover, case study, document analysis and interviews are the methods 
employed in this study.  
 
Based on massive official archives, this study divides China’s welfare regime into three 
phases: ‘communist China’ (1949-1978), ‘e conomic China’ (1978-2002) and ‘social 
China’ (2002-2011). All of them had distinct ive characteristics and certain political 
ideologies were mobilised to justify the in tentions of the Communist Party of China 
(CPC). In particular, the break-through in ‘s ocial China’ was related to the refreshed 
ideologies that emphasized social development and state intervention.  
 
Against this background, the Urban Minimu m Living Standard Guarantee (UMLSG) 
scheme is selected as a case study to indicate the welfare outcomes. Meanwhile, 
interviews of poor people and local bureaucr ats in Guangzhou are used to complement 
the findings. It is discovered that, despite the current pro-welfare strategy, the UMLSG 
was producing minimum effects of de-c ommodification and social programs, 
de-familialization or de-clien telization. Furthermore, ignor ance of social rights was 
aggravated by street-level bureaucracy  in policy implementation. Due to the 
over-emphasis on legitimacy, policies of the UMLSG provided little significance for 
beneficiaries to escape from the stratum. The performance of welfare outcomes and the 
prevalence of street-level bureaucracy seriously  contradicted the refreshed ideologies in 
‘social China’ and ultimately undermined the legitimacy of the CPC. 
 
In conclusion, this study ascribes the natu re of China’s welfare regime to power 
inequality. This not only refers to the authoritarian role of the CPC in developing the 
welfare system and shaping ideological hegemony, but also points  to the coercion 
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 imposed by local bureaucrats on poor people. Therefore, this study advocates that during 
the development of ‘social China’ social rights should be actualised and this campaign 
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 Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
The welfare model of the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) holds great interest to 
scholars in the West. Prior to the economic reforms of 1978, the leadership of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) kept its policies and internal process opaque to the 
world for nearly three decades. Thanks to the opening-up policy that accompanied 
the economic reform, large numbers of scholars from abroad could enter China to 
collect data and present China’s social policy in English. Some of these projects have 
attracted great interest in China studies because they provided a comprehensive view 
of the welfare systems before and after the economic reform in an overall sense 
(Chan et al., 2008; Wong, 1998; Leung and Nann, 1995; Dixon, 1981).  
 
There is currently growing attention paid to China’s welfare model. The reason is 
related to the socio-economic context which has been rapidly changing during the 
market transition. The achievement of the economic reform over the past three 
decades has surprised the world. The World Economic Outlook Database  established 
by the International Monetary Fund (2011) indicates that China had maintained a 
consistent increase of Gross Domestic Product (GDP, constant prices) ranging from 
7.8 per cent to 14.2 per cent during 1997-2007. This strong GDP growth persisted in 
2009 (9.1 per cent) and 2010 (10.5 per cent), even though China was not unscathed 
by the global credit crunch. In the next five years China is predicted to keep a 9.5 per 
cent annual increase in GDP. 
 
Due to Deng Xiao-ping’s design of ‘allowing some people to prosper first’, there is 
no doubt that the excellence of economic development has generally improved 
people’s living standards. For example, based on the consumption threshold of ‘$1 a 
day’ using 1993 Power Purchasing Parities (PPP), the World Bank (2009, p4-7) 
tracked a reduction of poverty from 652 million in 1981 to 135 million in 2004 
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 across the country. Meanwhile, China’s anti-poverty performance is still remarkable 
even with a new standard of ‘$1.25 a day’ at 2005 PPP. The numbers in poverty by 
this measure dropped from 848 million in 1981 to 351 million in 2004. This denotes 
that there were 517 ($ 1 standard) or 497 million ($ 1.25 standard) people who had 
escaped from absolute poverty during 1981-2004.  
 
Despite this unprecedented reduction in absolute poverty, ‘common prosperity’ - the 
other part of Deng Xiao-ping’s design - is proving to be more elusive. According to 
the World Bank (2009, p32-34), China is no longer a country of low inequality. The 
national Gini coefficient rose from 0.309 in 1981 to 0.453 in 2003. China’s 
performance in equality in 2003 was even worse than Thailand (2002), Vietnam 
(2002), Indonesia (2000) and India (2000).  
 
There are two important factors to account for the rising inequality. The first one is 
related to the maintenance of the urban-rural disparity from pre-reform China. This 
can be illustrated by the case of Guangdong Province, where the fieldwork of this 
study was conducted in its capital city, Guangzhou. The GDP of Guangdong in 2007 
was higher than that of Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore and even comparable to 
Austria, Sweden and Switzerland. However, by using a standard of ‘$2 a day’ for 
middle-income countries, 10.3% of Guangdong’s rural residents lived in income 
poverty and 18.6% in consumption poverty; while only 1% of its urban residents had 
income or consumption below the threshold (World Bank, 2011).  
 
Due to the restructuring of national enterprises, the newly-emerging problem of 
urban poverty is the other reason for increasing inequality. It is reported by the 
central government that during 1998-2003 there were 28.18 million laid-off workers 
(Information Office of the State Council, 2004). Moreover, it is discovered that being 
‘laid-off’ or ‘unemployment’ are two of the most important factors to explain or 
predict the poverty of urban residents (Li, 2006). Therefore, it is not surprising to 
find an increase in the population in poverty, which can be indicated by the number 
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 of beneficiaries of the Urban Minimum Living Standard Guarantee (UMLSG) across 
the country. The figure of 23.46 million UMLSG beneficiaries in 2009 was almost 
ten times as many as in 1999 when the UMLSG was formally institutionalised 
(Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2010a). 
    
Facing the critical problems of the urban-rural disparity and urban poverty, the Party 
significantly changed its approach towards development since the Sixteenth National 
Congress of the CPC in 2002. The dominant ideologies were refreshed to Three 
Represents, Scientific Outlook on Development and ‘harmonious socialist society’. 
As a result, more emphasis was placed on social development. For example, it was 
announced that a welfare system covering both urban and rural residents would be 
basically established by 2020 (The Sixteenth CPC Central Committee, 2006). 
Furthermore, the efforts spent on the improvement of the welfare system are being 
guaranteed by a more active role of the state than previously.  
 
It is against this pro-welfare background that the study was conducted. The central 
question of this study is: what is the nature of China’s welfare regime? The 
justification of employing the approach of welfare regime and designing specified 
research questions will be introduced in the next section.  
  
Research questions 
As acknowledged in the current literature, there exist general similarities between 
China’s welfare model and others in East Asia. The importance of the welfare models 
of East Asia in global comparative literature since the 1990s, according to White and 
Goodman (1998, p3), is because: ‘East Asia has the most dynamic economies in the 
world. They have managed to combine this dynamism with social cohesion, an 
apparent “health miracle” and very low crime rates, while keeping their welfare 
expenditures low.’ Similarly, Sharkh and Gough (2006, p47) classify China as well as 
Korea into a homogeneous group, which is characterised as: ‘relatively good welfare 
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 outcomes and social services outputs with remarkably low levels of state spending 
and low levels of external flows (aid and remittances)’. 
 
However, current literature also admits that there is a large variation within East Asia. 
The attempt of seeing the East Asian countries as a homogeneous group, such as 
Jones’ (1993) ‘Confucian welfare state’, has been seriously criticised (Walker and 
Wong, 2005a). Meanwhile, there are also efforts to try to divide sub-types in East 
Asia (e.g. Holiday, 2000). Therefore, before conducting any comparative study, it is 
necessary to first describe China’s welfare model.  
 
In order to accomplish this task, this study selects welfare regime as the theoretical 
approach. Welfare regime is a dominant approach in the global comparative literature. 
By applying this approach into China’s case, this study is able to be connected to the 
cutting-edge discussions about welfare regime theory and global welfare regimes.  
 
Other than the realistic consideration, welfare regime itself is a promising approach 
to accommodate both Eastern and Western welfare models. The traditional analysis 
of ‘the welfare state’ can be criticised as an ‘ethnocentric’ construction. The reason is 
because it deliberately neglects non-market or non-democratic societies, which 
however, share many characteristics with ‘the welfare state’ (Walker and Wong, 
2004). On the contrary, inspired by Titmuss’s (1974) classification, Esping-
Andersen’s (1990) theory of welfare state regimes no longer treats the state 
necessarily as the main provider. Instead, multi-domains in a welfare mix and multi-
functions of the state are acknowledged. This paradigm shift expands the narrow 
perspective of ‘the welfare state’ and enables the inclusion of non-Western societies 




 Other than welfare mix, welfare outcomes and path dependency are two more 
dimensions proposed to better understand a particular welfare regime. On the one 
hand, welfare outcomes entail three principles: de-commodification, de-
familialization and stratification. By testing the reliance on the market or family, the 
first two principles can be used to assess the actualisation of social rights; while the 
third one is to explore the relation between social citizenship and social class. On the 
other hand, path dependency refers to the historical development of political 
settlement in parliament. It can be used to account for the stabilisation of the welfare 
regime or the variation between regimes.             
 
The discussion of this study follows the three dimensions of Esping-Andersen’s 
theory, but it innovatively synthesises a feasible framework for China’s welfare 
regime based on two other streams of theories. After examining current research 
about the welfare models of East Asia, this study first points out that the reason why 
these models can derive a parallel category of ‘East Asian welfare regimes’ is 
because of their greater emphasis as productivism or developmentalism (Lee and Ku, 
2007; Holiday, 2000).  
 
Moreover, due to the emphasis of the market and family in the welfare mix, the 
effects of de-commodification and de-familialization are extremely low in East Asia. 
However, this does not suggest ‘social welfare is unAsian’ (Chau and Yu, 2005), 
because it is possible for their governments to introduce universal programs (e.g. 
housing, education or health service) as well as sponsor voluntary organisations for 
individual services (Wong, 2008; Aspalter, 2006). Therefore, the East Asian welfare 
regimes tend to display mixed effects of stratification in corporatism, estatism or 
residualism. Lastly, instead of political settlement in parliament, it is the intention of 
the authoritarian state that determines the overriding goal of economic development, 
implementation of some universal programs and variation between different regimes. 
Meanwhile, the imposition of political ideologies, such as Confucianism, is utilised 
to encourage people’s acceptance of the intentions of the state (Walker and Wong, 
2005a).  
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 In short, it is indicated by the East Asian welfare regimes that income maintenance as 
well as social programs should be considered as welfare outcomes; while historical 
development of authoritarianism including the mobilisation of political ideologies 
should substitute the focus of political settlement in parliament in Esping-Andersen’s 
original framework.   
 
The other stream of theory refers to informal security regimes contributed by Gough 
et al. (2004) and Wood and Gough (2006). Esping-Andersen’s one-dimension 
welfare mix is replaced by the institutional responsibility matrix which includes two 
levels: domestic and supra-national. Meanwhile, together with the state, the market 
and family, community is added into each level as the fourth domain for provision. 
In addition, the more unique contribution of this regime type lies in the new principle 
of ‘de-clientelization’ in welfare outcomes. ‘De-clientelization’ is derived from those 
social contexts of less developed countries where ‘markets are imperfect, 
communities clientelist, households patriarchal and states marketised, patrimonial 
and clientelist’ (Wood 2004, p58). Due to the lack of institutionalised protection, 
poor people have to be adversely patronised and incorporated in the informal 
relationship in exchange of temporary security, despite the price that they need to 
sacrifice their long-term liberation and capability.  
 
In short, it is significant for informal security regimes to expand welfare regime 
theory by considering community-based support, global forces and de-clientelization. 
Therefore, this study will also place community into welfare mix and de-
clientelization into welfare outcomes. However, due to the complexity of considering 
supra-national level in welfare mix, this study will only focus on domestic level.  
 
Based on the careful review to Esping-Andersen’s welfare state regimes, East Asian 
welfare regimes and informal security regimes, this study develops a holistic 
framework and specified research questions as follows: 
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 A. Welfare mix (domestic domains of the state, market, family and community) 
• What is the arrangement of the welfare mix in China?  
B. Welfare outcomes (de-commodification and social programs, de-familialization, 
de-clientelization, stratification) 
• In reference to the UMLSG beneficiaries in this study, how do their living 
standards deviate from the normal standards of ordinary residents? 
• How significant is the family unit in welfare support? 
• Could personal patronage be found in China’s welfare regime? 
• What is the effect of stratification produced by China’s welfare regime? 
C. Historical development (authoritarianism) 
• How have the intentions of the Party-State determined the development of 
China’s welfare system?   
• Especially, what political ideologies have been upheld during the 
development of China’s welfare system? 
 
Methodology 
This study adopts critical theory as the perspective and anti-oppressive research as 
the guidance for methodology. The strength of both critical theory and anti-
oppressive research is to deconstruct the complex mechanism imposed on the 
marginal group, which produces unequal relations of power in terms of substance 
and ideology. Particularly, anti-oppressive research values the voices of the 
marginalised group and embraces their strength for change. These advantages 
coincide with the aim of this study, which is to expose the operation of 
authoritarianism in China’s welfare regime.  
 
There are three methods employed in this study: case study, document analysis and 
interview. Regarding the method of case study, the macro unit of analysis rests on the 
welfare regime of China, while the meso and the micro levels of case study refer to 
the UMLSG scheme and its beneficiaries in Guangzhou City. Furthermore, five 
major groups of archives related to the most important documents of the Party and 
the state are systematically studied. These include Selected Collections of the 
 7
 Important Documents (from 1949 to present); Document Collections of the Work of 
Civil Affairs of the P.R.C.  (during 1949-1999); individual collections of Mao Ze-dong, 
Deng Xiao-ping and former Minister of Civil Affairs Duoji Cairang; statistical 
yearbooks of various years; and other specific regulations, documents, academic 
reports and speeches of other leaders. The third method of interviews is used to 
present the views of local bureaucrats and the bottom-up voices of poor people in 
relation to the UMLSG scheme. ‘Local bureaucrats’ refer to both the staff members 
in Residents’ Committees and the offices in Street Offices; while ‘poor people’ refer 
to the interviewees from the UMLSG families, the Low-Income families and 
potential users in the fieldwork.  
 
The fieldwork was conducted in Guangzhou from June to September in 2010. There 
had been a total of twenty-five interviewees in this study: eleven UMLSG cases, two 
Low-Income cases, two former UMLSG cases, two cases who failed the application, 
three officers in Street Offices and five staff in Residents’ Committees. All of these 
interviewees were identified by personal connections according to the strategies of 
‘snowball sampling’ and ‘purposive sampling’. Semi-structured interviews were 
applied in the fieldwork. The questions for local bureaucrats were mainly related to 
the usual practices to handle the application and regular administration of the 
UMLSG. By contrast, poor people were asked about their experiences in a time series: 
before applying to the UMLSG, when applying to the UMLSG and living on the 
UMLSG.  
 
There are five major limitations in the research process. The case study of the 
UMLSG will have to exclude danwei from the discussion of the welfare mix in 
relation to poor people, because this traditional source of welfare is only applicable 
to the public sector workers. Then, the strategies of ‘snowball sampling’ and 
‘purposive sampling’ may ignore the slight variations in different streets, such as 
demographics, culture or leadership. These factors might affect the experiences of 
poor people as well as the attitudes of local bureaucrats to some extent. Similarly, the 
sex of poor people was not specified during the process of identifying interviewees. 
Moreover, because of the absence of follow-up actions, the practices of anti-
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 oppressive research were not completely implemented in this study. Lastly, due to 
massive quotes from document analysis and interviews, there is a possible risk that 
some specific translations fall below the standard of native English. 
 
Significance of the thesis 
This study is significant in respect to theory, methodology and policy. Firstly, with a 
holistic framework, this study is innovative in describing China’s welfare regime 
during the period of 1949-2011. Especially, it will fill the gap in the current literature 
about recent regime-break of China’s welfare regime, so called ‘social China’ (2002-
2011) in this study.  
 
Secondly, this study emphasizes the feature of power inequality in China’s welfare 
regime. This will contain the discussions about the authoritarian role of the state, 
ideological hegemony and street-level bureaucracy. The findings of these discussions 
can also provide reference to other East Asian welfare regimes or informal insecurity 
regimes.  
 
Thirdly, this study is one of few that conducts ideological analysis in relation to 
China’s welfare system. Moreover, it will be the first domestic study to 
systematically review the archives of Selected Collections of the Important 
Documents (from 1949 to present) published by the CPC.  
 
Fourthly, due to the lack of statistics in China, this study is an important attempt to 
study the welfare regime of a particular country by qualitative methods. Moreover, 
the elements of anti-oppressive research substantially increase the credibility and 
readability of this study. For example, as one of the strategies, the method of finding 
interviewees outside of official channels guaranteed their willingness to express their 
views openly. As a result, the bottom-up approach of this study can generate under-
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 reported findings about the UMLSG policies.  
 
 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis consists of ten chapters. By examining three streams of theories about 
welfare regime, Chapter Two is aimed to develop a theoretical framework for 
studying the nature of China’s welfare regime. Based on this holistic framework, 
Chapter Two also develops specified research questions.  
 
The task of Chapter Three is to justify the methodology employed in this study, 
which includes philosophical foundation, methods, strategies, ethics, quality of study 
and limitations.  
 
In order to explore the continuities and the discontinuities of China’s current welfare 
regime, Chapter Four, Chapter Five and Chapter Six respectively review the welfare 
systems from 1949 to 2011. Chapter Four will demonstrate the development strategy 
and the welfare mix in the phase of ‘communist China’ (1949-1979). Furthermore, it 
will contrast the functions of welfare provision by danwei welfare and rural 
collectives. Lastly, the political ideologies that were mobilised to justify the welfare 
system will be discussed.  
 
Chapter Five introduces the transition of political economy and the corresponding 
changes of the welfare system in a chronicle order during 1978-2002. Then, it will 
characterise the welfare mix and stratification in this phase of ‘economic China’. 
Similarly, the last analytical task will refer to ideological analysis. 
 
Chapter Six relates the negative outcomes of the economic reform in the last three 
decades to the re-adjusted strategy of development in the Sixteenth and the 
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 Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC. The break-through in the welfare mix 
and stratification will be elaborated by the renewed ideologies of ‘social China’.  
 
After depicting the historical development of the welfare system and the political 
ideologies of the CPC, Chapter Seven, Chapter Eight and Chapter Nine are designed 
to test the welfare outcomes generated by China’s welfare regime. This task will be 
completed by the case study of the UMLSG. In order to assess the principles of de-
commodification and social programs, Chapter Seven investigates the standard of the 
UMLSG and the effects of the comprehensive assistance system in Guangzhou.  
 
Relying on the interviews with poor people and local bureaucrats in Guangzhou, 
Chapter Eight looks into the eligibility of the UMLSG in reality. The findings can be 
used to further assess the principles of de-commodification, de-familialization and 
de-clientelization.  
 
Also drawing the data from the fieldwork, Chapter Nine depicts the life of 
beneficiaries on the UMLSG and focuses on the stigmatisation effects caused by the 
daily practice. The daily practice includes public review, welfare support, voluntary 
labour, re-employment and solutions of leaving the UMLSG.  
 
Finally, Chapter Ten concludes the findings throughout the thesis. On the one hand, 
based on the findings in from Chapter Four to Chapter Six, it divides China’s welfare 
regime into three phases: ‘communist China (1949-1978)’, ‘economic China (1978-
2002)’ and ‘social China (2002-2011)’. On the other hand, it connects the findings 
from Chapter Seven to Chapter Nine to the discussion of the welfare outcomes in 
current welfare regime.  
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 Chapter Two 
The Welfare Regime: A Theoretical Approach for 
Understanding China’s Welfare System 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to find out a suitable theoretical framework for describing 
China’s welfare model. After a restatement of why the welfare models of East Asia 
are significant in the global comparative literature, it will examine Esping-
Andersen’s welfare state regimes and then supplement his framework by two other 
theories: East Asian welfare regimes and informal security regimes. Lastly, based on 
this theoretical framework, specified research questions will be developed  
 
Why are the welfare models of East Asia important? 
There has been increasing attention to the welfare models of East Asia, especially 
those of Japan, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan since the 1990s. One of 
the main reasons for highlighting ‘welfare orientalism’ in global comparative 
literature, as White and Goodman (1998, p3) point out, rests on the distinctive 
feature of the welfare models of East Asian: ‘East Asia has the most dynamic 
economies in the world. They have managed to combine this dynamism with social 
cohesion, an apparent “health miracle” and very low crime rates, while keeping their 
welfare expenditures low.’ 
 
In addition, these special cases can be used to contrast the dominant theories about 
the origins of the welfare state. For example, in response to the social problems 
caused by industrial development, the approach of industrialisation attempts to 
establish a convergence of the states in all industrial societies to spontaneously 
increase their public expenditures (Rimlinger, 1993; Wilensky, 1975; Wilensky and 
Lebeaux, 1965).  However, the public expenditures of the Asian ‘four little tigers’ 
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 have not been significantly increased since they became newly industrialised 
societies (Chow, 2003; Midgely, 1988). Similarly, the Neo-Marxists believe that the 
welfare state is the necessary product for reconciling the inherent contradictions of 
capitalism between accumulation and legitimacy; while the intervention of the 
welfare state in terms of rising public spending will ultimately paralyse the capitalist 
system (Offe, 1984; Gough, 1979; O’Connor, 1973). Again, without high state 
budgets, the Asian ‘four little tigers’ demonstrate dynamic economies as well as 
satisfactory human development and social cohesion (Tang, 2000).  
 
A question arises from the challenge of the welfare models of East Asia: Could it be 
concluded that, based on the level of public expenditures (Therborn, 1983), ‘the 
welfare state’ fails to appear in East Asia? Or could it be possible that ‘the welfare 
state’ itself is no more than a problematic definition, which excludes non-Western 
welfare models from analysis without any convincing reason? Walker and Wong 
(2004) criticise the equation of ‘the welfare states’ with the OECD (Organisation of 
Economic Cooperation and Development) countries, even though their performance 
actually varies widely according to the definitions of ‘the welfare state’. Therefore, 
the eligibility of the OECD countries for the club of ‘the welfare states’ is simply 
because of their shared institutions: capitalist market and parliamentary democracy. 
However, the exclusion of non-market or non-democratic societies in welfare 
analysis could be an ethnocentric construction, because these welfare systems 
actually share many characteristics with ‘the welfare states’. 
 
For instance, public expenditures may not be the single indicator for evaluating 
welfare outcomes. This indicator narrowly conceives the state functions in financing 
and provision and ignores other possible welfare players in practice (Kwon, 1998). It 
can be illustrated that the experiences of East Asia are characteristic by the state 
regulation instead of provision (Kwon, 1997). Likewise, the marginal and the 
subsidiary roles of the state can also be found in different constructs of welfare 
capitalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Moreover, the sources of the market, family 
and community can be as important as the state in welfare delivery in both Eastern 
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 and Western Contexts (Gough, 2001). Therefore, the concept of ‘the welfare state’ is 
severely flawed in global comparison and, Walker and Wong (2004, p127) suggest ‘a 
global perspective, to ensure that non-Western-style democracies and non-capitalist 
societies are included’. 
 
In summary, the discovery of the welfare models in East Asia challenges the 
conventional concept of ‘the welfare state’, especially in terms of understanding the 
state functions and the players in welfare delivery. Thus, it is necessary to identify a 
theoretical approach with better definitions and categorisation to accommodate both 
Eastern and Western welfare models.  
 
Esping-Andersen’s welfare state regimes 
Since its appearance, Esping-Andersen’s welfare state regimes have triggered great 
interest about the typologies of welfare models. However, it cannot be ignored that 
his work builds on the work of some other distinguished scholars. Esping-Andersen 
(1990, p20) admits that his approach to welfare state regimes is mostly inspired by 
Titmuss’s (1974) classification of the Residual Model, the Industrial Achievement-
Performance Model and the Institutional Redistributive Model. The reason is because 
Titmuss’s classifications enables the ‘move from the black box of expenditures to the 
content of welfare states’ and ‘perhaps most importantly, the extent to which 
employment and working life are encompassing in the state’s extension of citizen 
rights’. The first step for Esping-Andersen (1990, p2) to move away from ‘the 
welfare state’ is to adopt the term ‘regime’: ‘a regime is to denote the fact that in the 
relation between state and economy a complex of legal and organizational features 
are systematically interwoven’.  
 
Furthermore, he uses three dimensions to analyse the welfare state regimes. The first 
dimension is related to welfare mix: the inter-locking of the state, market and family 
in welfare provisions. Esping-Andersen (1999, p73) associates the arrangements 
between these players to the foundation of ‘regime’: ‘Regimes refers to the way in 
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 which welfare production is allocated between state, market and household’.  
 
Within a trinity of the welfare mix, Esping-Andersen (1990, p22-23) further assesses 
the second dimension of welfare outcomes by developing two principles. The first 
one is to assess social rights by de-commodification, which represents an extent 
‘when a person can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market’; the other 
is to explore stratification - the relation between citizenship and social class - and see 
‘what kind of stratification system is promoted by social policy’.  
 
In his later work, Esping-Andersen needed to modify this dimension because of the 
huge criticisms concerning the insufficient emphasis on family and gender issues. 
Although Esping-Andersen always acknowledges family as an indispensable 
component in a welfare mix, he equated the nexus of state and market with the whole 
welfare mix in his classic book. For example, when Esping-Andersen (1990, p81-82) 
discussed ‘the public-private mix of social provision in advanced capitalist 
democracies’, he identified it with ‘state and market provision of pensions’ on the 
next page.  
 
However, the absence of family in Esping-Andersen’s quantitative analysis leads to 
the fallacy that those welfare state regimes with high de-commodification effects do 
not necessarily indicate a greater extent of state provision. Rather, the de-
commodification effect may be absorbed by the family unit and ultimately by the un-
paid work of women (O’Connor, 1996; 1993; Lewis, 1992). Accordingly, Esping-
Andersen (1999, p45) re-examined the outcomes of social rights by adding a new 
principle of de-familialization: ‘policies that lessen individuals’ reliance on family; 
that maximize individuals’ command of economic resources independently of 
familial or conjugal reciprocities’.  
 
The third dimension concerns the cause for the variations within the welfare state 
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 regimes. Esping-Andersen (1990, p29) attributes the reason to the structure of 
political power: ‘the nature of class mobilisation (especially of the working class), 
class-political coalition and historical legacy of regime institutionalisation’. In brief, 
regime variations are not dependent on single working-class mobilisation; rather, 
they are determined by different cases of political settlement between the working 
class and other classes in parliament during a historical process. Moreover, welfare 
outcomes in terms of de-commodification and stratification tend to strengthen class 
formation and coalition, while the political settlement in return reinforces the original 
welfare state regimes. Consequently, the welfare state regimes are kept reproducing 
and sustained as relatively stable in a path-dependence way. 
 
Based on the three dimensions of welfare mix, welfare outcomes (de-
commodification, stratification and de-familialization) and path dependency, Figure 
2.1 shows the contents of three welfare state regimes. The liberal regime minimises 
the de-commodification effect and it mainly relies on the market for protection. 
Therefore, social dualism is created between the people covered by residual public 
welfare and private insurances. In contrast, the social democratic regime marginalises 
private provision and emphasizes universalistic benefits and services to guarantee a 
high standard of (gender) equality. The main framework of protection in the 
conservative regime is based on occupational social insurance funds. These funds are 
fragmented and collectively-run by independent bodies constituted by representatives 
of the employers and employees. Also, this regime rests on the family structure, 
namely a male bread-winner model. This is because women are usually encouraged 
to undertake family care responsibility as full-time housewives. Last but not least, 
voluntary organisations or church establish a corporatist relation with the state under 
the principle of subsidiarity (Palier, 2010; Palier, 2007; Daly, 2001). In sum, the 
liberal regime prioritises the individual purchase of welfare in the market, while the 
social democratic regime relies on state provision based on universalism. Instead of 
emphasizing redistribution, the conservative regime tends to preserve the 
segmentation of status in terms of work and gender.  
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 Esping-Andersen’s notion of welfare state regimes is significant for the following 
reasons. Firstly, Esping-Andersen places the welfare state regimes into a specific 
historical and social context for assessment. Class struggle in parliamentary 
democracy is re-conceptualised as a more complicated process of inter-class political 
settlement and it will be reproduced by welfare outcomes throughout a historical 
course. Secondly, although one may argue that Esping-Andersen over-emphasizes the 
stability of the welfare state regimes (Kay, 2005), his framework acknowledges the 
significance of collective force to policy-making, such as the working class 
mobilisation or class coalition. Thirdly, instead of the traditional state-centred focus, 
Esping-Andersen innovatively proposes a welfare mix which includes two more 
components of the market and family. This means that the significance of non-state 
provision in welfare can be acknowledged in regime analysis. Fourthly, the 
misperception of ‘provision’ and ‘financing’ as the major roles of the state is finally 
dismissed. This is because, for example, a subsidiary role of the state can also be 
found in the conservative regime.  
 
Figure 2.1: Three Welfare State Regimes  
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Source: Esping-Andersen (1999, p85) 
 
However, there are still controversies about the typologies of the welfare state 
regimes. It appears for some cases that their regime-types can depart from Esping-
Andersen’s category, such as Mediterranean (Leibried, 1993), Antipodean (Castles, 
1996) or East Asian countries (Jones, 1993). Regarding these challenges, Esping-
Andersen (1999, p 60-67) defends his typologies by revisiting the welfare state 
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 regimes with the principle of de-familialization. He confirms that the familialistic 
element of the Mediterranean countries and Japan is not significantly different from 
other Continental regimes. Moreover, Esping-Andersen (1997) believes that it is only 
a matter of time for the immature welfare system of Japan - a ‘hybrid’ mixture of 
liberal residualism and conservative familialism and corporatism - to evolve into the 
one closer to the Western welfare state regimes. Therefore, it can be inferred that the 
fundamental problem of applying the approach of the welfare state regimes to the 
welfare models of East Asia lies in whether these non-Western countries could earn a 
category independent of the original three that Esping-Andersen described.   
 
In summary, welfare state regimes are related to the welfare mix of the state, the 
market and family in welfare provisions as well as the welfare outcomes within a 
particular welfare mix: de-commodification, de-familialization and stratification. 
According to this framework, it is epoch-making for Esping-Andersen to divide three 
welfare state regimes in advanced capitalism: liberal, conservative and social 
democratic. Moreover, these three worlds tend to maintain their unique 
characteristics because the inter-class political settlement has been reproduced by 
welfare outcomes over time. Meanwhile, by acknowledging the joint efforts of a 
welfare mix and the multi-functions of the state, Esping-Andersen’s theory directs a 
prospective way for studying the East Asian welfare systems. However, the 
compatibility between the welfare regime analysis and the welfare models of East 
Asia needs to be settled first.  
 
East Asian welfare regimes 
In terms of multi-providers in welfare delivery and multi-roles of the state, the 
approach of welfare state regimes is very promising for exploring the nature of the 
welfare systems in East Asia. Nevertheless, this approach needs more thorough 




The starting point is to discuss if the welfare systems of East Asia qualify as an 
independent regime-type of the welfare state regimes. When considering the essence 
of the welfare state regimes, both the Neo-Marxists and Esping-Andersen absorb the 
strength from Polanyi’s (2001) idea about the obstruction of commodifying labour in 
the capitalist relation of production. Offe (1984, p48-51) defines this problem as 
‘negative subordination’, which refers to the independence or insubordination of the 
political and the normative systems to the economic one; while Esping-Andersen 
(1990, p22) adopts ‘de-commodification’ to indicate the extent of this process. 
However, Holiday (2000) proposes a productivist world for East Asia because he 
believes that social policy there is strictly subordinated to the overriding objective of 
economic growth. As a result of this distinction, the identity of ‘the East Asian 
welfare regimes’ can be legitimate and parallel to the welfare state regimes, rather 
than being incorporated into any of the three worlds.  
 
Although the names of ‘productivist welfare regimes’ (Gough, 2004a) or 
‘developmental welfare state’ (Kwon, 2005) have been attached to East Asia after 
Holiday’s proposal, these definitions may be misleading. This is because on the one 
hand, the independence of social policy from economic policy is not as strong in the 
welfare state regimes as it is supposed to be. Due to the institutional requirement to 
extract social resources from economy, even the social democratic welfare regimes 
exhibit the conception of social policy as a public burden on economy. This means 
that, for example, a high level of de-commodification requires a corresponding high 
level of re-commodfication (Walker and Wong, 2009).  
 
On the other hand, the productive elements in welfare regimes are not unique to 
those of East Asia. The Neo-Maxisits have identified the positive influences of the 
welfare state regimes on the economy: social capital including social investment and 
consumption is beneficial for infrastructure and human capital (Gough, 2000; Miller, 
1986; O’Connor, 1973). Furthermore, there has been increasing awareness of 
transforming ‘the welfare state’ to ‘the enabling state’ (Gilbert, 2004) or ‘social 
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 investment state’ (Giddens, 1998), which underpins public support for private 
responsibilities. As Giddens (1998, p117) summarises, ‘The guideline is investment 
in human capital wherever possible, rather than the direct provision of economic 
maintenance.’ 
 
Therefore, it is better to place the Western and the Eastern welfare models in a 
spectrum of ‘developmentalism’ instead of embracing the dichotomy. This can be 
demonstrated by Lee and Ku’s (2007)’s cluster analysis, the rational of which 
believes that nineteen OECD countries (including Japan and Korea) plus Taiwan 
should all be assessed by using the indicators of developmentalism. It is discovered 
that Korea and Taiwan constitute a group of developmentalism separated from the 
conventional three worlds, while Japan sits between developmentalism and 
corporatism. Therefore, this study prefers the title of ‘East Asian welfare regimes’ to 
indicate the welfare systems in East Asia, which shows their more significant - but 
not unique - extents of productivism or developmentalism.  
 
Welfare mix 
After demonstrating the possibility of the East Asian welfare regimes, the next step is 
to rethink the principles of welfare mix, welfare outcomes and path dependency in 
Esping-Andersen’s framework. Firstly, the ideal responsibility of providing welfare 
in East Asia lies in both the market and the family. For instance, the anti-welfare 
attitude in Hong Kong is originated from the presumption of maintaining economic 
competitiveness with low taxation as well as welfare support from the non-state 
sectors. The institutional social assistance is seen as a last resort for people, assuming 
that they can benefit from economic growth through employment and turn to their 
families or other informal support in the community for help (Chow, 2003).  
 
Moreover, private channels are usually mandated to achieve the commitment of the 
East Asian states to protect some risks from the people (Jacobs, 2000). As started in 
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 2000, the Mandatory Provident Fund in Hong Kong is such an example. It is a 
market-oriented pension scheme based on the principles of employment status, 
private management and defined contribution from employers and employees. 
Although it covers a limited number of employees, this scheme is quite beneficial for 
financial services because its assets can flow into the local economy and generate a 
large amount of employment (Chan, 2003). Therefore, unlike the market or the 
family as the dominant locus of solidarity in the liberal and the conservative regimes, 
the East Asian welfare regimes rely on the market and family at the same time, either 
assuming the private sphere as the primary source of welfare or regulating them to 
finance welfare.    
 
Welfare outcomes 
As a result of the emphasis of the market and family in the welfare mix, the effects of 
de-commodification and de-familialization are extremely low in East Asia. This can 
be illustrated by the prevalence of the underdevelopment of social assistance in Hong 
Kong. It is clearly stated in the 1977 Green Paper on social security that this system 
is designed to help those least able to help themselves (Hong Kong Government, 
1977). In other words, the expected beneficiaries are only those vulnerable groups of 
the elderly, the disabled and the extremely poor without family support. Moreover, 
even those eligible for the strict criteria still have to endure stigmatising procedures 
of application, hostile attitudes of staff and inadequate guaranteed standards (Chan, 
1998).  
 
However, it would be misleading to draw a conclusion that ‘social welfare is 
unAsian’ (Chau and Yu, 2005) simply because of the underdeveloped programs of 
social security. On the contrary, it is important to note governmental efforts to 
introduce universal programs (e.g. housing, education or health service) as well as 
sponsor voluntary organisations for individual services (Wong, 2008; Aspalter, 2006). 
For example, Hong Kong provides free and universal primary education to all 
citizens; college students can receive substantial subsidies and loans from the 
government. Meanwhile, 92% of the hospitalization was provided by the public 
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 health system and over 90% of the cost was paid by the government in the 1990s. 
Moreover, more than half of the residents are either renting public flats or purchasing 
private ownership with subsidy from the government (Chau and Yu, 2005; 2003). 
Thus, de-commodification in terms of income maintenance should not be the only 
principle to indicate the welfare outcomes of the East Asian welfare regimes. Instead, 
social programs in relation to human development should also be taken into account.   
 
In regard to the other principle for assessing welfare outcomes, the East Asian 
welfare regimes tend to display mixed effects of stratification in corporatism, 
estatism or residualism. According to Tang’s (2000, p64-112) case studies of Korea 
and Taiwan, employment-based social insurance is imperative for both of these 
welfare regimes. Meanwhile, the budget of the central government of Taiwan was 
mostly spent on a very small population who were military servicemen and public 
servants; while in Korea the programs of social insurance were first introduced to 
public-sector workers. However, it should be noted that the effects of stratification 
may vary among different regimes. For example, due to the very limited function in 
redistribution, the welfare system of Hong Kong produce a very high level of 
inequality. The figure of Gini coefficient increased from 0.476 in 1991 to 0.518 in 
1996 and even reached 0.525 in 2001 (Census and Statistics Department, 2002). 
Moreover, there is not a similar system of social insurance in Hong Kong as in 
Taiwan and Korea. As suggested by the following section, the understanding of the 
diverse stratification caused by the East Asian welfare regimes should be closely 
related to the intentions of the authoritarian states. 
 
Historical development of authoritarianism  
In Esping-Andersen’s original analysis, the variations of welfare state regimes are 
explained by the political settlement in parliament and its reproduction during the 
historical process. However, this account is mostly deficient in the case of the East 
Asian welfare regimes, where the influences from labour unions and social 
democratic parties have been absent in the making of social policy (Kwon, 1998). 
Therefore, rather than emphasize the political process within parliament as the 
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 Western literature does, it would be much more useful to focus on the authoritarian 
role of the state and see how it always determines the development of the welfare 
system, especially with the concerns of economic growth and political legitimacy 
(Walker and Wong, 2005b; Kwon, 1999; Goodman and Peng, 1996).  
 
This can be illustrated by the development of Hong Kong’s welfare regime. Due to 
the deterioration of family and community, massive social riots broke out in 1966 
and 1967. In order to weaken the influences of communists and re-establish the 
legitimacy, the colonial government changed its welfare ideology from laissez-fair to 
positive non-intervention. A public assistance system was introduced in 1971; 
housing, education, health services and social welfare were declared as ‘four pillars’ 
in society (Chan, 2011). In the next decades, however, more progressive proposals 
about social security had always been rejected because of the worries about the 
public burden on the government (Chow, 1998).  
 
If welfare development in the East Asian welfare regimes can be described as the 
selective use of welfare programs by the authoritarian states, a further question arises:  
why are the people in East Asia less willing to fight for their social rights? Or why do 
they seem to accept the intentions and the plans of the authoritarian states without 
serious rebellions? There are two different accounts to answer this question, though 
they are both related to a key term: Confucianism. The first one ascribes to the shared 
cultural traits influenced by Confucianism. Jones (1993) claims that Confucian ideas 
deeply affect East Asia, such as compliance to hierarchal order, commitment to 
informal obligations and consensus to the top-down state. In her opinion, this means 
that people there will value family, corporations and entire society more highly than 
individuals. Also, they will know exactly their roles in human relations and they are 
ready to fulfil their duties and responsibilities to others at any time. More importantly, 
individuals seldom have any expectation of what their governments should or should 
not do. Thus, these countries or districts entitle few individual rights to their citizens 
and they seldom use social welfare with an aim of achieving social equality. As a 
result, Jones maintains that the East Asian states should be classified into a 
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 homogeneous group of the ‘Confucian welfare state’. 
 
However, this cultural explanation has received a lot of criticisms. The first problem 
is related to ‘false consciousness’ that people there may have an unclear 
understanding about the imported ideas. This can be illustrated by a survey about the 
notion of democracy in which the citizens of China express a high demand for 
democracy and yet perceive a great supply of democracy in life as well. The 
identified reason lies in the differences of the respondents’ interpretations. By 
studying their subjective explanations about democracy, it is found that 42% have no 
idea about what democracy means. If this major response is excluded, the rest of the 
respondents actually support the procedural conception of liberal democracy (24.6%) 
instead of the paternalist idea of Confucianism (14.1%) which embraces authoritarian 
power by promoting welfare (Shi and Lu, 2010).   
 
Secondly, this essentialist view tends to be static and denies any possibility of change. 
In fact, the influences of Confucianism on the public do not always dominate in 
Chinese communities. Dating back to the early 1990s, Tam and Yeung (1994) 
surveyed the opinions of community residents in Hong Kong and reported that the 
community still retained some degree of traditional familism. Nevertheless, they 
were more appreciative of individual rights and more receptive to collectivist welfare. 
Likewise, Wong et al. (2009) conducted an attitude survey about social rights and 
responsibility in Hong Kong and Taiwan in the 2000s. Although the people in both of 
the Chinese societies similarly expected more self-responsibility regarding the issues 
of family care, they did think that the social rights entitled to them in practice were 
far less than their ideal expectation.  
 
Thirdly, the dichotomy between the East and the West can be exaggerated. For 
example, Chow (1987) contends that originating from religion and charity, social 
welfare in the West has been institutionalised as social rights; while traditional 
Chinese welfare provision mainly relies on the network of family and formal 
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 assistance is only perceived as benevolence and goodness. As a result of these 
variations in cultures, he claims that there is a strong ground for the Eastern and the 
Western welfare arrangements to be different from each other in form and in spirit. 
Actually, it can be argued that this dichotomisation may be just a biased 
understanding. Chau and Yu (2005, p31-32) point out that ‘Confucian’s 
Commonwealth has similar elements to the Western welfare value system, such as 
altruism and social integration’ and ‘Confucianism is a universal ideology without an 
Asian boundary’.  Similarly, Walker and Wong (2005b) support this idea: 
Indeed, Western value sets such as Victorian values, American values such as 
the Protestant work ethic and even the ‘Third Way’ of the British New 
Labour Party also share similar moral tones…In other words, Confucianism 
is not unique, in a comparative sense (p9). 
 
Last but not least, the ambiguous cultural factor neglects the indigenous welfare 
systems existing in East Asia, even though they are all influenced by Confucianism 
to some extent. For instance, Holiday (2000) categorises three sub-types for the East 
Asian welfare regimes: ‘facilitative’ for Hong Kong; ‘developmental-universalist’ for 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan; and ‘developmental-particularist’ for Singapore. 
Therefore, it will be of value to explore similarities as well as variations in the 
welfare systems of East Asian.  
 
Based on the above attacks to the essentialist view of culture, the other account 
prefers to explain people’s acceptance to current welfare regimes and the 
authoritarian states as ideological domination. Lukes (2005) argues that it is 
inadequate to identify power only within observable conflicts or only by exhibited 
grievances. Instead, the core question is: ‘Is it not the supreme and most insidious 
exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by 
shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept 
their role in the existing order of things (Lukes 2005, p28)?’ Therefore, the function 
of political ideologies is of great importance and it should be analysed from a 
historical perspective: as historical legacies or cultural camouflages, what political 
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 ideologies have been rhetorically used by the authoritarian state to justify the welfare 
system or respond to national and international changes and risks (Walker and Wong, 
2005c)? 
 
For instance, it is widely recognised that some Confucian ideas have been selected 
and upheld as rhetoric in East Asian Welfare Regime. In terms of family-centredness 
and mutual support, the primary objective of social welfare in colonial Hong Kong 
had not experienced major amendments since the first social welfare White Paper in 
1965. Moreover, after the hand-over in 1997, the first Chief Executive Tung Chee-
hwa clearly pointed out that traditional Chinese values, such as filial piety, obedience, 
discipline and responsibilities, should be upheld and emulated.  
I believe that we all desire a society of greater harmony, in which 
everybody respects and treats others well. We should carry forward our 
traditional virtues, such as filial piety, humanity, importance attached to 
education, and diligence. We favor consultation, not confrontation. We 
seek protection of the rights of the individual, yet we should also fulfill 
our social responsibilities and obligations (Tung, 1999; Cited by Chiu 
and Wong 2005, p85). 
    
In summary, based on the priority they assign to economic policy over social policy, 
the welfare systems of East Asia can occupy a parallel classification to the welfare 
state regimes. The category of the East Asian welfare regimes depends on both the 
market and the family in the welfare mix. Moreover, the original assessment of 
welfare outcomes by de-commodification should be extended to a broader scope of 
welfare such as education, housing and health service. Meanwhile, the other welfare 
outcome in terms of stratification may vary between one another in the East Asian 
welfare regimes. The variances of welfare outcomes show the vital role of the 
authoritarian states in shaping their national regime-types, no matter for the 
economic or the political considerations. Finally, political ideologies consistently 
upheld by the authoritarian states, such as the selective Confucian ideas, shape 
people’s acceptance of the welfare regimes.  
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 Informal security regimes 
The discussion in the last section seems to be very close to a promising theoretical 
framework for the East Asian welfare regimes. Nevertheless, this theoretical 
framework cannot be finalised until considering the insights of informal security 
regimes (Wood and Gough, 2006; Gough et al., 2004). First of all, an institutional 
responsibility matrix is proposed and it contains community as a fourth domain in the 
welfare mix. The notion of community here ranges from informal groups to non-
governmental organisations. Moreover, as shown by Figure 2.2, each of the four 
domains in the institutional responsibility matrix can be represented by the players at 
both domestic and supra-national levels. In other words, the impacts of the global 
actors should not be overlooked in the state, the market, community and household.  
Figure 2.2: The Institutional Responsibility Matrix  
 Domestic Supra-national 
State Domestic governance International organisations, national donors
Market Domestic markets Global markets 
Community Civil society, NGOs International NGOs 
Household Households International household strategies 
Source: Gough (2004b, p30) 
 
Based on the institutional responsibility matrix and social programs in terms of 
education, health and poverty reduction, Gough (2004b, p36-45) re-maps the world 
into three kinds of welfare regimes: the OECD welfare state regimes, informal 
security regimes and insecurity regimes. Furthermore, it was found in a primary test 
to the countries outside the OECD region that much of East Asia (probably including 
China) fell in the category of ‘more effective informal security regimes’. This finding 
was reinforced by a subsequent cluster analysis with a larger sample of 65 non-
OECD countries (Sharkh and Gough, 2006). The low levels of resources from the 
public and the international sectors imply that the category of informal security 
regimes heavily rely on family or community for welfare support. Accordingly, the 
reliance on the informal support seems to generate relatively satisfying welfare 
outcomes in statistics (Gough 2004b, p43).  
 
However, the unique contribution of informal security regimes lies in the scrutiny 
and criticism about the unequal power structure embedded in informal relations. A 
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 situation of ‘negative permeability’ is very likely to dominate the institutional 
responsibility matrix in less developed countries. The rules and the moralities of each 
of the four domains in the institutional responsibility matrix tend to interpenetrate. 
Much worse, they are displayed on the opposite side of principles: ‘of privilege; of 
natural superiority of rights and entitlements; and of selfishness; of private short-term 
gain; of fission; and of social closure’ (Wood and Gough 2006, p1702). These 
opposite sides of principles can be shown in detail by Figure 2.3. In short, the 
institutional responsibility matrix in less developed countries can be summarised as: 
‘markets are imperfect, communities clientelist, households patriarchal and states 
marketised, patrimonial and clientelist’ (Wood 2004, p58). 
Figure 2.3: Features of ‘Negative Permeability’ 
Domain Characteristics 
State Intervening in the economy without a formal-legal way; 
personalised power via patronage  
Market rent-seeking; restrictive practices via monopolies and oligopolies; 
false accounting, tax avoidance; the subordination of price 
mechanisms to non-transparent contractor asymmetries in resource 
allocation 
Community problematic social capital involving gendered patron-client relations
Household less as an altruistic unit and more as a site of patriarchy especially in 
gender 
Source: Wood (2000, p4) 
 
The phenomenon of ‘negative permeability’ in the institutional responsibility matrix 
leads to the serious problems of clientelism as well as adverse corporation. Poor 
people living in this context have to be patronised and adversely incorporated in the 
informal relationship in exchange of temporary security, despite the price that they 
need to sacrifice their long-term liberation and capability. This can be illustrated by 
the examples such as beggars asking police for protection, peasants paying brokers 
for urban employment, migrant workers bribing post office for successfully sending 
remittance, rural households relying on lineages or even warlords, poor people 
borrowing money from informal moneylenders or bonding to influential families by 
marriage (Wood 2003, p464-468). Thus, Wood and Gough (2006, p1708) advocate 
‘de-clientelization’ as an alternative principle of de-commodification. This principle 
is particularly needed in the regime analysis of less-developed countries to show ‘the 
process of de-linking client dependents from their personalized, arbitrary and 
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 discretionary entrapment to persons with intimate power over them’. As Wood (2000, 
p2) proposes, ‘The formal IRS [Institutional Responsibility Matrix] (the 
decontextualised, narrow version) is characterised as well-functioning in terms of 
rights, citizenship and accountability.’ 
 
To sum up, informal security regimes can be defined as: 
An informal security regimes reflects a set of conditions where people 
rely heavily upon community and family relationships to meet their 
security needs, to greatly varying degrees. These relationships are 
usually hierarchical and asymmetrical. This results in problematic 
inclusion or adverse incorporation, whereby poorer people trade some 
short-term security in return for longer-term vulnerability and 
dependence. The underlying patron-client relations are then reinforced 
and can prove extremely resistant to civil society pressures and measures 
to reform them along welfare state lines. Nevertheless, these relations do 
comprise a series of informal rights and afford some measure of 
informal security (Wood and Gough 2006, p1699; Gough, 2004b, p33-
34).  
 
The final remark to make about informal security regimes is its applicable context. 
Although the classification of informal security regimes is derived from a 
quantitative method similar to Esping-Andersen’s, the insights of ‘negative 
permeability’ and ‘clientelism’ are abstracted from the ethnographic observation in 
the poorest countries such as Bangladesh, where a peasant economy or under-
developed relation of commodifcation are still prevailing (Ramesh and Ash, 2000). 
Since their governments lack accountability and the market systems there are 
imperfect, poor people possess limited statutory rights and they have to seek security 
from community-based or family-based networks. However, can this model be 
applicable in other contexts of higher-level development such as China, even if it is 
classified into the same informal security regimes? Meanwhile, will this peasant 
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 analogy be suitable for non-rural areas such as urban China, provided community-
level welfare is also found important for poor people there?  
 
In summary, the innovation of the institutional responsibility matrix rests on the 
inclusion of community-based support and globalisation forces. This extends the 
spectrum of regime analysis from the OECD welfare state regime to informal 
security regimes. Moreover, the phenomenon of negative permeability and its 
consequences of clientelism and adverse incorporation reveal the unequal power 
structure embedded in a patron-client relationship. Therefore, the rights of poor 
people are informalised; their security is temporary and based on the surrender of 
personal autonomy to patronage. However, the generalisation of this regime-type in 
other developing contexts remains unknown. 
 
Theoretical framework for this study 
In order to search for the most appropriate approach for exploring the nature of 
China’s welfare system, three schools of theories have already been reviewed in the 
previous sections. They are: Esping-Andersen’s (OECD) welfare state regimes, East 
Asian welfare regimes and informal security regimes for less developed countries. 
Figure 2.4 provides a comparison between these three approaches.  
 
On the one hand, the reasons why Esping-Andersen’s concept of welfare state 
regimes is much more compelling than the traditional definitions of ‘the welfare 
state’ can be summarised as follows. Firstly, rather than the narrow focus on the state 
provision, the approach of welfare state regimes acknowledges a mix of players in 
welfare provision and the possibility of multi-functions of the state. Secondly, by 
looking beyond state expenditures, the approach of welfare state regimes 
concentrates on more dynamic welfare outcomes in terms of de-commodification and 
stratification. Thirdly, this approach is not only able to group the countries with 
similar characteristics into subtypes, but also allow variations existing in each 
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 country because of their unique development path. In short, Esping-Andersen’s 
analysis is based on three dimensions:  welfare mix, welfare outcomes and historical 
development. 
Figure 2.4: Comparison between Three Approaches of Welfare Regime 
 Welfare State 
Regimes 




Welfare Mix state/marke/family state/market/family global and domestic 
levels of state/market/ 
family/community  
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On the other hand, the principles in these three dimensions of Esping-Andersen’s 
framework can be revised as suggested by the East Asian welfare regimes and 
informal security regimes. Firstly, the trinity of welfare mix can be extended to a 
complex including four domains at both domestic and supra-national levels. 
Secondly, de-commodification, social programs, de-familialization, de-clientelization 
and stratification should be treated equally important in the assessment of welfare 
outcomes. Moreover, stratification may also refer to the effects of adverse 
corporation or clientelism. Thirdly, the role of the authoritarian states and the 
domination of political ideologies will be particularly useful for explaining the 
development or the stabilisation of the East Asia welfare regimes.    
 
Accordingly, by synthesizing these three approaches of welfare regime, a 
comprehensive theoretical framework for studying China’s welfare regime can be 
finalised. The dimensions, principles and research questions of this theoretical 
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 framework can be summarised as follows. 
 
Regarding the first dimension, the institutional responsibility matrix is 
comprehensive for crystallising China’s welfare regime because it comprises the 
principles of the state, the market, family and community at global and domestic 
levels. However, considering the complexity of the global actors in the welfare mix, 
this study only focuses on the domestic level of the welfare mix. Thus, the research 
question related to this dimension is:  
• What is the arrangement of the welfare mix in China?  
 
The second dimension is concerned with the welfare outcomes produced in a 
particular welfare mix of China, which includes the principles of de-commodification, 
social programs, de-familialization, de-clientelization and stratification. The first four 
principles reflect the extent to which people can maintain their livelihoods without 
the reliance on the market, family and informal network. Meanwhile, these three 
principles are used to indicate the actualisation of social rights: the relationship 
between the state and citizens in ‘the right to share to the full in the social heritage 
and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the 
society (Marshall, 1973, p8)’. Meanwhile, stratification is aimed to show the relation 
between social divisions and social rights in China. Therefore, the research questions 
related to this dimension are:  
• In reference to the UMLSG beneficiaries in this study, how do their living 
standards deviate from the normal standards of ordinary residents? 
• How significant is the family unit in welfare support? 
• Could personal patronage be found in China’s welfare regime? 
• What is the effect of stratification produced by China’s welfare regime? 
 
The third dimension focuses on the authoritarian role of the Party-State in historical 
development and situates its intentions of social welfare in concrete contexts. 
Meanwhile, the coordination of political ideologies in constructing China’s welfare 
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 regime should also be highlighted. Consequently, the research questions related to 
this dimension are:  
• How have the intentions of the Party-State determined the development of 
China’s welfare system?   
• Especially, what political ideologies have been upheld during the 
development of China’s welfare system? 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter argues that an appropriate theoretical framework, which is used to 
describe the nature of China’s welfare regime, should contain three dimensions and 
relevant principles. The first dimension is intended to explore the relation between 
different domains in the welfare mix, while the second dimension is aimed to assess 
welfare outcomes by investigating the extent of reliance on the market, family, 
informal network as well as the formation of social class. The last dimension focuses 
on the authoritarian role of the state, especially the political ideologies that are 
mobilised to justify the development of welfare regime.  
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The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the research process. Firstly, it will 
explain why critical theory and anti-oppressive research were adopted as the 
philosophical foundation and research practice in the fieldwork. Then, it will provide 
justifications about the three methods that are employed: case study, document 
analysis and interviews. Meanwhile, the ethics and quality of this study will also be 
full considered. The last section discusses the limitations of the research process. 
 
Critical Theory 
The philosophical foundation of this study is the perspective of critical theory. This 
paradigm of inquiry completely rejects the premises under positivism. Firstly, 
positivism assumes that the essence of the world exists independently from the 
knower. This ‘objective’ belief claims that universal laws and causality relations exist 
in the world and they can be discovered to explain, control and predict social 
phenomena. Secondly, as the ‘objective’ world and the ‘subjective’ knower are 
divided as objects and subjects, this separation not only indicates a distinction 
between ‘fact’ and ‘value’, but also suggests a value-free principle for researchers in 
the process of knowing. Thirdly, the world can be known by the use of human 
beings’ senses. Providing more and more sophisticated methods and precise 
instruments are developed, the truth of the objective world can be gradually 
approached by human beings (Usher 1996, p12-13). In summary, positivism holds a 
belief that the social world looks very similar to the natural world. The positivistic 
idea of knowing others in the social sciences means conducting research into 
‘objects’ outside a researcher, which requires measurable operationalisation, reliable 
instruments, replicable results, generalisable explanations and predictable outcomes.  
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 In contrast, critical theory offers a different view of the world (Guba and Lincoln, 
2005; Kincheloe and McLaren, 2005). Regarding the belief in ontology, critical 
theory considers reality as socially constructed in a historical context in relation to a 
specific political economy. Fundamentally, the reality is mediated by unequal power 
relations in terms of oppression, injustice or exclusion. Accordingly, it is very likely 
for people occupying certain positions of social status (e.g. gender, ethnicity or 
economy) to be under-privileged in society. Moreover, the epistemology of 
positivism can be accused by critical theorists of reproducing these unequal power 
relations, because the designs and the findings they produce simply reinforce 
inequality in society. This leads to the consequences for the powerless group that 
their understandings may be under-represented, degraded or even distorted by the 
existing social conditions and ideological domination. As a result, the purpose of 
researchers working together with disadvantaged people is to reveal the ideological 
hegemony produced by the dominant group and deconstruct its practices of 
producing or reproducing the oppressed group. In short, critical theory research aims 
to raise the consciousness of disadvantaged people about their oppression, identify 
the structural barriers for equality and ultimately advocate mutual actions for social 
change.  
 
For example, anti-oppressive research (Dominelli, 2002; Beresford and Croft, 2001; 
Wilson and Beresford, 2000) is one of the practices developed from critical theory, 
which has already been widely used in the marginalised groups such as disabled 
people (Beresford and Croft, 2001), women prisoners (Pollack, 2004), young 
mothers in care (Dominelli, 2005) or low-income Jewish women in business (Strier, 
2007). According to Clifford (1992), anti-oppressive research concerns with the 
perspectives of: 
• Anti-reductionist and historically specific: putting the explanation within a 
specific historical context. 
• Materialist: related to material power structures such as wealth, status or 
culture.  
• Combining personal and political: connecting private spheres to work, 
production and outside work 
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 • Thoroughly analysing ‘difference’: understanding individuals and groups in 
the hierarchy of social divisions. 
• Internationalist: considering wider contexts. 
• Reflexive and dialogical: the necessity of researchers to reflect their positions 
in the social structure and in the relationship with the disadvantaged group.  
 
In practice, Strier (2007) summarises nine elements for anti-oppressive research:  
• Goals: the development of knowledge to achieve freedom from oppression.  
• Population: the most oppressive group experiencing heavy exclusion from 
mainstream society.  
• Methodologies: the preference for the bottom-up interpretation of living 
experiences for reflecting the structural barriers as well as the deconstruction 
of the dehumanised or stigmatised image attached to the oppressed people.  
• Research environment: supportive environment for reflection and self-inquiry.  
• Role of participants: strongly encouraged and involved into the research 
process itself.  
• Researcher-participant relations: an egalitarian power relation between 
researchers and participants.  
• Ownership of knowledge: the affirmation of knowledge originated, produced 
and possessed by the oppressed group. 
• Knowledge-action relationship: possible action-oriented results from the 
research based on the informed consciousness of both researchers and 
participants.  
• Boundaries of research: not only publishing and disseminating research 
findings but also providing an action agenda. 
 
The relevance of critical theory and anti-oppressive research to this study lies in two 
areas. On the one hand, it is indicated by Chapter Two that the authoritarian states 
play a premier role in constructing the East Asian welfare regimes. This is not only 
related to their enforcement of actual welfare programs to trade off for social order, 
punish or sanction the non-productive population; but also concerned with their 
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 utilisation of certain ideologies to discipline the subjectivity of welfare users (Dean, 
1991). Considering the one-Party rule and its massive propaganda control, it is very 
likely for the coercion of welfare users and ideological hegemony of the Party to 
happen in China. Meanwhile, as China was empirically classified as an informal 
security regime (Sharkh and Gough, 2006), it can be predicted that it should contain 
the phenomenon of clientelization, which highlights the inequality of power 
embedded in inter-personal relationships and thus causes the informalisation of social 
rights.    
 
On the other hand, the emphasis on subjective perceptions and actions by critical 
theory and anti-oppressive research coincides with the combination of structure and 
agency underlying the approach of welfare regime. According to Gough (2004b, p23), 
the approach of welfare regime assumes that ‘structures are socially constructed, 
reproduced and changed through the actions of people in real time, but that, at given 
points in time, actors occupy different interest and power positions within structures, 
giving them different goals, levels of autonomy and clout’. This suggests that despite 
the dominant structural effects, significance should also be attached to personal 
agency for its contribution to shaping or re-shaping social structure. In relation to the 
studies of poverty, there have been some distinguished research aiming to understand 
people’s movements for welfare development (Piven and Cloward, 1977; Piven and 
Cloward, 1972) or presenting the worldwide voices of poor people about their life 
experiences (Narayan and Petesch, 2002; Narayan et al., 2000a; Narayan et al., 
2000b). Therefore, other than the institutional analysis, the micro perspective of 
welfare users in China - despite their frequent under-representation - will also be the 
key to reveal the nature of China’s welfare regime. 
 
In summary, the philosophical foundation of critical theory highlights the existence 
of inequality, oppression or hegemony in society. Moreover, it aims to deconstruct 
the complex mechanism which produces these unequal relations of power by 
substance and ideology. Anti-oppressive research is such a practice that values the 
perspective of the marginalised group and embraces their strength for change. 
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 Considering the authoritarian role of the CPC and the muted voice of the powerless 
group, the main ideas of critical theory and anti-oppressive research back up the 




The aim of this study is to reveal the nature of China’s welfare regime. At the macro 
level, the value of treating China as a case study rests on the long-term exclusion of 
China in the comparison of welfare regimes, especially in the traditional quantitative 
method. This is not only due to the difficulty of deriving statistics in relation to 
human development, but also because of the complex path of China’s development, 
such as the ongoing transformation to the socialist market economy, disparity 
between urban and rural areas and consistent changes of welfare programs after the 
economic reform. Furthermore, although there are several well-known books 
describing China’s welfare system in a certain time series (e.g. Chan et al., 2008; 
Wong, 1998; Leung, 1995), they are still lacking relevant ideological analysis of the 
welfare systems and overlooking the perspective of the welfare users.  
 
The meso and the micro levels of the case study refer to the UMLSG scheme and its 
beneficiaries in Guangzhou City. The UMLSG scheme was first trialed in Shanghai 
in 1993, and promoted to all the cities by 1997 and finally institutionalised in 1999. 
According to the following reasons, the UMLSG scheme is an ideal institution for 
this study. Firstly, as the UMLSG spanned two historical phases of ‘economic China 
(1978-2002)’ and ‘social China (2002-2011)’, the analysis of its rationale in Chapter 
Seven can be used to trace the influcences from the political ideologies imposed by 
the CPC in the welfare system during these two periods.  
 
Secondly, the contents of the theoretical framework of this study can be found in the 
UMLSG scheme. As pointed out by Chapter Two, one of the main indicators to 
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 reveal the nature of a particular welfare regime refers to ‘social rights’ in the 
dimension of welfare outcomes. Aiming at relieving urban poverty, the UMLSG 
scheme is the most appropriate institution to show how far poor people in urban 
China are able ‘to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards 
prevailing in the society (Marshall 1973, p8)’. Moreover, along with the transition 
from ‘economic China’ to ‘social China’, the UMLSG scheme has evolved into a 
comprehensive social assistance program, consisting of both income maintenance 
and social programs. This new charactertistic enables the UMLSG scheme to reflect 
both ‘de-commodification’ and ‘social programs’ in the theoretical framework. 
 
Lastly, after more than a decade’s development, the administration of the UMLSG 
has become formalised. The actual operation of the UMLSG scheme is managed by 
government (e.g. Street Offices) or semi-government organs (Residents’ 
Committees). This provides an opportunity for the researcher to study the interaction 
between local bureacucrats and poor people at the meso and micro-levels. 
Furthermore, unlike the newly-established scheme of the Rural Minimum Living 
Standard Guarantee (RMLSG) in 2007, there have already been detailed regulations 
for guiding the work of the UMLSG at both national and local levels. This also 
enabled the researcher to collect enough documents and fully review the 
development of the UMLSG.  
 
The reason for choosing Guangzhou as the research site is because of its high levels 
of economic performance and the UMLSG threshold. Guangdong Province, where 
Guangzhou is located as a capital city, is both the largest economy (3,948.256 billion 
yuan for Gross National Product) and has the most government revenues (364.981 
billion yuan) in China in 2009 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010a; National Bureau 
of Statistics, 2010b). At the same time, the size of Guangdong’s economy is also 
outstanding in international comparison. The GDP of 328 billion dollars in 2007 was 
higher than those of Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore and even comparable to 
Austria, Sweden and Switzerland (World Bank 2011, p45). Therefore, it is not 
surprising to find that when this study was conducted in June 2010, the UMLSG 
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 threshold of Guangzhou (410 yuan per month) was the third highest among 36 
central cities in China, only lower than Shanghai (450 yuan) and Tianjin (430 yuan) 
which are the municipalities directly under the central government (Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, 2010b).  
 
In short, the strong economic performance provides a financial base to support the 
determination of the Guangzhou authority to reduce urban poverty. Against this 
background of strong economic and government support, Guangzhou can be seen as 
an outstanding example of the UMLSG development. On the negative side, there is 
convincing reason to believe that any problem of the UMLSG occurring in 
Guangzhou is very likely to exist in other cities.  
 
Document analysis  
In order to answer the research questions about China’s welfare regime, the approach 
of this study can be divided into two parts. The first part is to review the historical 
development of the welfare system from 1949 to 2011 by situating it in the context of 
political economy. The findings of this part were based on the method of document 
analysis of a huge collection of archives. The first major group of archives used was 
related to the most important documents of the Party and the state. For example, all 
twenty-one volumes of Selected Collections of the Important Documents Since the 
Foundation of the P.R.C. during 1949-1965 were carefully reviewed. Similarly, the 
findings also relied on massive volumes of Selected Collections  of the Important 
Documents since the Eleventh (after the Third Plenary Session; 1978-1982), Twelfth 
(1982-1987), Thirteenth (1987-1992), Fourteenth (1992-1997), Fifteenth (1997-
2002), Sixteenth (2002-2007) and Seventeenth (2007-present) National Congresses 
of the CPC.   
 
The second group referred to Document Collections of the Wo rk of Civil Affairs of the 
P.R.C , which have three volumes of the central documents about Civil Affairs during 
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 1949-1999 . In relation to this study, the sections  of ‘general documents’, ‘speeches of 
leaders’, ‘social relief’ and ‘social welfare’  were thoroughly studied.  
 
The third source of analysis came from the individual collections of highest-level 
leaders. For instance, the thinking of Mao Ze-dong during 1949-1976 are edited in 
the thirteen volumes of Manuscripts of Mao Ze-dong Since the Founding of the 
P.R.C.  Likewise, Volume Ⅱand Volume Ⅲ of Selected Collections of Deng Xiao-
ping comprise the ideas of Deng Xiao-ping during 1975-1992. Moreover, Research 
and Practice of the Civil Affairs Work (two volumes) embodies the writings and 
speeches of Duoji Cairang when he was the Minister of Civil Affairs during 1993-
2003. 
 
As the fourth source, this study retrieved data from statistical yearbooks which were 
officially published in various years. These yearbooks include a wide range of data, 
such as China Statistical Yearbook, China Civil Affairs’ Statistical Yearbook, China 
Population and Employment Statistical Yearbook, Finance Yearbook of China , China 
Labour and Social Security Yearbook  and Historical Statistic s of Civil Affairs 1949-
1992.  
 
The last group contained other specific regulations, documents, academic reports and 
speeches of other leaders.  
 
All of these documents and archives but one in the bibliography are either formal 
publications or can be traced from reputable websites. Especially, the first group of 
archives - which was heavily depended on by this study - was all uploaded into the 
appointed website by the Party. Moreover, the collections in the first three groups of 
references are mostly published by authoritative agencies such as the Party Literature 
Research Centre of CPC Central Committee ( zhonggong zhongyang wenxian 
yanjiushi ), Central Party Literature Press ( zhongyang wenxian chubanshe) or the 
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 Ministry of Civil Affairs. Due to their importance and sensitivity, these publications 
have all been strictly censored before they were made public. As one of the ultimate 
purposes of this study is to identify the political ideologies mobilised by the CPC, 
these most official sources of literature and documents substantially enhances the 
validity of the findings about the orthodox political ideologies by the CPC. These 
findings will be presented separately in Chapters Four, Five and Six.  
 
Equally important, the other contribution of this study is to contrast these dominant 
ideologies with empirical evidence. This not only adheres to the critical methodology 
which was discussed in Chapter Three, it also points to the feasible improvement in 
the UMLSG scheme. However, it must be noted that there are differences in 
presenting the empirical evidence among the three historical phases. Originated from 
official statistical yearbooks and historical studies by other academics, the critical 
evidence in ‘communist China’ is put together with the ideological analysis in 
Chapter Four and they are compared with each other.  
 
In a similar but more elaborative way, Chapters Five and Six are also aimed to reveal 
the political ideologies in ‘economic China’ and ‘social China’. However, the task of 
challenging the rhetoric rests on the case study of the UMLSG in Chapters Seven, 
Eight and Nine. This is because the spanning of the UMLSG scheme over these two 
phases validates the assessment of the welfare outcomes in China’s contemporary 
welfare regime. By critically reassessing historical documents and analysing first-
hand interviews, this case study provides a thorough understanding about the life 
experiences of poor people in relation to the UMLSG. More importantly, this original 
analysis is aimed to show the discrepencies between dominant ideologies and actual 
welfare outcomes, especially in ‘social China’.  
 
Lastly, I am the person responsible for the work of reviewing, analysing and 
translating these literature and documents. In order to ensure the accuracy of the 
translation, a professional interpreter from China was hired to do the proofreading.    
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 Interviews 
The second approach was to investigate the views of local bureaucrats and the 
bottom-up voices of poor people in relation to the UMLSG scheme. The term ‘local 
bureaucrats’ refer to both the staff in Residents’ Committees and the officers in Street 
Offices. Street Offices are the lowest-level units of government administration in 
China, while Residents’ Committees are nominally the self-organisations by residents 
in community. Correspondingly, most of the officers working in Street Offices are 
public servants while the staff in Residents’ Committees should be elected by 
residents.  
 
However, it turns out in reality that the Residents’ Committee is treated as the branch 
of the Street Office and they carry out all the administration work assigned by the 
Street Office. For example, the work related to the UMLSG is only one of the many 
tasks in the daily list of the Resident Committee. The staff that are responsible for the 
UMLSG also have to deal with other fields of Civil Affairs, such as social welfare 
for older people, preferential treatment and settlement for veteran soldiers, or even 
registration of new-born babies, marriage and death of residents. Consequently, the 
Residents’ Committee is highly institutionalised. Other than the fact that all the staff 
are paid by public expenditure, every Residents’ Committee is also a branch 
committee of the Party in the community.  Usually, the chief of the Residents’ 
Committee doubles as the Party committee Secretary. In a word, the Residents’ 
Committee functions more as a dispatched agency from the Street Office than as an 
autonomous organisation of community residents.  
 
In the practice of the UMLSG, the Residents’ Committee is a key player in 
assessment. The application is first submitted to a specific staff member in the 
Residents’ Committee. Then, it is that staff member that decides the initiation of 
assessment, usually by the means of home visits and checking documents. If all the 
conditions were satisfied, the staff member would hand in the application to the 
supervisor in the Street Office. Usually, their supervisor would not have a second 
opinion because the staff member in the Residents’ Committee is believed to be most 
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 familiar with grass-root situations. Once approved, the staff member has to manage 
all kinds of affairs for the beneficiary, including helping them to apply for special 
assistance, claim reimbursement or receive donated goods. At the same time, the staff 
also need to monitor the attendance of voluntary labour as well as the progress of re-
employment. Moreover, the staff will reassess the beneficiary based on the renewed 
documents every six months. In short, as the actual policy assessors, administrators 
and supervisors, staff in Residents’ Committees and officers in Street Offices are the 
interface linking the UMLSG to its beneficiaries.  
 
The term ‘poor people’ refers to the interviewees with the UMLSG families, the 
Low-Income families and potential users in the fieldwork. During June to September 
2010, the former category aimed at those families with per-capita incomes lower than 
the threshold of 410 yuan per month; while the threshold of the latter one was set a 
little higher at 490 yuan. Furthermore, although the Low-Income families are entitled 
to the same welfare in kind or fees of exemption as the UMLSG families, they 
cannot receive the UMLSG subsidy. The reason for including some Low-Income 
families in the fieldwork is because their experiences of failing the application of the 
UMLSG could reveal more information about the unwritten conditions imposed by 
local bureaucrats.   
 
Regarding access to the interviewees, the original research design was intended to 
turn to personal connections in the UMLSG Department of Guangzhou Municipal 
Bureau of Civil Affairs for help. However, due to a scandal of corruption in the 
bureau, my personal connection not only could not assist the fieldwork, but also 
refused to provide an interview. As a result, I decided to adopt ‘snowball sampling’ 
and ‘purposive sampling’ to find appropriate interviewees by other personal 
connections. Despite the sudden change of strategy, it turned out that the informal 
contact of poor people was more helpful to the research. Since I held no official 
position, poor people were more willing to share their experiences, especially their 
negative feedback about local bureaucrats.  
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 The fieldwork lasted from June to September in 2010 in Guangzhou. The method of 
semi-structured interview was adopted because its flexibility is useful for 
understanding people’s perceptions about social relations and life experiences 
(Silverman, 2006).  As shown in Figure 3.1, the questions for poor people were 
mainly related to three dimensions of experiences: before applying to the UMLSG, 
when applying to the UMLSG and living on the UMLSG. Firstly, the employment 
history critically impacts the well-being of poor people. As will be shown in Chapter 
Four and Chapter Five, former workers in state-owned enterprises could still be 
better protected in certain aspects even though they are laid-off or unemployed. For 
example, their seniority will be counted as years of contributions to a pension even if 
they did not contribute at all before. It will be pointed out in Chapter Nine that the 
possibility of claiming a pension is one of those limited ways for the beneficiaries to 
escape from the UMLSG. By contrast, it is very unlikely for former workers from 
collective-owned enterprises or non-national enterprises to have pensions in the 
future. Additionally, it is of great importance to know the difficulty that triggers the 
application to the UMLSG, such as health-related or unemployment problems. 
Except for the state, the effectiveness of other players in the welfare mix can be 
indicated by the efforts of poor people in finding alternative resources before 
applying to the UMLSG.  
 
As Chapter Two has discussed the possibility of clientelization in informal security 
regimes, the second dimension was to examine the eligibility of the UMLSG from 
the experiences of poor people. The interaction and the relationship with local 
bureaucrats is one of the highlights at this stage. The other highlight is to present the 
opinions and feelings of poor people about the application process, whose voices are 
always ignored by the authorities. 
 
The third set of questions was to assess the sufficiency of the UMLSG support from 
the perspective of poor people. The satisfaction of needs here is not only related to 
survival level, but also points to a comprehensive level including human 
development and social inclusion. At the same time, the actual availability of non-
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 statutory support for the UMLSG beneficiaries can be used to contrast the myth of 
mutual help and family support. The last important questions were to ask the 
beneficiaries about the plan of leaving the UMLSG and their feelings about living on 
the UMLSG. 







A. What did you do before MLSG? 
B. Why did you need to apply to MLSG? What happened at that 
time? 
C. What efforts have you tried to solve the problem? 






A. Please tell me the process of the application: e.g. how to get the 
information; how long to wait; the relation with local 
bureaucrats; any other problems. 
B. What is your opinion of this procedure? 
C. How did you feel in this period? 
Experiences 
of living in 
the UMLSG 
 
A. How do (did) you cope with the needs such as money, housing, 
education, health care or social relations?  
B. Who do (did) you turn to for help? 
C. What is your plan about maintaining the livelihood without the 
UMLSG? 
D. How do (did) you feel in this period? 
 
In comparison, there were two categories of interview questions for local bureaucrats 
(Figure 3.2). The first category was to explore their usual practices to handle the 
application, such as the criteria and the rationale behind them. The second one was to 
understand the regular administration of the UMLSG, such as voluntary labour and 
re-employment. In particular, it is of interest to know how the UMLSG policy can 
help the beneficiaries to leave the UMLSG. Moreover, both of the two categories 
focus on the impressions of local bureaucrats to applicants and beneficiaries.  
 
Since the interview questions were semi-structured, it is possible to ask more 
questions according to the response of the interviewees. Furthermore, due to the 
sensitivity of the topic, it was not necessary for both poor people and local 
bureaucrats to fully disclose their opinions and feelings during the interview process. 
Other than the practices in the section of ‘ethics’, there was a particular technique 
usually employed in the interviews. For example, at the beginning of the interview, it 
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 was very likely for local bureaucrats to claim that they would precisely stick to the 
regulation for assessment. In order to elicit ‘less official’ replies, I often provided 
more detailed cases for discussion, such as: ‘What will you do if some healthy or 
younger people come to apply?’ ‘What about the older people with adult children? 
Are they eligible?’ 
 
Figure 3.2: Interview Questions for Local Bureaucrats 
Dimensions Questions 
A. Please tell me how you usually deal with the application. What 
are your criteria? How do you carry out the assessment? What 
is the reason for your style? 




C. What do you think of the applicants? 
A. What do you usually do in relation to the UMLSG? 
B. What is your general impression of the beneficiaries? 






 D. What aspects of the UMLSG administration do you think need 
to improve? 
 
The poor people would not talk freely unless they realised that their experiences in 
the application process were not unique. This can be achieved by asking: ‘Some 
people may undergo an awful experience in [voluntary labour, application process, 
buying food etc.], what about you? Have you ever had similar experiences?’ 
 
There were four stages in the process of finding interviewees. In this process 
comparative method and deviant-case analysis were always highlighted (Silverman 
2006, p296-298). A few years ago, a colleague of mine once conducted an 
ethnographic study in Street 1 which is one of the two communities with massive 
low-rent apartments in Guangzhou. Therefore, he knew many UMLSG or Low-
Income beneficiaries living in this area. In other words, this colleague and this site 
would entail a high chance of finding UMLSG or Low-Income families. Meanwhile, 
that colleague could also introduce me to officers or staff working in the Street Office 
or the Residents’ Committee. Taking these factors into consideration, Street 1 was 
chosen as a first research site for the fieldwork. 
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 At the beginning of the fieldwork, I explained the aim and the design of the work to 
the colleague. Also, the colleague was asked to help contact one three-no target, one 
UMLSG family and one staff member in the Residents’ Committee as pilot cases. 
The colleague successfully approached Mr. Wang (three-no), Ms. Zhang (UMLSG) 
and Ms. Tan (staff of the Residents’ Committee) by telephone and they all promised 
to make an appointment to meet with me. Afterwards, I found in the interview that 
Ms. Zhang’s husband was an active participant of voluntary labour and he had a good 
relationship with other participants who were also the beneficiaries and residents of 
this community. As result, Ms. Zhang’s husband was asked to find one three-no 
target and one UMLSG beneficiary for next interviews. Ms. Zhang’s husband 
showed me to his neighbours Mr. Chang (three-no) and Mr. Chen (UMLSG) 
immediately after the interview and both of them accepted the invitation of an 
interview right away.  
 
As the theme of ‘the ability to work’ seemed to emerge after these interviews, I asked 
for Mr. Chang’s help to locate both of the situations that: current UMLSG 
beneficiaries without the ability to work and failed applicants because of the ability 
to work. I selected Mr. Chang because, according to my observation, he seemed to be 
the key link in the building and even the group of blind people in the community. For 
example, when I visited his apartment with Ms. Zhang’s husband, he was chatting 
with five neighbours including Mr. Li and Mr. Lao. Moreover, during the interview 
another neighbour would offer her help for shopping when she passed by the door. 
Later, Mr. Chang introduced me to an UMLSG beneficiary Mr. Li and a Low-Income 
beneficiary Mr. Lao in his apartment and he called another Low-Income beneficiary 
Mr. Zhao to explain my intension. Finally, all of them agreed to be interviewed. 
 
The second stage was to keep searching for the cases related to ‘the ability to work’ 
in Street 2, 3 and 4 where I had personal connections with social workers. I asked 
them to look for those UMLSG families which had any member with the ability to 
work. Consequently, Ms. Lei, Ms. Zhou in Street 2 as well as Mr. Dong, Ms. Zhuo 
and Ms. Chi in Street 3 were selected. They all had one member with the ability to 
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 work, while other members are either old or unhealthy. Moreover, Ms Cui, who once 
applied to the UMLSG in Street 4, offered her story of being excluded by the 
principle of ‘the ability to work’.  
 
Since the experiences of Mr. Chen and Ms. Zhang in Street 1 indicated the other 
possible theme of ‘family unit’, the third stage was to look for those cases with the 
problem of getting approval for the UMLSG because of this condition. In Street 4, 
the application of Ms. Pan was not approved until she did not live with her brother’s 
family any longer, while Ms. Cai’s old mother never succeeded in her application 
because she lived with her three adult children. Similarly, the child of Ms. Lei should 
not have been enrolled in the UMLSG because Ms. Lei’s household registration is 
not affiliated to Street 2. Therefore, all of these cases were selected and they all 
agreed to join the interview.  
 
Due to their nature of work, the social workers in these three streets were also 
familiar with their respective Street Offices and Residents’ Committees. As a result, I 
succeeded in interviewing local bureaucrats at the fourth stage. There were two of 
them working in Street Offices as the supervisors of the UMLSG: Mr. Hao in Street 3 
and Mr. Shen in Street 4. In particular, the connection in Street 4 introduced her 
friend Ms. Xie who was working as the supervisor in Street 5, too. The rest of the 
local bureaucrats were working in different Residents’ Committees as the staff 
mainly responsible for the work of Civil Affairs. They were Ms. Tan in Street 1, Ms. 
Tang and Ms. Fan in Street 3, and Ms. Mo and Mr. Gan in Street 4.  
 
Based on all the interviews above, a third theme of ‘bureaucracy’ had emerged. In 
order to complement the theme, a three-no target Ms. Shu in Street 2 was 
recommended by the connection. Ms. Shu once worked in the Residents’ Committee 
and her UMLSG assistance was also managed by the same Residents’ Committee. 
However, she was well-known among the residents in the community for her 
critiques of the Residents’ Committee. Therefore her commentary could enrich the 
 49
  50
theme of ‘bureaucracy’.  
 
So far, only the experience of Ms. Zhang in Street 1 could demonstrate life after 
leaving the UMLSG, so I requested the personal connections in the three streets once 
again to find one more case that had also recently left the UMLSG. Finally, Ms. Xian 
was identified as her family left the UMLSG in early 2010.  
 
In total, there had been twenty-five interviewees in this study: eleven UMLSG cases, 
two Low-Income cases, two former UMLSG cases, two cases who failed the 
application, three officers in Street Offices and five staff in Residents’ Committees. 
Identifying interviewees came to the end is because there were not new themes 
emerging from the interviews any more.  Figure 3.3 provides a detailed profile of the 
seventeen poor people, including a range of personal attributes such as identity, 
affiliation, years in assistance, age, gender, health condition, employment, pension, 
and household members. Likewise, Figure 3.4 shows the identity, affiliation, age and 
gender of the officers and the staff.  
 
Concerning the process of interviews there are several things that need to be clarified. 
Firstly, although the names of interviewees are anonymous in the study, a code is still 
attached to each case in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. By doing this, readers can easily 
track the basic information of interviewees. In the case number, ‘street’ is 
anonymised by the first Arabic numeral. The second code, A or B, tells the difference 
between ‘former/current/potential beneficiary’ and ‘officers/staff’. The third code 
belongs to the individuals in each street. For example, ‘Case 1Aa’ refers to a 
UMLSG beneficiary interviewed in Street 1, while ‘Case 3Ba’ means a local 
bureaucrat in Street 3. 
 
 Figure 3.3: Profile of Poor People in the Fieldwork 

















Unemployed None Wife & 2 
children 
A casual household helper 
with about 400 yuan per 
month; no pension 
One child is in middle 
school and the other is 






1 6 46 Blind in 
both eyes 
Unemployed No None Divorced / 
Mr. Li 1Ac UMLSG 
User 








A casual household helper 
with about 400 yuan per 
month; no pension 
He was laid off in 1999 
and attached to an 
enterprise in 2004 with a 





















No Husband & 
an adult 
daughter 
Her husband was laid off in 
1997 but received the 
pension about 2,000 yuan 
per month since this year. 
Her daughter has just 
graduated from the 
college and found a job 
this year with the salary 







1 6 56 Good Unemployed No Wife & 1 
child in the 
vocational 
school 
His wife was laid off in 2004 
and she is a casual household 











Aro Good Employed as a 








Wife & 1 
child 
A casual household helper 
with about 400 yuan per 
month; no pension 
















2 2 56 Good Selling 
Ganoderma in 
the market 





  52 
Ms. 
Lei 











No One child 
in primary 
school 
Died Her child's household 
registration is in the 
Street 2 while she is in 





3 5 76 Good Retired No Wife & an 
adult 
daughter 
70 years old; retired without 
pension 
His daughter is 35 years 
old as a door guard of a 
warehouse with about 












Her husband was laid off in 
1999 and currently 
unemployed. 
She was laid off in 2002. 
Her child is a new 






3 5 68 Good Retired No Son and 
his wife 
and child 
Died Her son is mentally ill 
and unemployed now. 
Her daughter-in-law is a 
casual worker without 
stable income. Her 






4 4 45 Mentally 
ill 
Unemployed No None Single Currently subsidized 8 
yuan per day by the 
occupation therapy 













Depression Retired and 
re-employed 











Her husband is mentally ill 
and retired with the pension 
about 1,500 yuan per month.
The older child is 
mentally ill and in casual 
work about 400 yuan per 














Her husband is 58 years old 
and currently unemployed. 
Her son earns about 





4 / 73 Good Retired No 4 adult 
children 
Died Living with her oldest 
son and his family 
(daughter-in-law and 
grandchild), her divorced 
second child and her 
single daughter 
 Figure 3.4: Information of Local Bureaucrats in the Fieldwork 
Name No. Identity Street Age 
Ms. Tan 1Ba Staff in the Resident Committee 1 Around 30
Mr. Hao 3Ba Officer in the Street Office 3 Around 25
Ms. Tang 3Bb Staff in the Resident Committee 3 Around 40
Ms. Fan 3Bc Staff in the Resident Committee 3 Around 50
Mr. Shen 4Ba Officer in the Street Office 4 Around 50
Ms. Mo 4Bb Staff in the Resident Committee 4 Around 25
Mr. Gan 4Bc Staff in the Resident Committee 4 Around 25
Ms. Xie 5Ba Officer in the Street Office 5 Around 25
 
The second one is related to the personal connections in Street 2, 3 and 4. The social 
worker in Street 2 was working in a local youth centre which provided services to 
families in the community. Similarly, the connection in Street 3 was also a social 
worker in a community centre for family services. The third connection in Street 4 is 
more official. Although the title of this connection was still ‘social worker’, she was 
mainly responsible for the propaganda of the Street Office.  
 
Thirdly, when they were requested to identify eligible interviewees, the social 
workers in Street 2 and 3 searched among their case books while the social worker in 
Street 4 recalled the beneficiaries who had already worked with her in several 
functions in the Street Office. It is only after the social workers asked for the 
permission of potential interviewees that they would pass me the contacts. Upon 
receiving the contacts, I would first make a call and give a brief introduction. 
Meanwhile, I would have a quick assessment to see if these potential interviewees 
were actually qualified the criteria. Once eligible, I would continue to book an 
appointment with them after their further agreement. The same approach of 
contacting interviewees including local bureaucrats and poor people was applied in 
the whole process of the field work in Street 2, 3 and 4.  
 
Fourthly, as all of the interviewees were introduced by other people, such as my 
colleagues, Ms. Zhang’s husband, Mr. Chang, or the personal connections of social 
workers in Street 2, 3, and 4, I was very cautious about their voluntary participation 
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in the fieldwork. It was ensured that these personal contacts would ‘invite’ potential 
interviewees to ‘participate’ the research rather than ‘force’ them to ‘co-operate’ with 
me. When in contact of potential interviewees, I would explain the relevant 
information about the research to them in details. More importantly, I would reassure 
them that their agreement to do the interview needed to be truly voluntary rather than 
feeling pressured by referees to agree. This was especially emphasized in Street 4 as 
the social worker was working in the Street Office.  
 
The fifth issue refers to signing the informed consent forms. As the interviewees 
were informally approached, they were all unwilling to sign the consent forms even 
though they agreed to take the interview. This is because both the bureaucrats and 
poor people were concerned that a consent form with a signature may cause them 
any trouble. Bureaucrats were worried about anything they said would be considered 
as damaging the credit of the government, while poor people were afraid of any 
possible negative influence on their UMLSG entitlements caused by their opinions. 
My solution was to make sure that the interviewees fully understood every term on 
the information sheet. Furthermore, it was not until the interviewees verbally stated 
their understandings and consents of the research process that the interview would 
start.   
 
Sixthly, all the interviews with poor people were conducted in their homes. The 
purpose of doing this was to protect their privacy instead of exposing them in the 
public places of the community. Meanwhile, I would prefer to do the interviews 
either in the early morning or in the late afternoon. This was intended to minimise 
possible costs for the interviewees. For example, despite the hot weather in summer 
in Guangzhou, poor people usually did not turn on the fan for themselves unless 
there is a household guest. Likewise, some interviewees may be so hospitable as to 
invite me for lunch or dinner. By contrast, it was the bureaucrats’ decisions to choose 
the location for interviews. It turned out that they all preferred their offices as the 
ideal place.  
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Seventhly, since the beginning of the fieldwork, it had been found that both local 
bureaucrats and poor people were strongly opposed to the use of recording 
equipment during the interview. This also originated from the same concern about 
the signature on the consent form. Accordingly, I chose to make notes during the 
interviews. Upon finishing each interview, I immediately typed the transcripts into 
computer based on the notes and fresh memory.  
 
Lastly, all the interviewees agreed to the publication of their opinions or stories in the 
future. The only condition was that relevant information that would possibly expose 
the identity of the interviewees must be anonymous.   
 
After all the transcripts in Chinese were entered into the computer, the software of 
NVivo 8.0 was used for coding the texts and categorising the themes. When the 
Chinese transcriptions were analysed in NVivo, there were four steps in the 
procedure: 
• The contents of the texts were tagged by different meaningful ‘free nodes’. 
• These ‘free nodes’ were then categorised into different themes in terms of 
‘tree nodes’. For example, the theme (tree node) of ‘conditions’ contains three 
sets of free nodes: ‘the ability to work’, ‘family unit’ and ‘bureaucracy’.   
• Two general categories of ‘poor people’ and ‘local bureaucrats’ were 
established. Relevant themes were put into corresponding category.  
• The category of ‘poor people’ embodies the themes of ‘conditions’, ‘public 
review’, ‘UMLSG assistance’, ‘welfare mix’, ‘voluntary labour’, ‘re-
employment’, ‘feelings’ and ‘leaving the UMLSG’. Similarly, the other 
category of ‘local bureaucrats’ includes all the themes except that the theme 
of ‘feeling’ is replaced by ‘impressions of beneficiaries’.  
 
Again, I was the person responsible for interviews, transcriptions, analysis and 
primary translations. In order to maintain the precise meaning of the words, the 
analysis in NVivo was conducted in the Chinese texts. The translation would not start 
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until the quotes that were to appear in the findings were confirmed. A different 
professional interpreter from China was hired to crosscheck the translations, too.  
 
Ethics 
In the original research design, the recruitment of interviewees was supposed to be 
assisted by personal connections in Guangzhou Municipal Bureau of Civil Affairs. 
However, due to an unexpected circumstance, the strategy of finding suitable 
interviewees changed to ‘snowball sampling’ by informal contacts. Before the start of 
each interview, it was ensured that the interviewees were fully informed of following 
information.  
• The researcher is currently a PhD student studying in an English university 
abroad. This research is one part of a PhD thesis and its research design and 
ethics have already been approved by the Department of Sociological Studies 
in the University of Sheffield, UK.  
• The aim of the interview is to explore people’s opinions or experiences in 
relation to the UMLSG. 
• The contact of potential interviewees relied on my informal connections. In 
other words, there is not any official background of this study and myself.  
• The recording device will not be used if the interviewee rejects it.   
• It is the interviewees’ choice for the location and the schedule of 
appointments. In regard to poor people, public space is not suggested in order 
to protect their privacy. However, their final decisions will be respected.     
• A consent form will be provided and the interview will not be conducted 
unless all the contents are agreed to. 
• It is absolutely voluntary for the interviewees to participate in this research. 
The participant can pause, terminate or quit the interview at any time. 
• Any paper notes made by the researcher during the interview will be 
destroyed after they are typed into the computer.    
• The address book of the interviewees will be destroyed after the fieldwork 
finishes.  
• All the records, transcriptions and the saved file of NVivo 8.0 will be 
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encrypted and stored in the researcher’s personal computer. These data will 
not be passed to other persons and institutions and they will be destroyed at 
once after the completion of the PhD thesis.  
• The names of the interviewees will be anonymised by using other false names 
if they need to show up in the thesis or future publication.   
• There is very little possibility of causing any physical and psychological harm 
to the interviewees. However, if that were the case, a counselling service 
would be provided free of charge to the interviewee in need by a local 
community centre.  
• The interviewees are suggested to indicate their consent whether it is possible 
to publish their stories in future.   
• All the above information will be printed out and sent to the interviewees. 
Meanwhile, the contact details of the researcher will also be enclosed, in case 
the interviewees would have any inquiries in future. 
 
In short, the consideration of all the measures above was not only developed in 
accordance to ethical requirements; it also aimed at maximising the expression of 
poor people when they were living in an environment usually lacking in freedom of 
speech. 
 
Quality of the study 
There are normally two standards related to the quality of research: reliability and 
validity. Regarding reliability, the references used in the document analysis were 
either formal publications or could be traced in reputable websites. Therefore, there 
will not be a problem about the reliability of the documents. Similarly, instead of any 
assistance from the authorities, the informal contact with interviewees largely 
decreased the respondents’ hesitation of sharing their experiences and opinions. 
Moreover, the abandonment of using any recording equipment during the interviews 
also minimised the worries of the interviewees. 
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In order to improve the validity of this study, two kinds of practices were employed 
in the research process. The information and the sources of the Chinese references 
were clearly presented in both Chinese spelling pinyin and English. This enormous 
effort was aimed to enable the cross-check of the documents by other academic peers. 
Futhermore, in order to derive as much elaborated data as possible, constant 
comparative method and deviant-case analysis were always highlighted in the 
process of selecting proper interviewees (Silverman 2006, p296-298). For instance, 
there was a contrast between these interviewees: the UMLSG beneficiaries with the 
ability to work, the UMLSG beneficiaries without the ability to work and the failed 
applicants because of with the ability to work. Similarly, two different units of 
extended families were compared: the second generation as the applicant (named 
‘Type Ⅰ Households’ in this study) and the first generation as the applicant (‘Type 
Ⅱ Households’).  
 
Limitations 
There are five major limitations in the research design. Firstly, the selection of the 
UMLSG scheme as a meso-level case study can be used to indicate the arrangement 
between family, market, community and the state in the welfare mix. However, it will 
ignore the unique Chinese welfare contributor ‘danwei’ which is the institutional 
legacy from the phase of ‘communist China (1949-1978)’ and is still influential on 
the well-being of public employees.   
 
Secondly, although Guangzhou City was chosen as the micro level of case study, it is 
still possible for differences to exist in smaller localities. For example, the 
community with low-rent apartments in Street 1 was a newly-developed area. It is 
characteristic in the high density of the UMLSG and the Low-Income families in the 
same community. By contrast, Street 2, 4 and 5 were traditionally old communities 
while Street 3 was located in a suburb area. The slight differences in demographics, 
culture or leadership might affect the experiences of poor people as well as the 
attitudes of local bureaucrats. However, due to the ‘snowball sampling’ of identifying 
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potential interviewees, it cannot be guaranteed in the fieldwork that every type of the 
interviewee can be equally found in each street.  
 
Thirdly, the perspective of gender was underplayed in the fieldwork. Only one of the 
people in the household was interviewed and there was no particular order for the 
choice. Although the majority of the interviewees in the category of ‘poor people’ 
were female (11 out of 18), the possibility of gender differences about the life 
experience in the same household remains uncertain.  
 
Fourthly, the practices of anti-oppressive approach were not completely implemented 
in this study. Although the fieldwork involved the poor people in the research process 
by encouraging their voices, follow-up actions after the research (Beresford, 2000) 
was also absent. There was not any kind of advocacy for the change of the current 
problems of the UMLSG. Meanwhile, the possibility of future publication remains 
uncertain.  
 
The translations of the quotes from documents or interviews may cause a fifth 
problem. I tried to keep to the meaning of the Chinese words as accurately as 
possible. Also, external help was sought from two different professionals to examine 
the translations in the parts of document analysis and interviews. However, there is 
still possible risk about some specific translations being below the standard of native 
English.   
   
Conclusion 
The choices of critical theory and anti-oppressive research were useful in revealing 
the authoritarian nature of China’s welfare regime in terms of substance and ideology. 
This task could be accomplished by the methods of case study, document analysis 
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and interviews. Arrangements of interviews in the fieldwork were made carefully to 




Chapter Four  
Communist China: The Political Economy and Ideologies of 
the Welfare System 1949-1978 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is intended to summarise the characteristics of China’s welfare regime 
during 1949-1978. Firstly it will explain the industrialisation-led strategy that 
produced profound influences on the urban-rural disparity. Secondly, it will outline 
the welfare mix for the urban and the rural populations and describe the respective 
welfare systems of danwei and rural collectives. Lastly, it will examine the political 
ideologies that were mobilised to legitimate the dichotomy. 
 
Industrialisation-led strategy 
After the early establishment of the P.R.C. in 1949, the Party prevented serious 
inflation and massive urban unemployment by extending its economic control and 
providing state employment. In 1953, the Party began to adopt a strategy of 
modernisation which prioritised the development of heavy industry over agriculture 
and light industry. Serving as an outline of the propaganda of the time, the document 
For Mobilizing All the Forces  to Struggle for Building Our Country into a Powerful 
Socialist State  clearly indicated the general orientation of the Party: ‘In a fairy long 
time, to gradually accomplish the socialist industrialisation of the country; to 
gradually accomplish the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and 
capitalist industry and commerce by the country (The CPC Central Committee 1953a, 
p701).’ 
 
This general line was composed of two main tasks: socialist industrialisation and 
socialist transformation. On the one hand, the capitalist mode of production based on 
exploitation should be replaced by the state-owned enterprises, so that the socialist 
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industry could become the decisive power in the national economy. On the other 
hand, the original private ownership of peasants and handicrafts was required to be 
transformed into collective ownership.  
 
In essence, socialist industrialisation and socialist transformation were carried out to 
centralise as many resources as possible. Because of the prioritisation of 
accumulation rather than consumption, the living standards of people should be 
greatly restrained by the Party’s purpose: 
Due to the focus of industrialisation, the heavy industry will need more 
money but receive lower and later profits. Moreover, its products cannot 
directly satisfy the consumption of people. Therefore, the industrialisation 
requires [people] to economise food and clothing ( jieyi suoshi ), live plainly 
and struggle hard (jianku fnedou) ; (The CPC Central Committee 1953a, 
p711). 
 
[To criticise] those beliefs of rash advance, which demand to swiftly and 
largely enhance people’s livelihoods: to do all the good things in one 
morning.…Therefore, the improvement of people’s livelihoods had to be 
restrained. It must subordinate to the development of production and its speed 
must be lower than that of production (The CPC Central Committee 1953a, 
p712). 
 
Due to the emphasis on industrialisation and accumulation, there were two 
distinctive institutions established in urban and rural areas. In cities several measures 
were introduced: full employment by danwei with low wage, rationing of basic 
necessities and other consumption goods, neglect of ‘unproductive’ infrastructure and 
services, and prohibition of rural migration. Despite a call to ‘live plainly and 
struggle hard’, workers were still privileged in receiving a wide range of benefits, 
goods and services from their danwei. Therefore, danwei welfare played a very 
critical role for workers and it was ‘intended to induce productivity and discipline 
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from workers expected to be making strategic contributions to China’s 
industrialisation: the urban, heavy industrial, and elite sectors of the society’ (Lee 
2000, p50). 
 
The support to the industrialisation-led strategy in rural areas was manifested in the 
movement of agricultural co-operation. Mao (1955a, p249-250) explained the 
urgency and importance of promoting agricultural co-operation in 1955. The 
achievement of the socialist industrialisation would be hampered by a sharp 
contradiction between the low-level productions of crops and the increasing demands 
of commercial grain and raw materials for industry. Furthermore, a large proportion 
of the funding used for industrial construction was retrieved from agriculture. In 
short, agricultural co-operation was subordinate to the goal of industrialisation and 
was expected to provide significant resources.  
 
This can be illustrated by the state monopoly of purchasing and marketing of grain. 
Chen Yun (1953, p203-205), the then leader responsible for national economic and 
financial affairs, described the crisis of grain purchase by the state in 1953 as 
‘purchasing less, selling more’. With the aim of guaranteeing industrial progress, 
preventing from possible economic inflation and maintaining political stability in 
cities, Chen (1953, p217) proposed the implementation of the state monopoly of 
purchasing and marketing of grain, which rationed the purchase of grains in the rural 
areas in order to assure the supply in the cities. However, large transactional and 
administrative costs would be produced if this policy was processed between the 
state and individual households. In order to guarantee the grain supply to the state, 
Chen (1953, p277) advocated the establishment of rural collectives.  
 
It can be summarised that the appearance of danwei and rural collectives was closely 
related to the industrialisation-led strategy. Since they were the major social units in 
pre-reform China, what were their roles in welfare provision together with the state 
and family? 
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Welfare Mix  
Ever since the legislation of household registration in 1958 (National People’s 
Congress, 1958), there have been two kinds of citizenship in China: urban residents 
and rural residents. The identity of household registration is so vital that it not only 
controls people’s mobilisation, but also determines the welfare system they are 
eligible for. Moreover, in either the urban system or the rural system before the 
economic reform, welfare entitlements were heavily dependent on the ability to work. 
For example, statutory relief ( jiuji ) was mainly provided to those people temporarily 
suffering from natural disasters or permanently losing the ability to work and family 
support. In cities, the latter group were traditionally recognised by the government 
body of Civil Affairs as ‘three nos’: the most disadvantaged elderly, disabled and 
orphans in characteristics of no source of income, no ability to work and no family to 
support. Other than relief in terms of cash support, ‘three nos’ could also receive 
‘social welfare’ (shehui fuli) from Civil Affairs. The major personal service for them, 
for example, was residential homes. By contrast, in rural areas, this group usually 
referred to widowers, widows, orphans or older people without family support. They 
were protected by rural collectives with a scheme called Five-Guarantee Household 
(wu bao hu), which guaranteed beneficiaries’ living standards in terms of food, 
clothing, medical care, accommodation and burial.  
  
Considering the extraordinarily high coverage of collective units, the relief of the 
state or rural collectives could be rather marginalised (Wong, 1998). According to the 
official statistics, there had been a minor unemployment rate among the urban 
population, such as 5.9% (2 million) in 1957 or 5.3% (5.3 million) in 1978 (Ministry 
of Civil Affairs 1993, p136). Except for this unemployed population, Table 4.1 shows 
that nearly all the people working in cities were employed by danwei. This resulted 
in a very small number of people who would be eligible for government relief. Most 
of them were defined by official statistics as ‘older people without any family and 
danwei support’ or ‘the families with many dependents but without enough work 
forces’. For example, Table 4.2 indicates that the sum of these two categories 
comprised only negligible proportions in urban China during 1961-1963. Similarly, 
as illustrated by Table 4.3, the proportions of Five-Guarantee Households in the 
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whole rural population were even more insignificant based on a much bigger rural 
population.  
Table 4.1: Proportions of Workers in Danwei and Urban Working Population  
(Million People) 
Year Workers in danwei Urban Working Population Proportion
1965 49.65 51.36 96.67%
1970 62.16 63.12 97.05%
1975 81.98 82.22 99.71%
1980 104.44 105.25 99.23%
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 1986, p124 
 

















1961 0.08 0.23 0.31 127.07 0.24%
1962 0.53 1.16 1.69 116.59 1.45%
1963 0.58 1.62 2.20 116.46 1.89%
Source: Ministry of Civil Affairs 1993, p350-352;  
      National Bureau of Statistics 1986, p91 
 
Table 4.3: Proportion of Five-Guarantee Households in Total Rural Populations 
(Million People) 
Year Five-Guarantee Household  Total Rural Populations Proportion
1978 3.15 790.14 0.13%
1979 2.97 790.47 0.38%
1980 2.43 795.65 0.31%
Source: Ministry of Civil Affairs 1993, p375; 
         National Bureau of Statistics 1986, p91 
 
In regard to the working population, urban workers could receive comprehensive 
benefits and services from their occupational danwei. Similarly, rural residents 
working for local collectives, such as production teams (equivalent to village level), 




It can be inferred from ‘three nos’ and Five-Guarantee Household that the status of 
family is also important in welfare provision. However, its function was incorporated 
into the collective units. For instance, the dependents of workers were entitled to 
medical credits, benefits for funeral and death compensation (State Council, 1951), 
or even subsidies when they were leading a hard life (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1962). 
By comparison, the family burden of peasants was relieved to a certain extent 
because members of rural collectives were at least guaranteed a basic amount of 
grain whether they could attend the joint-labour or not (Huang, 1990).  
 
Figure 4.1 displays a contrast between the welfare systems in urban and rural areas, 
including social security, education, health services, employment, housing and 
personal services. Although it seems that both danwei and rural collectives provided 
similar welfare programs, they were quite varied in funding and extent. Due to 
limited official statistics published, Table 4.4 can only compare the welfare expenses 
of communes (the highest rank of rural collectives; equivalent to county level) with 
danwei from 1978 to 1980. The ratios of collective welfare fund of communes in 
1978 and 1979 were only equivalent to 18.93% and 15.52% of the total expenses of 
insurance and welfare for current and retired workers. In 1980 the percentage 
dropped to 10.44%.  
 
However, it cannot be ignored that most of the national population was working and 
residing in villages. Although nearly all of the urban working population was state 
workers, the total was rather small when placed in a nationwide context. It can be 
seen from Table 4.5 that urban workers took up less than one quarter of the whole 
working population across the country. Moreover, the proportion of rural residents in 
the national population could be very high, totalling 82.1% in 1978 (National Bureau 







Table 4.4: Comparison between Collective Welfare Fund of Communes and Total 



















1978 1.81 7.81 1.73 9.56 18.93% 
1979 2.17 10.73 3.25 13.98 15.52% 
1980 1.95 13.64 5.04 18.68 10.44% 
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics 1990, p815-816; 1983, p209  
 
Table 4.5: Proportion of Urban Workers to National Working Population  
(Million People) 
 1978 1979 1980 
Workers in Danwei 94.99 99.67 104.44 
Total National Working Population 398.56 405.81 418.96 
Proportion 23.83% 24.56% 24.93% 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 1988, p203; 1986, p124  
 
In summary, welfare entitlements in pre-reform China were determined by the status 
of household registration, the ability to work and support from family. As the main 
provider of welfare, danwei and rural collectives undertook the critical 
responsibilities of protecting the working population and their dependents. 
Meanwhile, the relief of the state or rural collective would be the last resort for 
people after they lost the ability to work as well as the support from family. However, 
there was a huge disparity of welfare resources between danwei and rural collectives, 
especially considering the beneficiaries they were supposed to cover. Characteristic 
of collective welfare and unequal distribution of resources, the welfare mix before 
the economic reform produced profound welfare outcomes. 
 
Danwei welfare  
Generally, danwei referred to the following three categories of workplaces: 1) profit-
making businesses, such as state-owned or collective-owned enterprises; (2) non-
profit agencies such as hospitals, schools or residential homes for ‘three nos’; (3) 
administrative units in terms of governmental organs. It is widely believed that the 
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danwei system performed very well in terms of egalitarianism in urban areas (Riskin 
1987, p223-255). For example, the estimation of income Gini index was only 
18.46% in 1981 (Ravallion and Chen 2007, p20). However, this ‘income’ perspective 
underestimates the significance of danwei welfare in the satisfaction of needs as well 
as ignoring the varied and stratified distribution of danwei welfare. 
 
The vital reliance on danwei welfare 
Because of the imposition of low wages, danwei welfare was particularly important 
for the livelihood of urban workers and their families. It can be found in Table 4.6 
that living expenses took almost all the household income of urban workers. This 
meant that the family budgets of urban workers were just in balance. Moreover, 
Table 4.7 displays the constitution of the living expenditures in detail. It can be seen 
that around 90% of living costs were spent on ‘commodities’, especially on food, 
clothes and groceries. By contrast, there was only a very small part of living 
expenditures on ‘non-commodities’: housing, education, nursery and transportation. 
This consumption list suggests that the whole wage of urban workers could only 
satisfy some of their basic needs. At the same time, urban workers had to rely heavily 
on danwei welfare for other necessary collective consumption. 
 
The ‘invisible’ danwei welfare can be revealed by the indicator of total expenses of 
insurance and welfare. For those urban workers in service, it referred to the items of 
benefits or subsidies of medical care, severance, poverty, entertainment, collective 
facilities, birth control, transportation, hygiene and others. It can be illustrated by 
Table 4.8 that the expenses of insurance and welfare could supplement the wage for a 
range from 13.73% to 17.66% during 1978 to 1980. In short, the vital importance of 
danwei welfare in need satisfaction strengthened the dependence of workers on their 
workplaces.
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Figure 4.1: Basic Arrangement of Welfare Provision in China before the Reform 
Main Aspects In Urban Areas  In Rural Areas 
Social security  1. The governmental financial subsidy towards food, clothing and other 
basic subsistence materials; so that urban residents could benefit from 
lower prices; 
2. ‘Labour insurance’ for workers in the state sector and governmental staff, 
which covers pension, medical care, occupational injury, etc.; 
3. Cash benefits for the urban ‘three nos’; 
1. Wu Bao Hu system: a rural collective-
organization-based social relief provision for the 
elderly and disabled who had no family support; 
2. Natural disaster relief system: governmental 
relief projects for villagers suffering from 
natural disasters. 
Education  
1. Public schools and other education facilities financed by the government 
and state enterprises; 
2. Low schooling costs for students in primary and middle school;  
3. Free enrolment to higher education (although only for those who passed 
the entrance examination). 
1. Public primary and middle schools financed 
mainly by the rural collective organizations and 
subsidized by the government;  
2. Lower schooling costs for students in primary 
and middle schools.   
Health services  
1. Preventive health action organized and financed by the government and 
state enterprises; 
2. Public hospital system financed by the government and state enterprises; 
low prices in medical care as a result; 
3. Free medical care for state workers and governmental staff. 
1. Preventive health action organized and financed 
by the collective organizations and subsidized 
by the government; 
2. Rural cooperative medical care system, based on 
the rural collective economy.   
Employment  
1. Full employment policy: all urban labour could be assigned a job in 
either state or collective sectors; 
2. Stable employment: state workers were free from the risk of losing their 
job, once they got it. 
Full & stable employment for all rural labour based on 
the public ownership of farmland; all labourers had the 
right to work and get grain and a cash income from it. 
Housing  
1. Public housing: most urban houses and flats were owned by the 
government and state enterprises, and distributed to workers and staff 
free of charge;  
2. Lower rent: the average rent of public housing and flats is even lower 
than the basic maintenance standard. 
No.  
Personal services 1. The public caring facilities and services financed by the government and 
urban communities for the elderly, the disabled and orphans, etc. who 
had no family support; 
2. Daily services in childcare, elderly care, mess service, etc. by state 
enterprises and community organizations. 
Some public caring facilities and services in some rich 
villages, financed by the collective economy, for the 
elderly, the disabled and orphans, etc. who had no family 
support. 
Source: Guan 2000, p116 
 Table 4.6: Average Income and Consumption for the Families of Urban Workers 
(Yuan/Person/Year) 
 1957 1964 1981 
Average Living Expenditures 222.00 220.68 456.84 
Average Income 253.56 243.48 500.40 
Ratio 87.55% 90.64% 91.29% 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 1986, p667  
 
Table 4.7: Constitution of Consumption for the Families of Urban Workers (%) 
 1957 1964 1981 
Average Living Expenditures 
(Person/Year) 
100.00 100.00 100.00 
1. Expenditures for Commodities  85.89 85.37 92.01 
1) Food 58.43 59.22 56.66 
2) Clothes 12.00 10.98 14.79 
3) Groceries  5.98 9.56 
4) Recreational Goods 
7.62 
1.09 5.67 
5) Books, Newspapers & Magazines 0.59 1.14 0.95 
6) Medicines  1.84 1.85 0.60 
7) Fuels 3.89 4.24 1.94 
2. Expenditures for Non-
Commodities 
14.11 14.63 7.99 
1) Rents  2.32 2.61 1.39 
2) Bills of Electricity & Water 1.46 1.74 0.97 
3) Tuition Fees 0.65 1.25 0.58 
4) Nursing Fees 1.30 1.58 0.60 
5) Transportation Fees 1.34 
6) Communication Fees 
2.38 1.74 
0.11 
7) Entertainment Fees 1.08 0.71 0.63 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 1986, p668 
 
Table 4.8: Total Expenses of Insurance and Welfare and Total Wages  
for Urban Workers in Service (Billion Yuan) 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 1990, p131; p815  
Year Total Expenses of Insurance and Welfare  Total Wages Ratio 
1978 7.81 56.89 13.73% 
1979 10.73 64.67 16.59% 




 Differences between danwei welfare providers 
The distribution of welfare was diversified among danwei and based on at least three 
factors. The first is related to the ownership of enterprises. As the welfare expenditures 
in collective-owned enterprises were dependent on profits and losses each year, their 
workers were generally treated worse than the counterparts in state-owned enterprises. It 
is shown by Table 4.9 that workers from collective-owned enterprises garnered less than 
half of the welfare expenses per capita compared to those working in state-owned 
enterprises. 
Table 4.9: Total Expenses of Insurance and Welfare and National Enterprises 



























1978 6,910 74.51 92.74 900 20.48 43.95 
1979 9,490 76.93 123.36 1,240 22.74 54.53 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 1986, p124; 1990 p815 
1980 11,930 80.19 148.77 1,710 24.25 70.52 
 
Secondly, those state-owned enterprises of higher administrative rank, such as under the 
central government, usually provided better welfare. Table 4.10 displays the data which 
covered 70,342 state industrial enterprises in 1985 and it clearly shows that enterprises 
managed by the central government possessed more welfare resources and generated 
stronger outputs. Moreover, Bian (1994) discovered that the administrative rank of 
danwei determined the services of its neighbourhood in terms of piped gas, leading 





 Table 4.10: Collective Welfare Programs in State-Owned Industrial Enterprises 1985 




Total  County 
Number of employees (in ten 
thousands) 
8689.8 29,892.1 6608.7 
Number of enterprises 3825.0 66,517.0 35263.0 
Average size of enterprises 2271.8 449.4 187.4 
Per ten thousand employees  
1. Library books 36,488.7 25,307.8 14,277.7 
2. Club space (square metre) 4758.1 2723.3 1615.1 
3. Medical Staff 192.2 97.2 42.0 
4. Hospital beds 138.3 49.7 3.5 
5. Sanitarium beds 13.4 3.5 0.6 
6. Children in nursery and day 
care  
739.0 555.1 341. 
7. Elementary-school students 1746.4 678.4 181.0 
8. Middle-school students 1379.6 430.8 44.1 
9. Technical-school students 164.3 75.7 2.2 
10. Middle-level professional 
school students 
39.2 14.3 1.4 
11. College Students 63.4 20.6 1.1 
Source: Yuan, 1989; cited by Bian 1994, p188 
 
Thirdly, gender was another factor contributing to the differences within danwei welfare. 
Compared to male workers, female workers tended to aggregate in collective-owned 
enterprises which provided less comprehensive welfare. For example, 66.87% of the 
urban state workers of women were employed by state-owned enterprises in 1980, while 
82.21% of the urban state workers of men were working in state-owned enterprises 
(Table 4.11).  
Table 4.11: Sex Distribution in State-Owned Enterprises 1980 
 (Million People) 
 Men Women 
Total Population in State-owned Enterprises 55.46 24.733 
Total Population of Urban Workers 67.455 36.986 
Ratio 82.21% 66.87% 





 Differences within danwei 
As well as the differences between danwei, there were also internal variations in the 
same danwei according to at least four attributes. Firstly, unlike permanent workers, 
temporary workers who acted as an informal but necessary complement to state labour 
force could only receive a relatively short, unfixed or even unwritten contract with very 
limited social protection. Secondly, the determinants of personal power, such as political 
identity or administrative position (Li and Li, 1999), were quite significant. For example, 
Bian et al., (1997) investigated the relation between danwei and the housing they 
allocated to workers. It was discovered that the per-capita living space for the families of 
administrators and cadres (24.4 square meters) were nearly twice as large as those of 
ordinary workers (14.8 square meters) in Tianjin. Furthermore, the powerful group was 
more likely to have a private kitchen and toilet. Another example is Yang’s (2007) 
research which reveals the unequal distribution in the hierarchy of government cadres. 
He demonstrates that there was a huge wage gap between the top and the bottom rank in 
government, such as 25.2:1 in 1956 and 20.24:1 in 1960. Moreover, higher-rank officers 
were given special welfare provision such as private secretaries, drivers, baby-sitters, 
chefs, better houses and scarce commodities in market.   
 
Thirdly, the guarantee of welfare resources in danwei required workers to display 
preferred behaviours by the Party as well as show loyalty to their supervisors. According 
to Walder (1986), since danwei welfare was usually decided by directors and Party 
branch secretaries in organisations, workers generally had to display conformity to the 
Party’s moral-political standards in front of their supervisors. Therefore, danwei welfare 
produced the effects of reinforcing work performances, regulating individual behaviours 
and cultivating ideological commitments.  
 
However, due to the discretionary assessment in the hands of cadres, it was also 
important for workers to develop informal relationships with them. For example, the 
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 personal favours of activists to their supervisors in daily work, such as production, 
administration, volunteer work and political study, was aimed to gain job promotion, 
material advantages and social status. Meanwhile, other personal relationships, such as 
cliques, fractions or instrumentalism, provided opportunities for the ordinary workers to 
achieve their interests by petty corruption or emotional attachment. The role of informal 
networks in danwei welfare is also supported by Bian et al.’s (1997, p231-232) study. 
Only 36% in Tianjin and 25% in Shanghai of respondents considered the procedures of 
housing allocation in their danwei were ‘very fair’ or ‘fair’. Furthermore, when asked 
what strategies would work for getting a better residence, the top choice in both cities 
was to ‘maintain a good relationship’ with ‘the leaders in charge’ and with ‘the housing 
committee’ of danwei.   
 
Fourthly, gender again influenced the distribution of welfare. Ping’s (1998) qualitative 
study points out that the traditional role expectation confined the development of women 
workers in factories. They were more likely to be appointed to ‘feminine jobs’, such as 
logistical support, service providers and other non-technical occupations. Since these 
positions were of less importance in industrialisation, female workers actually had 
smaller chance of being promoted to senior positions in factories. Meanwhile, it was less 
likely for women workers in factories to become activists, model workers or Party 
members because they had to spend most of their time looking after families. In short, 
the stereotype of gender role caused the disadvantage of political resources for women, 
which ultimately affects their access to danwei welfare.    
 
In summary, three main aspects of the outcomes of danwei welfare can be identified: 
dependence on danwei, stratification and clienteliza tion. Firstly, there is no doubt that 
the comprehensive provision of danwei welfare compensated for the low wages of urban 
state workers and largely enhanced their living standards. This created the vital necessity 
for urban workers to depend on danwei. Secondly, there were some conditions imposed 
on access to danwei welfare. Welfare resources varied in danweis with different 
 74
 ownership and administrative ranks, while the internal distribution within danwei was 
determined by personal identities, such as job status, political membership or 
administrative position. Meanwhile, gender inequality was hidden in the whole 
distribution system of danwei. Moreover, in order to gain access to danwei welfare, 
workers needed to comply with the Party’s moral-political standards. All of these 
conditions were related to the national strategy of industrialisation, which led to the 
welfare divisions of urban workers based on their importance for the state. Lastly, since 
the assessment of distribution was informal and monopolised by leaders and cadres, 
urban workers had to establish informal relationship with them. In short, in contradiction 
to the rhetoric of egalitarianism, danwei welfare could be rather regressive and corrupted 
based on personal power and informal network. 
 
Welfare of rural collectives 
In pre-reform China, there had been a consistent tendency to coordinate peasants into 
local- and collective-based units for production and distribution. The movement of 
agricultural co-operation started in 1951 when agricultural groups or co-operatives were 
proposed at that time. By joint labour and collective-owned tools, collective members 
could earn profits according to their contributions in work and the means of production 
(The CPC Central Committee 1951, p515). The work of developing more co-operatives 
had been the focus of the Party in rural areas since 1953. It was required that all rural 
households join co-operatives by the spring of 1958 (The CPC Central Committee 1955a, 
302). Moreover, senior co-operatives were widespread from 1956 on. As an advanced 
organisation, members of senior co-operatives would transfer most of their croplands, 
draught animals and farm tools to the collective ownership. Unlike elementary co-
operatives, however, members could not receive any future profits from the properties 




 The development of agricultural co-operation reached a peak when the system of 
communes was finally established in 1958. According to the Some Decisions about 
Issues of People’s Communes (The CPC Central Committee 1958a, p598), around 740 
thousand co-operatives had been transformed into about 26 thousand communes across 
the country beginning in the summer of 1958. This meant that by then more than 99% of 
rural households were affiliated to a commune. The establishment of commune was 
crucial in integrating government administration and commune management ( zheng she 
heyi). Communes were local and segmented units with totalitarian management in the 
domains of economy, politics and society. Regarding its structure, the institution of the 
commune consisted of three levels of units. On top communes were usually equivalent 
to county levels, coordinating the intermediate units of brigades; while at the bottom 
were production teams at the village level, which were mainly responsible for organising 
labour. Moreover, the distribution of communes was related to the principles of 
according to one’s work (the wage system) and according to one’s needs (the supply 
system), though there may be different emphasis at various stages later.  
 
If these rural settings were equivalent to danwei in cities, would they provide similar 
welfare programs to those of danwei? It has been argued in the previous section that 
compared to danwei, rural collectives had to cover a much larger proportion of the 
population but with very limited funding (Table 4.4). The following analysis will 
provide more details about the fiscal constraints of rural collectives.  
 
Fiscal constraints 
The welfare provision of rural collectives was highly decentralised and varied greatly. 
Collective welfare funds in local communes were the major source for raising collective 
protection to members. However, the amounts of funding had been quite minor. At first, 
it was required in 1955 that only 1% of the actual revenues of co-operative should be 
used for collective welfare fund and the proportion could be slightly extended to 2% or 
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 3% along with the development of productivity (The CPC Central Committee 1955b, 
p387-388). Meanwhile, it was stated in 1956 that no more than 2% of net profits should 
be raised in each senior co-operative (The CPC Central Committee 1956a, p419). 
Furthermore, with reference to a model commune which was recommended by Mao Ze-
dong, the collective welfare fund in the commune should not exceed 5% of all the 
revenues (Chayashan Satellite People’s Commune 1958, p396). In 1962, when the 
responsibility of collective welfare was laid down to the lowest level of production team, 
similar proportions of 2% or 3% of all the distributional revenues were suggested (The 
CPC Central Committee 1962, p634). Due to the restriction imposed on fund raising, the 
share of collective welfare funds in reality was even lower than that allowable. Table 
4.12 shows the spending of communes on different items from 1958 to 1981 and it can 
be found that collective welfare fund possessed a very insignificant percentage. It 
climbed to 1.76% at its highest in 1975 and dropped to 1.36% in 1980.  
  Table 4.12 Distribution of Revenues in Communes1958-1980 (%) 











1958 25.49 9.51 9.89 1.52 52.29 
1962 25.90 6.50 4.41 1.44 58.73 
1965 25.05 5.60 6.56 1.43 57.29 
1970 27.94 4.53 6.54 1.69 54.87 
1975 31.23 4.02 7.48 1.76 51.48 
1978 32.31 3.35 6.76 1.63 52.59 
1979 31.53 3.23 7.06 1.75 53.12 
1980 31.93 3.07 4.45 1.56 53.98 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics 1983, p210 
 
 
Note: a. The sum of these five items is not 100%; the original data do not show other 
negligible proportions in the items of ‘Costs’ and ‘Retained by Collectives’. 
          b. The collective accumulation fund was used for future preparation for expanding 
production.   
      
Despite such limited funding, it is surprising to find that rural collectives were expected 
to provide all kinds of welfare programs. For instance, according to the Outline (Draft) 
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 of National Agricultural Development 1956-19 6 7 , (Political Bureau of the CPC Central 
Committee, 1956), co-operatives were responsible for a wide range of welfare provision, 
such as improving living conditions, eliminating fatal illnesses, establishing health 
stations, wiping out illiteracy, protecting women and children, and even creating 
employment for the urban unemployed. Likewise, senior co-operatives were required to 
shoulder similar responsibilities (The CPC Central Committee 1956a, p422). 
Furthermore, in the most ultra-left operation during 1958-1961, it was a requirement for 
communes to contain welfare institutions and social amenities, such as collective 
dinning halls, nurseries, kindergartens, homes of respect for the aged, primary schools, 
middle schools, adult education, hospitals and libraries (The CPC Central Committee 
1958a, p615-616).  
 
Nevertheless, these efforts of establishing comprehensive welfare programs by rural 
localities turned out to be a failure. This was largely related to the mismatch between the 
great demand for resources and the less developed productivity. For example, Xushui 
was once a famous model for its supply system (Wu, 2006). In September 1958, all the 
members in the communes of Xushui had free access to the ‘fifteen-guarantee’ program: 
meals, cloths, housing, shoes, socks, towels, soaps, kerosene, matches, heating, bathing, 
hair cut, entertainment of movies, health service and burial. However, these standards 
were soon proved to beyond the fiscal capacity of communes. Just 720 thousand out of 
1.44 million towels were actually granted; other daily suppliers could be sent only to 
some kindergartens and elderly care homes. Some items such as haircuts, bathing and 
movies had never come into reality. As soon as in November 1958, Xushui changed the 
promise to only guarantee free meals. By the end of December, this universal system of 
welfare provision was declared to be abandoned. 
 
The example of Xushui is illustrative of the impossibility for rural collectives to run 
comprehensive welfare services by themselves. Even Mao Ze-dong realised that it may 
simply be a romantic idea. There was another locality proposing to achieve communism 
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 by 1960, which also included a universal and comprehensive welfare scheme. Mao 
(1958a, p494) commented in 1958 that: ‘it seems to be too urgent for the time; it does 
not matter if it cannot be accomplished in three years as it can be extended’. Due to 
these unsuccessful experiences between 1958 and 1961, the system of communes was 
re-evaluated in 1962 and welfare provision by rural collectives was diminished. It was 
suggested by the Revised Draft of the Regulations  of Rural People’s Communes Work  
that the supply system only referred to the provision of rationed grain for each member 
(The CPC Central Committee 1962, p632). In short, this retrenchment clearly indicated 
the limited fiscal capacity of rural collectives and their impossibility to hold a similar 
welfare institution to that of danwei.       
 
Five-Guarantee Household 
The retrenchment of collective welfare, however, did not affect the Five-Guarantee 
Household program. It is important to note that this poverty-relief program had been 
upheld throughout the history of agricultural co-operation since it was first 
institutionalised in 1956. As the Outline (Draft) of National Agricultural Development 
1956-196 7 (Political Bureau of the CP C Central Committee 1956, p47) and the 
E xemplary Rules of the Senior  Agricultural Co-Operatives  (The CPC Central 
Committee 1956a, p422-423) pointed out, co-operatives or senior co-operatives should 
provide food, cloth, fuel, education (to children) and burial to those who were 
incapacitated, widowers, widows, orphans, older couples without children and disabled 
veterans. Meanwhile, homes of respect for the aged (jinglao yuan) were mentioned in 
the foundation document of communes in 1958 as a means of collective support to the 
Five-Guarantee Household (The CPC Central Committee 1958a, p615). Moreover, the 
Revised Draft of the Regulations of Rural People’s Communes Work in 1962 required 
production teams to extend the benefits to those who incurred accidents and thus lived a 
difficult life (The CPC Central Committee 1962, p634).  
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 Figures 4.2 and 4.3 illustrate some examples of Five-Guarantee Households, which were 
derived from a report of oral history interviewed in Liu Ling Village, Shanxi Province in 
1961. It can be seen that most of the cases were those having only one person of the 
couple (especially the wife) working for the current collective and probably having 
many dependents as a big family. In short, Five-Guarantee Household mainly covered 
those vulnerable families with insufficient working members.  
 
While not widely implemented as a routine welfare program, why did Five-Guarantee 
Household remain intact? The reason is because this poverty-relief program was 
necessary for the development of agricultural co-operation. In 1956, the attendance of 
senior co-operatives required members to transfer their private ownership of croplands 
and other instruments of production to the collectives for free or at a very low price. 
Meanwhile, as the distribution of revenues was dependent on members’ actual 
contribution to work, this raised a problem for those who had no ability to work and 
relied on the rents from their croplands. Under this situation, the program of Five-
Guarantee Household was designed to solve the problem and facilitate the process of co-
operation. Mao (1955b, p121-122) estimated in 1955 that only around one tenth of rural 
households had insufficient grain and half of them were widowers, widows, orphans, 
older couples without children (guan gua gu du) or those disabled to work. However, 
their living standards could be guaranteed by rural collectives. Mao (1955c, p531) 
clearly stated that any decision or instruction about agricultural co-operation in each 
province should add a clause that: ‘All co-operatives have responsibilities to help the 
difficulties of those who were widowers, widows, orphans, older couples without 






 Figure 4.2: Five-Guarantee Households of Liu Ling Village Production Team 
Name Grain 
( jin )c 
Reason 
Tuan Fong-ying 560 Husband works in Yenan. Parents-in-law old. 
Shortage of labour. 
Tung Chi-lian 220 Alone at home. Son at school. Bound feet. 
Li Yü-hsin 300 Widow with three children. Only one person 
working in the family. 
Fung Yü-lan 200 Husband works in Seven-mile Village. Two 
children, no parents. Works at home. 
He Huang-ho 50 Only person working in the family. 
Kao Chin-lan 200 Husband works in Yenan. New member. A lot to 
do at home. 
Chang Chu-liang 200 Husband works in Lochuan. On her own. 
Li Kuei-ying 300 Husband away working. On her own. 
Source: Myrdal 1965, p122 
 
Figure 4.3: Five-Guarantee Households of the Production Team 
for Cultivating Vegetables 
Name Grain ( jin) Reason 
Tuan Fu-yin 200 Only one of five family members working. 
Kao Yü-kuei 200 Husband Working in Yenan. 
Shi Yü-chieh 85 No able-bodied person in family. Recipient occupied 
mostly on his private plot. 
Yang Kuei-ying 160 Husband working in Yenan. 
Yang Fu-lien 120 Husband working in Yenan. 
Shu Hsiu-chu 60 Husband studying in Peking. 
Chang Chen-pong 300 Only one of the eight members of the family is 
working. 
Shueh Shen-huei 320 Only one person of the seven in family working. 
Source: Myrdal 1965, p155 
 
In relation to the promotion of senior co-operatives in 1956, Liao Lu-yan (1956a, p363-
364), former head of the National Department of Agriculture, acknowledged the 
significance of the Five-Guarantee Household program. He argued that this program is 
the key to gain the approval of those incapacitated to submit their croplands to the 
collectives. In addition, facing to the spreading inclination of members to withdraw from 
co-operatives by the end of 1956, Five-Guarantee Household was again advocated by 
the CPC Central Committee (1956b, p550). It was seen as one of the solutions to 
guarantee the livelihoods of those households without work force members, so that they 
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 would choose to stay in co-operatives instead of leaving. At the same time, it was also 
promised that the living standards of beneficiaries should be no lower than what they 
were before they joined the collectives (The CPC Central Committee and State Council 
1956a, p21).  
 
In summary, enormous efforts had been spent by the Party to incorporate peasants into 
collective units for production and distribution. Unlike the parallel setting of danwei in 
cities, it has been demonstrated that the rural collectives failed to afford comprehensive 
welfare programs for members, because their collective welfare funds had been 
suppressed to a minimum level by regulations. Despite this fiscal constraint, collective 
welfare in terms of Five-Guarantee Household still played a vital role in legitimating the 
Party’s intention. It not only effectively contributed to the achievement of agricultural 




It has been shown in the previous discussion that urban workers and peasants were 
managed by similar settings: danwei and communes. Since these collectives were 
expected to provide maximum resources to the progress of industrialisation, the living 
standards of people were largely restraint to a low level. It was argued that danwei 
welfare was used to compensate urban workers and buy their loyalty according to their 
importance attached to industrialisation. However, the same logic does not apply to rural 
areas because of the absence of similar welfare programs. A question arises here: Why 
would peasants consent to the imposition of rural collectives, while their welfare 
provision was far worse than urban workers? The following analysis reveals that, other 
than the strong policy enforcement, the Party also sought help from the effective 
propaganda of ideologies to justify the urban-rural disparity. These ideologies can all be 
headed by a titled called ‘communist China’. 
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 Developmentalism 
The first group of political ideologies referred to ‘developmentalism’, which included 
two elements: ‘localised disparity’ and ‘self-reliance’. Against the background of the 
pro-industrialisation development, the privilege position of urban workers, such as 
comprehensive danwei welfare, was explained as a dichotomy grounded on two different 
institutions. For instance, Liao Lu-yan (1956a, p368) explained in 1956 that urban 
workers could only benefit from wages as their products were turned in to the state. By 
contrast, the products of peasants were mainly distributed to themselves and only a small 
proportion was kept in collective welfare fund. Consequently, it was ‘unreasonable’ and 
‘impossible’ for rural collectives to undertake those welfare programs beyond this fiscal 
capacity. Similarly, in 1957 Mao (1957a, p336) disagreed with the argument that urban 
workers were preferentially treated by the state. The reasons were because ‘the 
efficiency of workers was much higher than peasants and the living costs of peasants 
were comparatively cheaper than urban workers’. Moreover, the report to the Eighth 
National CPC Congress in 1958 stated that: 
It is necessary for some reasonable differences existing in the living standards 
between workers and peasants or urban and rural areas, as well as in different 
natures of jobs, different levels of skills or different regions. …Considering the 
problem of labour income and welfare, it should be adapted to the situation of 
rural areas rather than copy the current setting of danwei (Liu 1958, p319).   
 
In addition, the Party boosted the value of self-reliance for peasants as it was unintended 
to put much investment into rural areas. According to the interpretation of Liao Lu-yan 
(1956b, p67) about the Outline (Draft) of National Agricultural Development 1956-19 6 7 , 
peasants were expected to rely on their forces and mobilise as many as human, material 
and fiscal resources to achieve development in education, leisure, health service, 
housing and employment. Again, he emphasized that it was impossible for the state to 
fiscally assist rural areas because the transfer to rural development would delay 
industrial development. Likewise, the report to the Eighth National CPC Congress also 
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 maintained that the development of agriculture did not necessarily need to divert funding 
from industrialisation. On the contrary, it had been proven by the success of agricultural 
co-operation that the development of agriculture could simply rely on peasants’ own 
power without state investment (Liu, 1958, p309).  
 
In short, ‘developmentalism’ appealed to peasants not only to tolerate the unequal 
treatment in comparison to urban workers, but also to rely on their hard struggle for 
improvement.  
 
To coordinate the relation between the state, co llectives and individuals 
The second cluster of political rhetoric advocated by the Party was ‘to coordinate the 
relation between the state, collectives and individuals. This can be analysed by the 
following two sub-titles: ‘thrift’ and ‘to increase individual’s income’. Keeping thrifty in 
the management of rural collectives was considered as an important method to prevent 
resources from wasting in ‘non-productive’ areas. These ‘non-productions’ were 
believed to slow down the development of industrialisation and ultimately sacrifice the 
state’s interests. As early as 1953 when co-operatives were still experimental, it had 
already been argued that welfare provision should only be established only where 
existed advanced productivity existed as well as where there were urgent needs. 
Consequently, ‘it was extremely wrong and absurd for some co-operatives to display 
extravagance rather than focus on production, such as building offices, dining halls and 
bath rooms’ (The CPC Central Committee 1953b, p242).  
 
During the process of vigorously developing co-operatives in 1956, The CPC Central 
Committee and State Council (1956b) issued a specific document to criticise the 
phenomenon of extravagance and waste (puzhang langfei ). The problem was described 
as ‘an overdraft of non-production costs’ such as ‘building new houses, clubs or offices 
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 and buying massive and expensive goods for entertainment, chairs, desks or toys for kids 
in nurseries’. Furthermore, it was reasserted that welfare provision, such as 
transportation, postal and telecommunication, culture, sports, health service and housing, 
should develop in accordance to the level of productivity. Therefore, the document 
clearly instructed that co-operatives were forbidden to pay the members for their labour 
in the non-productive activities. In another document in 1956, it was further demanded 
that non-productive costs should be reduced or eliminated (The CPC Central Committee 
and State Council 1956a, p20). Similarly for communes, the CPC Central Committee 
suggested that most of their profits flow to collective accumulation for the investment of 
reproduction rather than collective consumption (The CPC Central Committee 1958b, 
p453). 
 
Other than the jeopardy to the state interest, collective welfare provision was also 
accused of setting back the increase of individual income. For example, dated back to 
1953, the Rural Work Department of the CPC Central Committee (1953, p428) noticed 
the problem of members receiving lower incomes after joining co-operatives. One of the 
reasons posited was that too many revenues of co-operatives were deducted for the 
collective accumulative fund and welfare fund. As a result, it was announced in 1953 
that collective accumulative fund and welfare fund would not increase until the actual 
incomes of members had a definite rise (The CPC Central Committee 1953c, p674). 
 
This dilemma was summarised by Mao in 1956 as one of the ten primary relationships in 
the country: the relation between the state, collectives and individuals. With the 
unquestionable correctness of the state retrieval of resources from peasants, Mao (1956, 
p90) argued that although the costs of production, collective accumulation fund and 
welfare fund were all ultimately served for members’ interests, their over-deduction may 
affect members’ current incomes. Thus, Mao suggested ‘not to do all the good things in a 
year’. The costs for production and the collective funds should be strictly controlled. By 




There is more evidence which shows the blame put on collective welfare at different 
stages of agricultural co-operation. It was once required that collective funds could be 
cut in senior co-operatives if there was not a significant rise of the production (The CPC 
Central Committee 1956a, p420). The reason, as pointed out by Liao Lu-yan (1956a, 
p369), was because only when members’ incomes increased would they be in favour of 
agricultural co-operation and socialism. Influenced by the great famine during 1959-
1961, it was even commanded in 1960 that poor communes or those affected by failed 
crops could contribute less to collective funds, so that the incomes of members would be 
maximised (The CPC Central Committee 1960, p667).  
 
In short, by blaming the collective funds as being extravagant and wasteful, the 
fundamental problem of the state diverting resources from peasants (e.g. state monopoly 
policy of purchasing and marketing of grain) could be cleverly blurred. 
 
Contradiction between capitalism and socialism 
The localised disparity between urban and rural areas, the promotion of self-reliance and 
the problemisation of rural collective welfare could be raised as whole to a third 
principle: contradiction between capitalism and socialism. It is shown in the following 
analysis that this rhetoric was mobilised in every critical crisis or transition of 
agricultural co-operation. For instance, Chen Yun (1953, p210-211) confessed that the 
state monopoly policy of purchasing and marketing of grain would probably sacrifice 
peasants’ interests and even lead to social resistance or riots among peasants. He also 
admitted that in order to keep up labour motivation, it would be much better to trade 
grain not only with money but also with daily necessities and other instruments of 
production (e.g. drought animals or farm tools). Nevertheless, this was definitely beyond 
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 the state’s capacity. In order to carry out this policy successfully, the Party proposed to 
widely mobilise Party members and government cadres at grass-roots levels to persuade 
peasants into understanding the significance. The embracing of it was in accordance to 
the highest interests of the entire people, a demonstration of obligations to the state and a 
display of patriotism (The CPC Central Committee 1953d, p487).  
 
In 1955, Mao (1955a, p254) criticised the opposition to agricultural co-operation as ‘a 
wrong observation from the perspectives of the bourgeoisie, the rich peasants or the 
well-to-do middle peasants (fuyu zhong nong ) with spontaneous tendency to capitalism’. 
Instead, he treated the movement of agricultural co-operation as a method to strengthen 
the alliance of workers and peasants. According to his judgment, new rich peasants had 
appeared and those well-to-do middle peasants were striving for becoming much richer; 
while many poor peasants were still struggling in poverty because of the deficient means 
of production. Therefore, Mao (1955a, p255) argued that only when the rich-peasant 
economy and the individual economy were eliminated by the socialist transformation in 
terms of agricultural co-operation would common prosperity be realised among all 
peasants.  
 
Between 1956 and 1957 when agricultural co-operation was being strongly promoted as 
an upsurge across the country, a phenomenon of peasants’ quitting co-operatives 
appeared as well. As croplands and other means of production were confiscated to senior 
co-operatives, some peasants felt that their properties had been infringed and their 
profits would have been reduced by collaboration in co-operatives. Thus, a few members 
in the provinces of Guangdong, Henan, Anhui, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Shanxi, Hebei and 
Liaoning, ranging from 1% to 5% of the households in each co-operative, decided to 
quit and take back their properties from the collectives. Assessed by the CPC Central 
Committee (1956b, p559), these people were largely composed by those well-to-do 
middle peasants. As a result, in 1957 Mao (1957b, p545) judged this situation as a 
struggle between two political directions: socialism or capitalism. He proposed a large-
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 scale socialist education to all the rural population, which specifically aimed to criticise 
the inclination of capitalism and individualism among those well-to-do middle peasants. 
Shortly afterwards, a detailed instruction was issued and four key topics were identified 
for a new round of ideological education: the superiority of co-operatives, the issue of 
the state monopoly of purchasing and marketing of grain, the relationship between 
workers and peasants, and the compliance to laws and regulations. Furthermore, it was 
clearly stated that the goal of the debates and discussions about these issues was to 
enhance peasants’ commitment to socialism, consolidate the institution of co-operatives, 
activate higher labour motivation, guarantee the task of the state monopoly purchasing 
of grain (The CPC Central Committee, 1957a).   
 
In relation to reaching consensus on distributing revenues in co-operatives and 
establishing communes, a campaign of socialist and communist education was launched 
in rural villages in 1958 (The CPC Central Committee, 1958b). With the methods of free 
airing of one’s view (daming dafang), great debates, big-character posters (da zi bao ), 
on-the-spot meetings ( xianchang hui ) and exhibitions, the following principle points 
were largely propagated: great achievement of bumper harvests because of communist 
co-operation, the coming vision of well-fed and well-clothed (fengyi zushi ) and the 
bright future of socialism and communism. More importantly, manifested by the 
resistance to agricultural co-operation, the attitudes of pro-capitalism, individualism and 
selfish departmentalism (benwei zhuyi ) should be severely criticised. In short, peasants 
were entreated to join the communes by the pronounced superiority of socialism. 
 
The Great Famine from 1959 to 1961 not only caused severe damage to rural 
productivity, but also undermined peasants’ confidence to the collective style of 
production. In order to increase the motivation without changing co-operative 
production, the CPC Central Committee (1961) conducted the education of socialism in 
rural villages at the end of 1961. It was aimed to propagate the importance of upholding 
socialism, collectivism and patriotism, the significance of coordinating national, 
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 collective and individual interests, the necessity of inheriting hard work, plain living and 
self-reliance in revolutionary experiences. Especially, this document advocated that 
peasants should restore production by the means of agricultural co-operation; and 
support industrial construction and urban cities in terms of complying with the state 
monopoly policy of grain.   
 
In short, all of these texts demonstrate that the upholding of socialism was the most 
powerful and unquestionable principle to defend the Party’s ideas about the disparity of 
the welfare system.   
 
Familism 
In order to legitimate the whole welfare regime, the Party laid great significance on the 
last type of rhetoric: familism. This can be illustrated by the legislation of informal 
support. In 1950 one of the articles in the Marriage Law (Council of the Central 
Government 1950, p174) stated that ‘parents shall be under the obligation of upbringing 
and educating their children; the children shall also be under the obligation of supporting 
their parents.’ Furthermore, the Outline (Draft) of National Agricultural Development 
1956-196 7 was amended in 1957 and a paragraph about family care was added into the 
article about collective relief in rural areas. It was maintained that other than Five-
Guarantee Household and preferential treatment to martyrs’ families and disabled 
veterans by rural collectives, men and women of younger age should be educated to 
support and honour their parents when they became incapacitated (The CPC Central 
Committee 1957b, p652).  
 
Despite a certain extent of familism, it should be noticed that the function of the family 
was an adjunct to the collectives. Dependents of urban workers were entitled to danwei 
welfare while everyone in rural collectives could receive a basic amount of rationed 
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 grain regardless of the ability to work. Moreover, the Party was famous for its hostile 
attitudes to patriarchal relations. For example, it was proclaimed that the establishment 
of communes was to destroy the traditional patriarchy with thousands of year’s history 
(The CPC Central Committee 1958a, p616-617). Specifically, welfare institutions, such 
as collective dinning halls, nurseries, kindergartens and homes of respect for the aged, 
were symbolic of the liberation of women who had been serving the domestic 
responsibilities for thousands of years (The CPC Central Committee 1958a, p599). As 
Mao (1958b, p433) pointed out in 1958: 
Women would not be totally emancipated without one or two thousand jin grain 
for every one per year, collective dining halls, elderly homes, nurseries, learning 
to read and access to primary schools, middle schools or colleges. …Communes 
are the way for women towards total liberation. Patriarchy would be destroyed 
as wages were dispensed to women and youth instead of parents.     
 
Conclusion 
Due to the prioritisation of industry, danwei in urban areas and rural collectives were the 
two most distinctive institutions in pre-reform China. Also, they were the most important 
units of providing welfare to the members and their dependents. The significance of 
danwei and rural collectives were closely related to the intention of the state. Danwei 
welfare was used to exchange state workers’ obedience to the strategy of 
industrialisation as well as cultivate their loyalty to the Party and individual leaders. 
Similarly, welfare of rural collectives (mainly in terms of ‘Five-Guarantee Household’) 
was designed to faciliate agricultural co-operation which was supposed to guarantee 
necessary recourses for industrialisation. In addition, there were four sets of political 
ideologies that were mobilised to legitimate China’s welfare regime in the communist 
period (1949-1978): ‘developmentalism’, ‘to coordinate the relation between the state, 
























 Chapter Five 
Economic China: The Political  Economy and Ideologies of 
the Welfare System 1978-2002 
 
Introduction 
Subsequent to the economic reform in 1978, China’s welfare regime had experienced 
significant changes. The first task of this chapter is to describe the transitions in the 
political economy as well as the development of the welfare system during each 
National Congress of the CPC from 1978-2002. Then, it will characterise the welfare 
mix and the stratification during this period. Finally, this chapter will identify the 
political ideologies that were used to justify the continuities and discontinuities of the 
welfare regime.  
 
Political economy of the welfare system  
The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee (1978-19 8 2 ) 
The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee in 1978 marked the 
most crucial transition for China in the recent decades. The Party decided to put its 
emphasis of work on ‘four modernisations’ of industry, agriculture, national defence, and 
science and technology. This announcement indicated a deviation from the Mao Ze-
dong’s ‘doctrine of class struggle’, which was especially upheld in the Cultural 
Revolution. Now, more pragmatic thoughts were adopted by the Party. As Deng Xiao-
ping (1978a) advocated, ‘Only by emancipating our minds, seeking truth from facts, 
proceeding from reality in everything and integrating theory with practice can socialist 
modernisation work smoothly.’ 
 
 92
 According to the senior leader Chen Yun’s (1979a) assessment, the reality of initiating 
four modernisations was: ‘80 per cent of the 900 million populations are living in 
villages. Some are beggars even after thirty years of the revolutionary victory and they 
need to improve their living standards.’ Deng Xiao-ping (1979) summarised the 
principle contradiction at that time as ‘the level of our productive forces is very low and 
is far from meeting the needs of our people and the country’. 
 
Under this circumstance, material incentives were perceived as the most important 
means to motivate people for production and ultimately enhance their livelihoods. Deng 
Xiao-ping (1978a) even asserted: ‘Revolution is based on material interests. If only 
talking about dedication rather than material interests, it would be idealism (weixin 
zhuyi ).’ In Deng Xiao-ping’s (1978a) design, inequality of income growth could be 
tolerated and he perceived it as beneficial to the future prosperity for all the people:  
I think we should allow some regions, some enterprises, some workers and 
peasants to earn more and enjoy more benefits sooner than others in accordance 
with their hard work and greater contributions to society. …This will help the 
whole national economy to advance wave upon wave and help the people of all 
our nationalities to become prosperous in a comparatively short period. 
 
In order to improve people’s living standards, the Party proposed several key changes in 
economic institutions. Firstly, an opening-up policy was launched to welcome foreign 
technologies and capitals to start businesses in China. The southern coastal provinces of 
Guangdong and Fujian were approved as special economic zones. Secondly, national 
enterprises should be given more autonomous power in operation and their management 
was expected to gradually separate from government administration (zheng qi fenkai ). 
Furthermore, the revenues of national enterprises and their workers should be associated 
with final outputs and profits. Thirdly, the economic unit of accounting in rural 
collectives was aimed at the lowest level - production teams and the principle of 
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 distribution according to one’s work should be strictly carried out to prevent 
egalitarianism. Furthermore, commune members were allowed to maintain their private 
plots of cropland, household sideline production was approved (The Eleventh CPC 
Central Committee, 1978). Fourthly, the market was legitimate as ‘a subordinated but 
necessary composition’ of the socialist economy and ‘it is a beneficial complement and 
basically not harmful’. Thus, ‘it is not necessary the more of the command, the less of 
the market; they may proportionately increase’ (Chen, 1979b).  
 
As ‘class struggle’ was eliminated from the dominant political ideology and more pro-
capitalist revisions seemed to be introduced into the coming economic reform (e.g. 
market, incentives or temporary inequality), the Party had to provide accounts for the 
political institution of one-party rule. Deng Xiao-ping (1979) proposed Four Cardinal 
Principles (sixiang jiben yuanze) during the drive for socia list modernisation, which was 
‘adhering to the socialist road, people’s democratic dictatorship, leadership of the CPC, 
and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Ze-dong Thoughts’. Since its proposal, Four Cardinal 
Principles have been regarded as unquestionable guidelines in politics throughout the 
process of economic reform.  
 
The reform of rural collectives was definitely in the spotlight during this period, since it 
proceeded more rapidly than the Party’s expectation. At first, the Party was still 
uncertain about a thorough institutional change. It was declared in 1979 that production 
tasks could be contracted to smaller units of groups (baogan dao zu ) and the revenues of 
peasants would be correlated to their extra output beyond the quota. However, ‘contract 
to individual household’ was still forbidden except in some extremely undeveloped areas 
(The Eleventh CPC Central Committee, 1979). It turned out that ‘contract to groups’ was 
greatly advocated at local levels because of the incentive motivation. For example, by 
the end of 1979, 61.6%, 57.6% and 52% of the production teams respectively in the 
provinces of Anhui, Sichuan and Guizhou had already implemented this policy (Yin and 
Yang 2004, p58). In the next year, the Party apparently eased the restriction of ‘contract 
to household’ (baogan dao hu) as this policy was encouraged in poor areas. Furthermore, 
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 those ordinary areas which had conducted this policy were allowed to carry on unless 
the masses were dissatisfied with it (The CPC Central Committee, 1980). Lastly, 
‘contract to household’ was acknowledged in 1981 as one of the responsibility systems 
of production in socialist collective economy (The CPC Central Committee, 1981) and it 
had been adopted by 86.7% of all the production teams across the country in 1982 (Yin 
and Yang 2004, p64).  
 
During 1978-1982, the initiation of economic reform re-oriented the national strategy to 
‘four modernisations’. Specifically, it was a pragmatic move for the Party to focus on the 
improvement of the livelihood of the individual within the political institution of one-
party rule. It was notable that peasants were the first beneficiaries of the reform because 
of the decentralisation of production and distribution in rural collectives. However, the 
welfare system still remained intact until the reform was extended to national enterprises 
later.  
 
The Twelfth National Congress of the CPC (1982-19 8 7 ) 
‘To achieve four modernisations and build a highly civilised and democratic socialist 
country’ was confirmed in the Twelfth National Congress of the CPC in 1982 as the 
general mission in the new era (Hu, 1982). The economic institution was further 
interpreted from previous ‘complement’ to ‘planned commodity economy based on 
public ownership’. This meant that although the command economy was still recognised 
as domination in China, certain goods (e.g. some agricultural products and daily 
necessities) and service industry were completely opened to the market. Furthermore, 
other than mandatory planning ( zhilingxing jihua), it was pointed out that command 
economy could also consist of guidance planning (zhidaoxing jihua ): the macro 
regulation of the market by the state (The Twelfth CPC Central Committee, 1984).   
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 The highlights during this period include the fundamental abolition of the commune 
institution, the restructuring of national enterprises and the further opening-up of special 
economic zones. Firstly, as the household responsibility system of production thrived in 
rural areas, the main function of the commune in economic co-operation had little 
significance any more. Up to the end of 1984 ‘contract to household’ had been carried 
out by 99% of all the 5.69 million production teams (Yin and Yhang 2004, p69). 
Therefore, it was decided that the institution of the commune should be completely 
replaced by county ( xiang ) government by the end of 1984 and Villagers’ Committee 
would be in charge of local affairs at village level. From then, the economic activities of 
peasants were set free from totalitarian control by rural collectives (The CPC Central 
Committee and State Council, 1983).  
 
Secondly, as inspired by the previous success of reform in rural areas, the Party decided 
to promote comprehensive changes for national enterprises from 1984. ‘To invigorate 
enterprises’ was valued as the key in the economic reform (The Twelfth CPC Central 
Committee, 1984). It was clarified that the state ownership of enterprises may not be 
necessarily equivalent to the direct operation of the state. Rather, enterprises could be 
independent in management and responsible for their own profits and losses. Meanwhile, 
the income of workers should be based on their performance and the success of 
enterprises.   
 
Thirdly, new special economic zones were established in far northern areas of China. 
Fourteen more coastal cities were recognised as special economic zones and preferential 
policies in taxes and lands were employed to attract foreign capital (The CPC Central 
Committee and State Council, 1984).  
 
In regard to political reform, Deng Xiao-ping clearly showed his opposition to Western 
democracy, including multi-party election and separation of the executive, legislative 
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 and judicial powers. Deng Xiao-ping (1987a) described himself as ‘conservative’ 
because he objected to ‘bourgeois liberalisation’ ( zichan jieji ziyouhua) in politics. 
According to his argument, ‘We cannot simply copy the institution from the capitalist 
countries, and we cannot allow bourgeois liberalisation. For instance, we cannot 
abandon the leadership of the Party. Without the Party there would be chaos, or at least 
instability. Under those conditions, any development would be impossible (Deng, 
1987b).’ Thus, the political reform in his mind was confined to certain aspects such as 
promoting younger leaders, streamlining the administrative structure and decentralising 
the control (Deng, 1987c).   
 
The reform initiated in national enterprises led to the corresponding change of danwei 
welfare. The term ‘social security’ (shehui baozhang ) appeared in the highest-level 
document for the first time. As pointed out by the Seventh Five-Year Plan for National 
Economic and Social Development  in 1985, a new social security system, especially in 
terms of pension and unemployment insurance for workers, should be established based 
on ‘diversified types, different programs and varied standards’. It was suggested by these 
principles that the funding of social security should be shared by the state, enterprises 
and individuals instead of all being guaranteed by the state as before. Its design was 
required to comply with the actual situation of China and its coverage, programs and 
standards must not exceed the affordability of the state, enterprises and individuals. At 
the same time these new state sponsored plans were being initiated it was declared that 
tradition of mutual help within family and neighbours should be carried forward (The 
CPC Central Committee, 1985). 
 
The launch of the social security system was aimed at coordinating the restructuring of 
urban enterprises. Due to the introduction of market competition, enormous efforts were 
spent on abolishing egalitarianism (‘eating from the same big pot’; chi daguo fan) and 
vanishing permanent employment (‘iron rice bowl’; tie fanwan). State-owned enterprises 
could now apply to the bankruptcy procedure in accordance with the law. Also, jobs in 
 97
 the national enterprises were no longer permanently secure and workers could be fired if 
they violated the codes of conduct (State Council, 1986a). In addition, the workers who 
were newly recruited from 1986 were asked to sign a fixed term contract. These new 
workers retirement benefits were to be funded by employer contributions of 15% of 
wages, matched by a 3% contribution from the workers (State Council, 1986b). Lastly, 
the funds for unemployment insurance were fully funded by enterprises with 1% of the 
total wages. Workers from bankrupted enterprises or whose contracts were terminated 
were eligible to claim unemployment benefit up to twenty-four months (State Council, 
1986c).  
 
During 1982-1987, the steps of reform were speeded up. The institution of the commune 
was finally abolished and national enterprises were becoming more market-oriented. 
More coastal cities were opened up as special economic zones to attract foreign 
investment. The reform of government functions and administration was undertaken but 
without any change related to one-party rule. Against this background, the introduction 
of labour contract, retirement benefit and unemployment insurance in 1986 can be seen 
as the beginning of China’s social security system.   
 
The Thirteenth National Congress of the CPC (1987-19 9 2 ) 
The theory of the primary stage of socialism was proposed in the Thirteenth National 
Congress of the CPC in 1987. This theory was supposed to provide justification for the 
economic reform. It was argued that the primary stage of socialism did not necessarily 
occur in every socialist country; rather, it specifically pointed to the phase when 
socialism in China would be constructed under the circumstances of backward 
productive forces and undeveloped commodity economy. Due to this assessment, the 
principal contradiction could be defined as the one between the ever-growing material 
and cultural needs of people and the backwardness of social production. Consequently, it 
was reasonable for the fundamental task to focus on developing productive forces and 
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 ultimately achieve socialist modernisation. In short, the key elements for the Party to 
build socialism with Chinese characteristics in the primary stage could be summarised as 
‘one centre and two basics’: centring on economic development, sticking to the Four 
Cardinal Principles and pressing ahead with reform and opening-up (Zhao 1987, p9-13). 
 
In line with the recognition of the primary stage of socialism, the goal of economic 
growth was specified into three phases. Firstly, by the end of the 1980s, GNP would be 
twice as high as in 1980 and the problem of food and clothing (wen bao) would be 
basically solved. It was declared that this phase was basically accomplished in 1987. 
Secondly, GNP would double again by the end of the twentieth century and the living 
standards of people would achieve a moderate level of prosperity. Thirdly, by the middle 
of the next century, GNP per capita would approach that of the mid-level developed 
countries (Zhao 1987, p16).   
 
During this period, the market mechanisms were drawing more and more attention from 
the Party. The inter-relation between the market and state planning in the economic 
institution ‘planned commodity economy based on public ownership’ was further 
clarified. The market, which determined the activities of enterprises, should be regulated 
through state planning by economic, legal and administrative measures (Zhao 1987, p26-
27). Moreover, Deng Xiao-ping’s (1990) remarks explicitly showed his continuous 
support in adopting the market device after the incident of Tian’anmen Square in 1989: 
‘Socialism can have the market economy, while capitalism also has control through 
planning.’ He added, ‘Planning and the market are both the means. The market can also 
serve socialism (Deng, 1991a).’ 
 
The other highlight of the Thirteenth National Congress of the CPC was the 
confirmation of transforming government functions (Zhao 1987, p34-47). According to 
‘the demands of the economic reform and the separation of national enterprises from 
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 government administration’, the contents of the restructuring of government bodies in 
1988 were all aimed at ‘improving the unreasonable structure of departments and the 
low efficiency of administration by transforming functions, decentralising power, 
restructuring departments, reducing staff, minimising government administration in 
enterprise management, strengthening macro-control capability’ (Song, 1988). Also, 
social organisations were expected to take up some of the functions of administrative 
departments because it was proposed that ‘the effects of mass organisations and 
autonomous mass organisations at grass-root levels should be fully utilised, so that the 
masses can carry out their affairs by themselves in accordance to law (Zhao 1987, p39)’. 
All of these contents were re-emphasised by each of the political reforms subsequently 
in 1993 (Luo, 1993), 1998 (Luo, 1998) and 2003 (Wang, 2003).  
 
More innovations in the welfare system were called for in the Report about the Ten-Year 
Plan of National Economic and Social Develo pment and the Outline of the Eighth Five-
Year Plan. The reformation of free medical care and public housing and the 
establishment of industrial injury insurance was about to launch (Li, 1991a). For 
example, drastic ideas of privatisation were proposed in public housing. The operation of 
public housing was going to run on a basis of the market rather than depend on free 
allocation by danwei (State Council, 1991). Furthermore, active attempts should be 
initiated for setting up the pension schemes (Li, 1991a). It was suggested that rich 
villages should carry out trials, which were mainly based on personal contributions and 
small amounts of collective subsidies. Meanwhile, the provinces (cities) of Jiangxi, 
Guangdong, Shanghai, Dalian and Qingdao were chosen for experiments of pension in 
national enterprises. Likewise, employees in non-national enterprises, such as Sino-
foreign joint ventures, enterprises with Sino-foreign cooperation, foreign-owned 
enterprises, private-owned enterprises and individuals business, were also encouraged to 
join the pension scheme (State Council, 1991).  
 
The final point to mention refers to the ‘socialisation of social welfare’. As the political 
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 reform demanded restructuring of national enterprises, transforming government 
functions and activating social organisations, personal services previously conducted by 
danwei were now transferred to private channels, such as family, community 
organisations and the market. According to the explanation of then Minister of Civil 
Affairs Cui Nai-fu (1982-1993; 1992, p137), ‘Along with further reform of large- and 
medium-scale enterprises and the transition of their operational systems, some of the 
services carried out previously by enterprises would have to be transferred to society.’ 
Particularly, ‘socialisation’ could be defined as: ‘push the society and the masses to carry 
out their affairs by themselves with the advocacy, regulation and subsidy of the 
government’ (Ministry of Civil Affairs 1991, p129). 
 
During 1987-1992, the theory of the primary stage of socialism established the centrality 
of economic development and acknowledged the introduction of market mechanisms. 
Furthermore, Deng Xiao-ping’s design of political reform was actualised mainly in 
terms of transforming government functions to regulation. In regard to the welfare 
system, the reform of free medical care, public housing and pension was being piloted in 
certain localities. Meanwhile, the government remained reluctant to take over other 
aspects of danwei welfare and thus encouraged the ‘socialisation of social welfare’ to 
family, community organisations and the market. 
 
The Fourteenth National Congress of the CPC (1992-19 9 7 ) 
After the incident of Tian’anmen Square in 1989, Deng Xiao-ping decided to make a 
whirlwind tour in South China to eliminate the doubts about the economic reform. 
During the trip, he made his famous remarks about the essence of socialism to justify the 
use of the market device in socialist China. As Deng Xiao-ping (1992) pointed out, ‘The 
proportion of planning to the market forces is not the essential difference between 
socialism and capitalism.’ He argued that ‘the essence of socialism is the liberation and 
the development of the productive forces, the elimination of exploitation and 
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 polarization, and the ultimate achievement of prosperity for all’. Consequently, “the 
chief criterion for making a distinction of what is socialist and what is capitalist should 
be whether it could promote the growth of the productive forces in socialist society, 
increase the overall strength of the socialist state and improve people’s living standards”. 
 
This trip of Deng Xiao-ping produced influential impacts on the following Fourteenth 
National Congress of the CPC. The exact word ‘market’ (shichang) was finally accepted 
by the Party, because it was clearly declared that ‘the goal of economic restructuring is 
to establish the socialist market economy for liberating and developing productive 
forces’. Meanwhile, the structure of ownership in China was re-defined as ‘public 
ownership as the main form and the joint development of diversified forms of 
ownership’; while the way of distribution was re-conceptualised as ‘the distribution 
according to work as domination and the coexistence of a variety of modes of 
distribution’ (Jiang, 1992). As to distribution of income, it was particularly emphasized 
that ‘priority should be given to efficiency with due consideration to fairness’ ( xiaolv 
youxian jiangu gongping ; The Fourteenth CPC Central Committee, 1993).   
 
‘To establish a modern enterprise system’ was set as one of the most crucial ways to 
further deepen the reform. This call not only reinforced the divisions between the 
government and national enterprises in ownership, power and responsibilities; it also 
pointed out that the selection of national enterprises, whereby superior enterprises would 
prosper and inferior ones be eliminated, should be based on their competitiveness in the 
market. Thus, enterprises with long-term losses shall be closed down (The Fourteenth 
Central Committee, 1993). Afterwards, State Council (1996; 1994a) decided to promote 
the bankruptcy of large- or medium-scale national enterprises in eighteen cities from 
1994 and the experiment was extended to thirty-two more cities in 1996. In order to 
account for the massive bankruptcy, then Chairman Jiang Ze-min (1995a) even re-
interpreted the criterion of the state-owned economy: ‘In the next few years, the 
proportion of the state-owned economy may fluctuate in some industries. But it will still 
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 play a leading role as long as the state-owned economy occupies the dominant position 
in the key industries in the national economy.’ It turned out that the wave of closing 
national enterprises with poor performance had become widespread in the country. This 
could be illustrated by the fact that 7.2 out of 8.6 billion loans which were unable to pay 
back by bankrupted enterprises were not from those experimental cities (Zhu, 1997a).  
 
Aiming to help those enterprises in financial crisis, Zhu Rong-ji (1997a), then Deputy 
Premier, instructed three kinds of solutions: bankruptcy, merger and redundancy of 
employees. No matter which method was adopted, enterprises were to establish re-
employment centres to take up their laid-off or unemployed workers and guarantee their 
basic living expenses or unemployment benefitc. In brief, ‘Those enterprises eligible 
for closure should standardise the procedure of bankruptcy; those eligible for merger 
should be encouraged to do so; those ineligible for closure or merger and whose 
products are still demanded in the market can lay off employees and implement the re-
employment project (Zhu, 1997a).’  
 
During these years, the social security system was elaborated and it was supposed to 
reinforce the establishment of the socialist market economy. The Decision by the CPC 
Central Committee about Several Problems of Establishing the Institution of Socialist 
Market Economy  in 1993 was the first highest-rank document to map out the contents of 
the social security system. According to its description, the ‘multi-level social security 
system’ should consist of social insurance, social relief, social welfare, preferential 
treatment and settlement (for veteran soldiers), social mutual help and personal savings. 
Moreover, their standards should in principle comply with the development of the 




 Also, this document elaborated the dichotomised design for the sub-programs in urban 
and rural areas. On the one hand, the schemes of pension, medical insurance, 
unemployment insurance and industrial injury insurance were made compulsory for the 
employees of urban enterprises. It was particularly pointed out that pension and 
unemployment insurance were the keys to reduce the burden on enterprises, reorganise 
the structure of enterprises, and enhance the profitability and competency of enterprises. 
On the other hand, the support of elderly peasants mainly rested on family, but peasants 
from better-off villages were encouraged to join the pension schemes based on personal 
savings. Meanwhile, the co-operative scheme of medical care needed improvement in 
rural areas (The Fourteenth CPC Central Committee, 1993). 
 
In the following years the social security system and other welfare reforms (e.g. housing) 
were mostly focused mostly on urban areas, especially linked to the transformation of 
national enterprises. Among specific regulations reflecting this was the State Council 
(1994a) promulgation that the prime task of the bankrupted enterprises was to 
successfully re-settle their employees. The money derived from land auction should be 
used first for severance payments. Furthermore, according to legislation, unemployed 
workers were entitled to unemployment benefit and after that they could receive social 
relief if they were in great need.  
 
Secondly, with contributions by enterprises and individuals, the schemes of pension and 
medical insurance were featured as ‘the combination of socially-pooled funds and 
personal accounts’ (The CPC Central Committee and State Council, 1997; State Council, 
1995). Taking pension as an example, it was legislated that the pension scheme should 
cover all types of employees in cities by the end of the 1990s (State Council, 1995). 
Employees were to contribute 4%-8% of their wages into personal accounts, while 
employers would top up personal accounts to a total of 11% and pay additional 
contribution to socially-pooled funds. The total share of employers’ contributions to 
personal accounts and socially-pool funds should normally not exceed 20% of 
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 employees’ wages. After a minimum length of fifteen years for contribution, the monthly 
pension would be constituted by 1/120 of the total savings in personal account and 20% 
of the average wage in the locality dispensed by socially-pooled funds (State Council, 
1997a).  
 
Thirdly, a new scheme, the UMLSG, was added into the social security system in 1997. 
According to its tentative regulation, the UMLSG was mainly designed for unemployed 
or laid-off workers as the last safety net. This can be seen from its targets listed in the 
regulation: 1) three nos; 2) urban residents whose average family incomes were lower 
than local thresholds during the period of claiming unemployment benefit; or who were 
still unemployed after no longer eligible for unemployment benefit; 3) urban residents 
whose average family incomes were lower than thresholds after they received wages, 
minimum wages, basic living expenses for laid-off workers or pensions (State Council, 
1997b).  
 
Last but not least, the commercialisation of housing was perceived as a new engine for 
economic growth (Zhu, 1997b). According to its design, the allocation of housing would 
be changed from danwei to the market to a large extent: a tier of economically 
affordable housing for mid- and low-income families and the other tier of commercial 
housing for the families of higher incomes. There were also a series of tasks announced 
for housing reform: establishing accumulative housing fund (contributed by enterprises 
and individuals), enhancing the rents of public housing, selling public housing to tenants 
and speeding up the development of economically affordable housing (State Council, 
1994b). 
 
During 1992-1997, the socialist market economy was finally made legitimate in China. 
This not only allowed the co-existence of other forms of ownership and various modes 
of distribution, but also explicitly prioritised efficiency and minimised fairness. 
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 Furthermore, the goal of establishing a modern enterprise system required the 
abandonment of danwei welfare and caused a massive load of laid-off or unemployed 
workers from inferior national enterprises. Under this circumstance, more attention was 
paid to the social security system and other welfare reforms in cities because they were 
all connected to the prime task of the restructuring of national enterprises.  
 
The Fifteenth National Congr ess of the CPC (1997-2 0 0 2 ) 
The further restructuring of the state-owned economy was still the central task in this 
period. It was argued that instead of dominating most sectors of the economy, the 
leading role of the state-owned sector could be demonstrated in its control of the 
lifelines of the national economy. By acknowledging this presumption, the reduction of 
the state-owned economy was then not seen to threaten the socialist nature of China 
(Jiang, 1997a). Consequently, it was proposed in 1998 that the majority of the large- and 
medium-size national enterprises should get rid of losses and succeed in establishing a 
modern enterprise system within three years. In order to achieve this goal, following 
practices were employed, such as encouraging mergers, standardising bankruptcy, laying 
off and reassigning redundant workers, streamlining for higher efficiency, and 
implementing re-employment projects.  
 
The consequence of the radical reform was a huge number of laid-off workers during 
1998-2001. According to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (2003, p161-162), 
there were 25.5 million laid-off workers from national enterprises. Regarding this, Jiang 
Ze-min (1999) pointed out that ‘the assessment of the reform of national enterprises not 
only depends on whether they can make profits in the end, but also relies on how laid-off 
workers are treated and whether the work of re-employment is conducted well’. 
Therefore, re-employment centres for laid-off workers were set up in every national 
enterprise to carry out the practice of dispensing basic living expenses, paying social 
insurance premiums, and conducting re-employment trainings. Moreover, some schemes 
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 of the social security system were seen as vitally important to protect laid-off workers, 
such as pension, medical insurance, unemployment insurance and the UMLSG (Li, P. 
1998).  
 
Since most of the claimants for social insurance had not paid any contributions in the 
past, it was decided that the seniority of laid-off workers working in national enterprises 
could be assumed as the years of contribution to social insurance (The CPC Central 
Committee and State Council, 1998). As a result, the funding of social insurance and 
basic living expense for redundant workers had to rely on a ‘three-thirds system’ (san 
san zhi ): equal contributions by the government, enterprises and social security funds 
(The CPC Central Committee and State Council, 1998). However, a large deficit was 
caused because of the huge number of claimants emerging in a short time. This can be 
illustrated by the fact that the contribution to pension owed by national enterprises had 
reached 37.6 billion yuan by the end of 1999 and the incomes of the pension funds in 
twenty-six cities were falling short of expenditures in 2000. In order to solve the 
problem, the central government had invested about 19 billion Yuan in total. The ‘three-
thirds system’ seemed to fail because it turned out that the government actually 
contributed 70% of the total (Zhu, 2000).  
 
In order to guarantee the subsistence of redundant workers, it was quite urgent for the 
government to expand the coverage of social insurance. Consequently, except 
government bodies, the scheme of pension was to be strictly implemented in all kinds of 
urban enterprises. In addition, the share of enterprises should be unified and the funds 
should be co-ordinated at provincial levels (State Council, 1998a). At the same time, all 
the urban enterprises, government bodies and their employees were expected to join 
medical insurance (State Council, 1998b) and its funds should be co-ordinated at 
municipal levels (Li, 2001). It was also established that instead of relying wholly on 
enterprises as before, starting in 1998 employees needed to contribute 1% of their wages 
to unemployment insurance (The CPC Central Committee and State Council, 1998). As 
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 the allocation of housing by danwei was finally ended in the late 1998, accumulated 
housing funds - respectively contributed by enterprises and individuals of no less than 
5% - were considered as the main source for purchasing housing in the market (State 
Council, 1998c).  
 
The other solution referred to the repeated emphasis of ‘two ensures’ (liangge quebao ) 
and ‘three guaranteed thresholds’ (santiao baozhangxian ) to local governments. ‘Two 
ensures’ meant that basic living expenses for laid-off workers and pensions for retired 
personnel should be allocated to them both timely and sufficiently; while ‘three 
guaranteed thresholds’ referred to the process that, after receiving basic living expenses 
for three years, laid-off workers would become ‘unemployed’ and eligible for 
unemployment benefit (State Council, 2000a; 2000b; 1999a; The CPC Central 
Committee and State Council, 1998). In addition, as institutionalised across the country 
in 1999, the UMLSG was expected as ‘the last safety net’ for those three-no targets or 
families whose average incomes were lower than local thresholds (State Council, 1999b). 
Afterwards, the thresholds of the UMLSG were required to be less than minimum wage, 
basic living expense and unemployment benefit (State Council, 2001). Meanwhile, it 
was strongly suggested that the UMLSG should ‘cover whoever is eligible’ (ying bao jin 
bao; Zhu, 2002a) 
 
As one of the components in the social security system, social welfare was experiencing 
more radical ‘socialisation’. The contents of the ‘socialisation of social welfare’ were 
clarified by then Minister of Civil Affairs Duoji Cairang (1998-2003; 1998). Firstly, the 
range of beneficiaries (older people, disabled and orphans) should be expanded from 
three-nos to the whole group in society. For example, all older people could be admitted 
to state nursing homes providing that they could afford the fees. Secondly, various 
sources of fund raising, such as welfare lotteries and donations, could be used to support 
public funds for social welfare. Furthermore, private investors were warmly welcomed 
to initiate businesses in the elderly care field. Thirdly, community organisations were 
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 encouraged to undertake responsibility for the provision of care and support. Fourthly, 
volunteers were expected to be fully mobilised to support service delivery. In essence, 
the role of the state in social welfare should be restricted to designing goals, plans and 
policies, and inspecting their implementation.  
 
There was still a major campaign for the ‘socialisation of social welfare’ in the early 
2000s. Its guiding principle was formulated in the Suggestions about Speeding up the 
Socialisation of Social Welfare  as: ‘Based on family support, supported by community 
and supplemented by social welfare systems’. Meanwhile, the role of state provision was 
constrained because it was clearly stated that ‘state-owned systems of social welfare 
should be the demonstrations while other ownerships of social welfare systems should 
be the backbone (Ministry of Civil Affairs et al., 2000)’. 
 
Lastly, compared to the expanding coverage of social insurance in urban areas, the social 
security system in rural areas remained underdeveloped. It was still argued that the 
protection of peasants should rest on the incomes from their croplands because of the 
household responsibility system of production. Accordingly, the unit of family was 
advocated as the main source to support older people in rural areas (Zhu, 2000).  
 
During 1997-2002, the restructuring of national enterprises had become more radical 
than ever before; a very short limit of three years was set as the deadline. Therefore, with 
the dismantling of danwei welfare, it was very important for social insurance to expand 
its coverage for urban employees. Moreover, re-employment centres, basic living 
expenses and the UMLSG undertook the major responsibility to protect laid-off or 
unemployed workers. Meanwhile, in terms of services for older people, disabled and 
orphans, social welfare administered by the departments of Civil Affairs had more 
specific guidance for the ‘socialisation’. Lastly, the social security system was still 
underdeveloped in rural areas and the unit of family was embraced as the main source 
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 for welfare.   
 
Summary 
There had been fundamental changes in the political economy of China’s welfare system 
during 1978-2002. After the Cultural Revolution, the national strategy was re-oriented to 
socialist modernisation: developing backward productive forces and improving people’s 
living standards.  On the one hand, market devices were introduced into the socialist 
market economy. The institution of the commune collapsed shortly after the launch of 
the economic reform and the mode of production was replaced by household 
responsibility system. Meanwhile, the leading role of state-owned economy was 
redefined as the control of the lifelines of the national economy rather than in quantity. 
Therefore, there was a very radical for the restructuring of national enterprises to a 
market-based system, especially for those that performed poorly in competition. During 
this process, it was claimed that efficiency was prioritised over fairness in distribution. 
Moreover, the opening-up policy not only boosted economic growth by export 
manufactures, but also created a massive floating population between urban and rural 
areas. On the other hand, due to the profound changes to China’s economic base, the 
CPC had to relax its totalitarian control previously imposed through danwei and rural 
collectives. The political reforms always concerned about the decentralising, to some 
extent, the power of enterprises and social organisations, transforming government 
functions in regulation and increasing administrative efficiency. However, Four Cardinal 
Principles or one-party rule was absolutely unshakable in the political institution. 
Embedded in this political economy, development of the welfare system was outlined 
above and it will be summarised in the next section. 
 
Welfare mix and stratification 
The welfare mix and the stratification of China’s welfare regime during 1978-2002 were 
closely related to the urban-rural disparity. Based on the historical development of the 
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welfare system described above, Figure 5.1 summarises the main welfare programs for 
urban residents, migrant workers and peasants. Regarding the first group of peasants, as 
early as in 1984 the institution of the commune was replaced by county government and 
Villagers’ Committee for managing local affairs. Also, the mode of production was 
transformed from collaborative labour to household responsibility. It is without doubt 
that the re-organisation of production greatly improved productive forces and incomes of 
most peasants. However, the decentralisation of power did undermine the collective 
function of localities as the main welfare provider to a large extent. This is because the 
new administrative authorities had much less power to raise collective welfare funds 
than earlier communes. Ironically, as peasants were not the key targets of the newly 
emerging social security system, welfare provision in rural areas still had to heavily rely 
on collective-raised funds at local levels.  
 
One of the consequences was that by 2002, registered rural residents comprised a huge 
population of 903.01 million (Department of Population and Employment Statistics 
2003, p209), but they were covered by underdeveloped welfare programs. Five-
Guarantee Household, respect homes for the aged and education were the three major 
schemes collectively provided by localities. However, the levels and the participation 
rates of collective schemes were very disappointing. This can be illustrated by rural 
pension and co-operative medical care. As started in 1991, the scheme of rural pension 
would only have 54.81 million participants with an inadequate fund of 2.33 million yuan 
by 2002 (Ministry of Labour and Social Security 2003, p5). Moreover, according to a 
national investigation by Ministry of Health (1998), there were only 6.5% of peasants 
joining the scheme of co-operative medical care in 1998 and 87.44% were self-financing 
medical costs. 
 
Due to the weakening of collective functions and the hands-off approach by the state, the 
other consequence was related to the primary importance of self-reliance and family 
support in the welfare mix. Previously, even if they were unqualified to Five-Guarantee 
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Figure 5.1: An Overview of China’s Welfare System 1978-2002 
 
Items Urban Areas Migrant Workers Rural Areas 
Pension Pension scheme for urban employees (1997): 
contributed by employees and their employers. 
Danwei institution for most of government 
bodies, non-profit government institutions.  
Old rural pension (1991): personal 
saving account with minor and 




Contributed by employees and their employers. 




Medical insurance for urban employees (1998): 
contributed by all kinds of employees and their 
employers. 
Extra medical aid for public servants.  
Old co-operative medical insurance 
inherited from the pre-reform period: 
existed in very limited rural areas.   
Industrial Injury 
Insurance 
Contributed by employers. None. 
Maternity 
Insurance 
Contributed by employers. 
Should apply for social 
insurance if they work for 
urban enterprises. 
However, the coverage 
rate for migrant workers 
had been extremely low. 
None. 
UMLSG mainly in terms of income maintenance 
(1999). 
Three-year basic living expenses for laid-off 
workers (1998). 
None. Five-Guarantee Household 





Disaster relief for victims.  
Social Welfare State residential homes for three nos. None. Respect homes for the aged 























Mutual Help Socialisation of social welfare for urban dwellers. Welfare lotteries or welfare donations.  
Housing Privatisation.  
Accumulative housing fund (1998): contributed 
by employees and their employers, respectively 
no less than 5%. 
None.  None.  
Education Nine-year compulsory education. Full tuition fees for their 
children if they went to 
school in cities.   
Collective-raised funds.  
 
 Household, the hard life of younger people with the ability to work or older people with 
family support could be supported by egalitarian distribution (e.g. basic ration of grain 
for everyone) and collaborative faming. After the reform, the targets of Five-Guarantee 
Household or respect homes for the aged remained confined to those unable to work 
plus without family support. However, the criteria became very strict and stigmatising 
when they appeared out of the context of agricultural co-operation. Without regular 
collective protection any more, peasants would be eligible only for collective relief when 
they lost their own ability to work as well as all the informal support. 
 
The second group referred to migrant workers who floated between urban and rural 
areas as labour surplus. In relation to the opening-up policy, a massive rural population, 
especially the young people, were allowed to temporarily work and live in cities. The 
number of migrant workers increased rapidly from 30 million in 1989 to 62 million in 
1993 (Li, 2008). According to Ministry of Labour and Social Security (2006), the figure 
reached about 100 million in 2002 and 80% of them were mobilising to cities. 
 
Despite such a large population working and residing in cities, these migrant workers 
were excluded from the urban welfare system. They were only entitled to the welfare 
programs attached to their household registrations. Therefore, migrant workers were not 
protected by the UMLSG; their children had to pay full tuition fees for the nine-year 
compulsory education which was universally free for urban residents. Furthermore, the 
coverage rate of social insurance for migrant workers was extremely low. According to a 
nationwide survey by National Bureau of Statistics (2006), 88.5% of the respondents 
worked for enterprises that did not apply any social insurance for them and 79.3% did 
not sign a contract. Meanwhile, even if migrant workers really contributed to social 
insurance such as a pension, it was legislated that in the future they could only claim 
their benefits from their original localities. This would produce a significant difference 
whether pension was claimed in urban or rural areas. The reason was because other than 
the contribution in personal account, future pension was also constituted by the part 
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 from socially-pooled fund, which was 20% of the average monthly wage at localities. 
Considering these limitations, migrant workers had to rely on their meagre incomes and 
family support for welfare.  
 
As to the third group, there were 349.34 million people registered as urban residents by 
2002 (Department of Population and Employment Statistics 2003, p209). The privileged 
position of urban residents no longer existed, but they were still better protected 
compared to peasants and migrant workers. Nine-year compulsory education was 
universally applied to them and the UMLSG was covering 20.65 million people whose 
family incomes were lower than local thresholds (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2010a). 
Meanwhile, due to ‘two ensure’, all the 4.1 million laid-off workers should receive the 
full amount of basic living expenses or pensions on time (Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security 2003, p3).  
 
In addition, an increasing proportion of the working population was covered by social 
insurance and the expansion of coverage was always a top priority. Danwei welfare was 
only preserved for public servants or government employees, while other ordinary urban 
employees contributed to most of the schemes with their employers. By 2002, 147.37 
million urban employees joined the scheme of pension and its fund accumulated to 
160.8 billion Yuan. Meanwhile, 36.08 million personnel were receiving pensions. 
Similarly, unemployment insurance had 101.82 million participants, while 6.57 million 
people were claiming unemployment benefit. Other than pension and unemployment 
insurance, medical insurance was another major scheme with 94.01 million contributors. 
Lastly, industrial injury insurance and maternity insurance covered 44.06 million and 
34.88 million employees (Ministry of Labour and Social Security 2006, p4-5). 
 
Despite the expanding coverage of social insurance, urban residents experienced radical 
privatisation of welfare. As social insurance only targeted the working population, this 
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 would leave a gap for people without regular occupations or dependents of working 
population. For example, the Ministry of Health (1999) reported that the ratio of urban 
residents who paid medical costs by themselves increased dramatically from 27.28% in 
1993 to 44.13% in 1998. Moreover, the traditional provision of personal services by 
danwei was transferred to private channels. This can be illustrated by the privatisation of 
housing and ‘socialisation of social welfare’. The rents of public housing were increased 
close to the market price. Although current occupiers could buy the public housing at a 
relatively cheap price, the main provision of housing in the future would depend on the 
market. Likewise, facing the great demands of elderly services released by danwei, the 
state limited its support to a very narrow scope of targets: the older people without 
income source and family support. Furthermore, the state advocated the rhetoric of 
‘socialisation’ for elderly support instead of undertaking further responsibility: ‘pushing 
the society and the masses to carry out their affairs by themselves with the advocacy, 
regulation and subsidy of the government’ (Ministry of Civil Affairs 1991, p129). 
 
In summary, inherited from the pre-reform period, the household registration system 
kept the urban-rural division in China’s welfare regime during 1978-2002. Firstly, since 
the welfare system in rural areas was not the focus of the welfare regime being re-
established, the expectation of raising welfare programs resided in collective provision 
as before. Nevertheless, due to the decentralisation of production, rural collectives no 
longer acted as the main welfare provider and the reformed authorities had much less 
power in guaranteeing collective funds. As a result, self-reliance and family support 
were given primary importance in the welfare mix. This can be illustrated by the fact 
that collective relief would not be delivered until beneficiaries had proven the losses of 
the ability to work and family support at the same time. 
 
Secondly, the household registration would not be changed even when peasants 
mobilised to cities as migrant workers. This meant that migrant workers were excluded 
from the welfare system in urban areas. They could only return to their localities for 
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 entitlements, however, which were far worse than those in the cities. Thus, similar to 
peasants, migrant workers heavily relied on their meagre incomes and family support for 
livelihoods and welfare.  
 
Thirdly, except for public servants and government employees, the main body of the 
welfare mix no long rested on danwei and its comprehensive provision. Instead, work-
related welfare was mainly changed to social insurance in terms of mutual contributions 
by employees and employers. Meanwhile, families whose incomes were lower than a 
certain level were entitled to the UMLSG for subsidies. Furthermore, regarding other 
personal services originally carried out by danwei, the state withdrew or maintained its 
limited intervention such as in housing or elderly service. Consequently, urban residents 
had to turn to other non-state channels. In short, occupational unit, the market, family 
and community organisation were all significant for welfare provision, while the state 
was the last resort for urban residents after the resources of these providers were cut off.   
 
Lastly, there were four main stratification effects produced by China’s welfare regime 
during 1978-2002. The welfare divisions existed in peasants, migrant workers, working 
urban residents, urban residents with difficult living, and public servants and other 
government employees. In terms of state provision, the well-being of peasants had 
always been ignored, even though they occupied the majority of the national population. 
They were covered by a limited number of collective-raised and low-level welfare 
programs. When they worked and lived in cities, migrant workers could not either 
enable them to access the urban welfare system unless their household registration 
changed. In other words, migrant workers undertook the same risks as urban residents 
but with differential treatment. By contrast, the category of urban residents was still the 
emphasis in the welfare regime, but they were not privileged any more. Instead of 
comprehensive provision, the work unit protected employees only to the extent of their 
contributions to social insurance. At the same time, the working population was forced 
to search for other sources for welfare, such as the market, family or community 
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 organisations. It was not until all of these channels broke down that the state would 
intervene for the families with difficult living. This created a growing division between 
those receiving state benefits, which was mainly composed of the traditional three-nos 
and the newly-emerging UMLSG beneficiaries. Lastly, compared to the marginal role of 
the state for the majority population, most elements of danwei welfare were preserved 
for public servants and other government employees.   
 
Political Ideologies  
No matter whether in urban or rural areas, the weakening or dismantling of protection 
from collective units and the reluctance of state intervention contributed to the greater 
significance attached to family, the market, or community. However, related to the four 
stratified groups of peasants, migrant workers, working urban residents and urban 
residents with difficult living, the Party needed to provide justifications to the re-
organisation of the welfare system: preservation of collective-based welfare for peasants, 
lack of protection to migrant workers, damage of the privilege of urban workers and a 
new means-test scheme for income maintenance in cities. The following analysis argues 
that the welfare regime during 1978-2002 was deeply affected by the dominant ideology 
of ‘economic China’, which was composed by ‘superiority of socialism’, ‘subordination 
of social system to economic system’ and ‘legitimacy of the CPC’.  
 
Superiority of socialism 
The first group of political ideologies referred to ‘superiority of socialism’, which was 
utilised to justify the economic reform and the enlarging income gap. At the beginning 
of the economic reform, controversy arose about the transition from Mao Ze-dong’s 
‘class struggle’ to Deng Xiao-ping’s ‘centring on economic development’. This debate 
led to the need of re-interpreting socialism in China and making it compatible to the 
capitalist means that was going to be employed. Deng Xiao-ping argued that socialism 
should not produce underdevelopment; rather, it was the superiority of socialism that 
drove the pragmatic turn of emphasizing ‘the development of social productive forces’ 
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 and ‘the improvement of people’s material and cultural life’. 
 
Socialism means eliminating poverty; pauperism is not socialism, still less 
communism (Deng, 1984). 
The fundamental demonstration of the superiority of socialism is: to allow social 
productive forces to develop in such a rapid speed that never occurred in 
previous societies and to gradually satisfy people’s increasing needs of material 
and cultural life. From the perspective of historical materialism, the 
consequence of correcting political leadership should essentially be shown in 
the development of social productive forces and the improvement of people’s 
material and cultural life. If the development of productive forces in socialist 
countries were slower than capitalist countries, how could superiority be 
mentioned ever (Deng 1978b, p128)? 
 
With the transformation of Chinese socialism, the specific implementations in the 
economic reform could be simply seen as pragmatic means to develop social productive 
forces and improve the living standards of the masses. However, how could the socialist 
institution be guaranteed when market competition, foreign capital, income difference 
and household responsibility of production were introduced? The answer lay in the 
understanding of ‘common prosperity’. On the one hand, ‘The status of common 
prosperity was by no means equivalent to absolute egalitarianism or the situation that all 
the social members were able to become rich at the same time and at the same speed 
(The Twelfth CPC Committee, 1984).’ The allowance of income gap, on the other hand, 
should not lead to polarisation. As Deng Xiao-ping (1986a, p172) pointed out, ‘Our 
policy will not lead to polarisation, a situation that the rich get richer while the poor get 
poorer. To be frank, we shall not permit the emergence of a new bourgeoisie.’ He even 




 Two reasons can be identified to explain why polarisation would not ensue. One reason 
was related to the socialist distribution according to one’s work:  
If turning to the capitalist road, it may make less than one per cent of Chinese 
become rich; but it must fail to solve the problem for the other people of more 
than ninety per cent. Thus, we should stick to socialism. According to the 
principle of distribution to each according to work, there will not be excessive 
disparities in wealth. Consequently, polarisation would not happen even after 
productive forces were fully developed in twenty or thirty years (Deng, 1984).  
 
The other reason of preventing polarisation was because the Party showed a firm 
determination to assist the vulnerable group or the undeveloped districts for common 
prosperity.  
We should provide social relief to the people of old, weak, sick or disabled and 
widowers, widows, orphans or childless couples, actively support those who 
have not become rich yet, implement preferential policies and offer necessary 
technologies to those old revolutionary bases, ethnic minority districts, remote 
regions and other poor areas of economic underdevelopment (The Twelfth CPC 
Central Committee, 1984). 
 
Similarly, Deng Xiao-ping (1992) also highlighted state redistribution: ‘One way is for 
the areas that become prosperous first to support the poor ones by paying more taxes or 
turning in more profits to the state.’ He even set ‘by the end of the century when 
achieving the moderate level of prosperity’ as the schedule to solve the problem of 
regional disparity.  
 
It can be seen from the above analysis that the economic reform would not contradict the 
ideology of socialism in China provided three conditions were satisfied: when the goal 
of socialism was revised to improve the living standards of individuals in substance; 
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 when during the economic reform polarisation would be restrained; when common 
prosperity would be finally achieved by two methods: distribution to one’ work and state 
redistribution. All of these can be summarised by the following quote:  
To allow some people to prosper first only means the differences between first 
and later or between fast and slow for all the social members on the road of 
common prosperity. It is absolutely not the polarisation that a very small amount 
of people would become exploiters while most would be trapped in poverty. The 
policy of encouraging some people to prosper first not only complies with the 
development of socialism but also is the only way to lead the whole society to 
prosperity (The Twelfth CPC Committee, 1984).  
 
Subordination of social syst em to economic system  
The above analysis shows that the Party did pay attention to ‘prevention of polarisation’ 
when upholding ‘allowance of some people to prosper first’ in the discursive system. 
However, it turned out in reality that the latter had been more favoured than the former 
by the Party. For example, the structure of distribution was confirmed by the Decision by 
the CPC Central Committee about Several Prob lems of Establishing the Institution of 
Socialist Market Economy in 1993 as:  
The distribution of personal income should adhere to the system of distribution 
according to work as primary and the coexistence of a variety of modes of 
distribution, which should represent the principle of giving priority to 
effieciency with due consideration to fairness (The Fourteenth CPC Central 
Committee, 1993).  
 
What does the principle of ‘priority to efficiency with due consideration to fairness’ 
mean? According to the original authors who proposed it in 1986, ‘the goal of 
prioritising efficiency to fairness ought to be changed to the one of embracing efficiency 
to the first place’. The aim of the social system ‘is to match the goal of efficiency, 
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 rectifying the imperfectness of equality of opportunities, and reducing some of its 
negative influences by certain degree of equality of outcomes’. In other words, ‘the goal 
of efficiency and the mechanism of market should be made primary while the goal of 
fairness and the mechanism for social stability should be made supplementary’ (Zhou 
and Lu 1986, p33; p36). 
 
Since economic development was set as an overriding goal for social policy, the next 
question is: how did the Party persuade people into accepting the idea of the 
subordination of social system to economic system? Firstly, danwei welfare - which was 
often used as a demonstration of the superiority of socialism before - was re-constructed 
as barriers of motivation to work. For example, it was criticised in the Decision by the 
CPC Central Committee about Economic Reform in 1984 that the disadvantages of 
danwei welfare were:  
The regulations of the state for enterprises are too much and too rigid. The 
effects of the production of commodity, the law of value and the market device 
were all ignored. The problem of egalitarianism in distribution is very serious. 
All of these have caused the deficiency of the autonomy of enterprises and the 
consequences of enterprises ‘eating from the state’s pot’ (chi guojia daguofan ) 
or workers ‘eating from the enterprises’ pot (chi qiye daguofan ).  The 
motivation, initiative and creativity of massive workers and enterprises are so 
severely suppressed that the expected energetic socialist economy has been 
largely invigorated (The Twelfth CPC Central Committee, 1984).   
 
When a series of innovations were initiated in 1986 to terminate permanent employment, 
such as labour contracts, pension, unemployment insurance and employee dismissal, it 
was maintained that ‘these implementations could contribute to removing the 
disadvantages in current labour system in terms of over-protection (baode guoduo), 
over-centralisation (tongde guosi) and only recruitment without job mobilisation 
(nengjin bu nengchu )’. By doing this, the motivation of workers was expected to 
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 effectively activate (The CPC Central Committee and State Council, 1986).   
 
Moreover, the Party believed that the ‘social burden’ of national enterprises was one of 
the reasons to explain their incapability to compete in the market. For instance, then 
Premier Li Peng (1988-1998; 1991b) attributed the deficit of some enterprises to their 
heavy burden: ‘The tax burden and the social burden of national-operated enterprises are 
much higher than the enterprises of other ownerships; national-owned enterprises 
shoulder many social responsibilities for the state.’ Likewise, Jiang Ze-min (1998) 
blamed the excessive number of redundant workers as ‘a very important reason’ for the 
dissatisfying performance of national enterprises: ‘We have adopted such a employment 
institution and pattern over such a fairly long period of time that all the labour are 
protected by the state especially in terms of national enterprises. Practice has proven that 
this method did not work.’ 
 
Secondly, after danwei welfare was successfully promulgated as impeding the 
enhancement of efficiency and competition of national enterprises, the re-generation of 
the welfare system was aimed at taking over the welfare responsibilities from danwei. 
The innovation of the welfare system, especially the newly-emerging social security 
system, was considered as ‘the complementation to economic restructuring’ ( jingji gaige 
de peitao cuoshi). After the goal of establishing the socialist market economy was 
announced in the Fourteenth National Congress of the CPC in 1992, the pace of 
restructuring national enterprises was accelerated. Under this circumstance, a 
comprehensive social security system was urgently required. Zhu Rong-ji (1994), who 
was mainly in charge of economic affairs, addressed that, ‘To gradually establish the 
social security system is the current focus of the CPC Central Committee and State 
Council; it is the most crucial complementation for deepening the reform of national 
enterprises.’ Likewise, another Deputy Premier Zou Jia-hua (1994a) made the same 
statement: ‘It is very vital to input the complementation for establishing a modern 
enterprise system. There are things that need to be done urgently. One is to transform the 
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 functions of government…; the other is to establish a comprehensive social security 
system.’ 
 
Furthermore, the significance of the social security system as the ‘complementation to 
economic restructuring’ rested on its protection to those redundant workers by social 
insurance and the UMLSG. According to Zhu Rong-ji (1997a), the re-invorgating of 
national enterprises depended on the settlement of redundant workers, which required 
the assistance of a comprehensive social security system:        
The reason why some of the national enterprises are trapped in difficulty is 
because there are too many redundant employees. It would not be possible to 
dismiss and re-settle these staff without a comprehensive social security system. 
Therefore, a compatible social security system and the re-employment project 
should be established. Those people who are temporarily out of work should be 
guaranteed for their minimum living standards. …Profits would definitely 
increase after the reduction of staff.  
 
Thirdly, since the social security system was born to support the restructuring of national 
enterprises, the Party needed to choose the standards for the programs such as social 
insurance and the UMLSG. In general, the Party decided that the social security system 
should comply with the ‘actual conditions of the country’ (jiben guoqing ): the primary 
stage of socialism. As early as in 1980, Deng (1980) rejected any possibility of 
importing the welfare state into China. He insisted that the enhancement of welfare 
should be coordinated with the development of production. 
We are poor and weak in foundation (dizi bo ) with underdevelopment of 
education, science and culture. We oppose to the argument of actualising the 
welfare state in China now because it is impossible. We can only improve our 
living standards gradually on the basis of developing production. It is wrong to 
develop production without raising people’s living standard, but it is also wrong 
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 - in fact impossible - to improve people’s living standard without developing 
production. 
 
Therefore, it is not surprising to find that the future evolution of the social security 
system was always restricted by the awareness of ‘centring on economic development’. 
As first mentioned in 1985, the new social security system was characterised as 
‘diversified types (xingshi duoyang ), different programs ( xiangmu butong ) and varied 
standards (biaozhun youbie )’. It was also required that the funding of social security 
should be shared by the state, enterprises and individuals instead of all being guaranteed 
by the state as before. According to the Party’s explanation, this overall design should be 
‘in compliance with the actual conditions of the country and the coverage, programs and 
standards must not exceed the affordability of the state, enterprises and individuals’ (The 
CPC Central Committee, 1985). Similarly, when the contents of the social security 
system were confirmed in 1993, it was re-emphasised that their levels should be 
‘compatible with social productive forces of the country and the affordability of each 
quarter (The Fourteenth CPC Central Committee, 1993)’.  
 
Furthermore, ‘actual conditions of the country’ was established in 1994 as one of the 
general principles for social development in the next fifteen years.  
Due to the diversified stages of history, cultural tradition, social institution and 
economic development for different countries, there may be variances of focus 
and policy to solve the problem of social development, especially between 
developed and developing countries. Our country is a developing socialist 
country with a huge population, fewer per-capita resources and uneven regional 
development. Thus, our social development should proceed from the actual 
conditions of the country and take on the road of social development with 
Chinese characteristics (Zou, 1994b). 
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 Again, Zhu Rong-ji (2000) mentioned the principle of ‘considering economic 
development and the affordability of each quarter into the level of social security’ in 
2000. He even illustrated the welfare state, as Deng Xiao-ping once did, to warn the 
negative impacts caused by the high standards of welfare: 
Our country is currently at the primary stage of socialism, in which productive 
forces are less developed. Thus, the contributions and the levels of entitlements 
could not be too high. Otherwise, it would be unaffordable for each quarter, 
damage economic development of the state and the competitiveness of 
enterprises. A huge deficit has been caused in some European countries because 
of the high standards of social welfare. The public and enterprises were 
dissatisfied after these countries were forced to reduce welfare or increase taxes.  
 
As a result, the rationale of ‘proceeding from the actual conditions of the country’ can be 
found in every sub-program in the social security system. Regarding social insurance, it 
was stated that: ‘As a developing country, the level of social insurance must proceed 
from the actual conditions of the country and thus start from the low standard; it is not 
allowed to offer high entitlement in excessive of the affordability of the state (Zou, 
1994b).’ For instance, the account for the full reform of danwei medical care was 
provided in 1998: ‘Since our country sill currently remains in the primary stage of 
socialism, it is impossible for the state and enterprises to pay for medical costs. Only 
shared by enterprises and employees could the basic medical care of employees be 
guaranteed (Li, L.-q. 1998).’  
 
On this basis, Zhu Rong-ji (2000) outlined the ‘basic’ levels for most of the programs: 
The standard of pension should be made middle level of the living standard 
before retirement. The standard of unemployment benefit should maintain the 
basic subsistence (jiben shenghuo) for the unemployed people, as a high 
standard will raise lazy persons and will not stimulate their motivation to work 
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 again. The standard of basic medical care should satisfy the general and basic 
medical needs for employees. The standard of the UMLSG should guarantee the 
basic survival (jiben shengcun ) conditions for poverty-stricken residents.   
 
Fourthly, in contrast to the major attention paid by the Party to social insurance and the 
UMLSG, ‘socialisation’ was mobilised to defend the marginalisation of another integral 
component in the social security system - social welfare. As argued before, most of the 
urban population were provided with danwei welfare in the pre-reform period; while the 
non-employment related social welfare delivered by the authorities of Civil Affairs was 
narrowly defined as ‘residual’ (buque xing ): only assistance to the most disadvantaged 
elderly, disabled and orphans who were neither covered by danwei nor supported by 
their family. However, facing the prospect of the new welfare responsibilities released 
by danwei after the economic reform, the Party attached little importance to social 
welfare as state responsibility. Consequently, the solution was to ‘socialise’ social 
welfare (especially in terms of elderly service) to family, the market or community 
organisations. As then Minister of Civil Affairs Cui Nai-fu (1992, p137) pointed out:    
As it will be heading towards the direction of ‘small government and big society’, 
many services which were conducted by the government should be carried out by 
society. Some of them will be delivered by the means of commercialisation and a 
considerable amount of them will be organised according to the socialisation by 
the masses. 
 
Similarly, the next Minister Duoji Cairang (1998, p6) considered the ‘socialisation of 
social welfare’ as the adaptation to the socialist market economy, because it was 
beneficial for streamlining the over-expanded functions of the government and 
withdrawing its administration in welfare systems and social organisations.  
‘Small government and big society’ is coming into formation because of the 
reform of government bodies. Regarding the administration of social welfare, the 
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 government should change their functions by separating away enterprises, 
institutions and social organisations in accordance to the requirement of the 
socialist market economy. …Only by doing this can the long-term problems of 
over-sized government body, over-lapping functions, over staff, unclear 
governmental relations with enterprises or institutions, and serious bureaucrat 
practices be fundamentally corrected. 
 
Moreover, the ‘socialisation of social welfare’ was significant in relieving the constraint 
of public spending. Because of the limitation of fiscal input, it was advocated as early as  
1985 that the work of Civil Affairs should be shifted from ‘only emphasising social 
profits and ignoring economic profits’ to ‘emphasising both social profits and economic 
profits’ as well as ‘not only in relation to spending but also to earning money’. 
Regarding the practice of social welfare reform, welfare agencies were expected to 
actively enrol self-financing customers, so that they could realise benefits without 
seeking statutory investment. Also, welfare agencies were required to develop new 
programs aimed at ‘gaining quick return by small investment’ in order to subsidise their 
expenditures (Ministry of Civil Affairs 1985, p59-60). In short, Cui Nai-fu (1988, p100) 
summarised the experience of ‘relying on social forces to run social welfare at multi 
levels and through multi channels’ as ‘to do more things with less money and to do 
things without money’. 
 
The heavy pressure behind the search for alternative resources for Civil Affairs was still 
prevailing throughout the 1990s. As Duoji Cairang (1994, p190) stressed, ‘The problem 
of the state finance dissatisfying the needs of Civil Affairs in the temporary future should 
be fully considered.’ Accordingly, ‘The economy of Civil Affairs should be actively 
developed and the economic power serving Civil Affairs targets should be strengthened 
steadily.’ For example, ‘All kinds of Civil Affairs institutions should strive to make 
revenues and subsidise welfare provisions by running businesses.’ Likewise, having 
admitted to the limited fiscal support, the former Deputy Minister Fan Bao-jun (1997) 
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 insisted that the focus should be placed on broadening the sources of revenue by the 
socialisation of Civil Affairs.  
 
The last set of discourses referred to familism, which was especially mobilised for the 
welfare system in rural areas. Considering the collapse of collective protection and the 
reluctance of state intervention, the unit of family was given more significance. Duoji 
Cairang (1996) once defined family support as the primary provider in the rural social 
security system, while Villagers’ Committee and county government should be the 
second and the third sources of protection. According to his opinion, the primacy of 
family was not only related to the tradition of respecting older people and the relevant 
legislation since the 1950s, it was also because of the household responsibility system 
which treated family as the basic unit in production. Moreover, Duoji Cairang related the 
imposition of self-reliance for peasants to other rhetoric that was discussed before. On 
the one hand, it could be learned from the lessons of danwei welfare or the welfare state 
that a comprehensive welfare system would add burdens to the state, undermine people’s 
motivation to work and ultimately damage economic growth. On the other hand, the 
state was still fiscally unable to provide social security programs to 900 million peasants. 
This point of view from the Party lasted until 2000, when Zhu Rong-ji (2000) reinforced 
that social security of peasants should be different from urban residents and it should be 
mainly supported by family and supplemented by collectives.  
 
In short, due to the over-emphasis on efficiency during the economic reform, social 
policy was subordinated to the prime goal of economic development. As comprehensive 
danwei welfare was re-constructed as a barrier of motivation to work, the innovative 
welfare system was designed as ‘complementation to economic restructuring’. This 
made social insurance and the UMLSG the main aspects of the social security institution, 
while their standards were severely constrained by the claim of ‘proceed from actual 
conditions of the country’. By contrast, other personal services shifted from danwei were 
headed by the rhetoric of ‘socialisation’. Lastly, ‘familism’ was especially mobilised in 
 128
 the rural welfare system to justify the weakening collective support and the reluctance of 
state intervention.    
 
Legitimacy of the CPC 
In terms of the dedication to improve people’s living standards and the promise of 
common prosperity, the revision of Chinese socialism contributed to the legitimacy of 
the CPC. On the one hand, if socialism were the only possible way to guarantee common 
prosperity for all the people in society, the CPC shall be the only legitimate authority to 
lead China on the way of socialism. Both of the following quotes from the interview of 
Deng Xiao-ping with an American journalist and the Government Report of Li Peng 
after the incident of Tian’anmen Square in 1989 can be used to illustrate this logic: 
If we could achieve four thousand dollars of GNP per capita, which was 
common prosperity; this would convincingly demonstrate the superiority of 
socialism to capitalism by then. It would point the way for three quarters of the 
world’s population and provide further proof of the correctness of Marxism. 
Therefore, we must confidently keep to the socialist road and uphold the Four 
Cardinal Principles (Deng, 1986b). 
In our country, if we go back to capitalism rather than sticking to socialism, the 
phenomenon of the great disparity between the rich and the poor, polarisation, 
poverty for most of the people, long-term instability for society must 
appear. …It is inseparable between the adherence to socialism and the 
leadership of the Party. …In China, the stability of the state, the union of the 
people and the revitalisation of the Chinese nation would not occur without 
sticking to socialism and the Party (Li, 1990). 
 
On the other hand, the development of the welfare system to manage the consequences 
of economic restructuring was also aimed to alleviate the pressure on the legitimacy of 
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 the CPC. When facing the growing unemployed population in cities in the 1990s, Jiang 
Ze-min (1995b) argued that the balance between reform, development and stability 
should be incorporated correctly. This meant that, ‘Reform and development should be 
promoted with the stability in politics and society; the promotion of reform and 
development is to achieve long-term stability.’ Jiang Ze-min (1997b, p229) further 
pointed out, ‘In recent years, the increase of laid-off workers, growing pressure of re-
employment and difficult living of a small number of urban residents all become the big 
issues that are affecting the reform of enterprises, development of reform and stability of 
society.’ 
 
Accordingly, both social insurance and the UMLSG played a vital role in social stability. 
For example, Zhu Rong-ji (1998) commented the importance of ‘the basic living 
guarantee and the re-employment work for laid-off workers from national enterprises’ as 
‘the top priority in relation to reform, development and stability’.  
This task is closely related to the interests of massive employees, the success of 
the reform of national enterprises and the general situation of reform, 
development and stability. There are many laid-off workers from national 
enterprises and some of their livelihoods are not secured. This problem is 
increasingly acute. Social unrest and instability would appear if this problem 
was not solved quickly or the problem may become more deteriorated. Without 
a stable society, it would be impossible for the reform to go on further and the 
established goal of economic development would fail.  
 
Similarly, the UMLSG was posited by Duoji Cairang (1997a, p280) as a good response 
from Civil Affairs to tackle current social problem: 
Take the example of the UMLSG scheme. Under what situation was it proposed? 
As we all know, along with the more thorough economic reform, some 
enterprises were merged and even bankrupted. A number of workers were laid-
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 off and poverty is growing in cities, which will lead to instability. This is the 
new situation occurring in the economic reform and this situation urgently 
required an effective implementation to guarantee the basic livelihoods of the 
masses. 
 
In short, the legitimacy of the CPC was bolstered by the promise of achieving common 
prosperity by adhering to the institution of socialism and the leadership of communist 
party. The Party remained concerned about possible threats caused by laid-off or 
unemployed workers from economic restructuring.    
 
Conclusion 
During 1978-2002, the national goals were re-oriented to economic development and 
improvement of people’s living standards. This included measures of introducing the 
market mechanisms, establishing special economic zones, decentralising the production 
system and restructuring national enterprises. At the same time, the CPC also initiated a 
series of political reforms, though one-party rule was absolutely unshakable in the 
political institution. These transitions in the political economy caused corresponding 
changes in the welfare mix and the stratification. Due to the weakening protection from 
collective units and the reluctance of state intervention, more significance was attached 
to family, the market, or community. Meanwhile, there were four main stratified groups 
in this period: preservation of collective-based welfare for peasants, lack of protection to 
migrant workers, shared responsibility of welfare for urban workers and emerging state 
protection to urban residents with difficult living. 
 
In order to account for the features of the welfare regime, the Party first reinforced the 
rhetoric concerning the ‘superiority of socialism’ in terms of improving people’s living 
standards and preventing polarisation. However, it turned out that the Party prioritised 
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 ‘efficiency’ over ‘fairness’ in reality and this produced the discourse of ‘subordinating 
social system to economic system’. Despite the subordination of social policy, the 
ideology ‘legitimacy of the CPC’ still required the Party to respond to the crisis of one-
party rule and achievement of common prosperity.  
 
Note 
c Laid-off workers still have contractual relations with their danwei even though they 
were redundant. In contrast, the contracts of unemployed workers were completely 
dismissed.
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 Chapter Six  
Social China: The Political Economy and Ideologies of  
the Welfare System 2002-2011 
 
Introduction 
After more than two decades of the economic reform, it is without doubt that China had made 
enormous progress in economic and social terms. However, the first part of this chapter will 
point out three main negative consequences occurring during the economic reform. In order to 
address these worsening problems, the second part of this chapter will introduce the significant 
changes of the welfare system made by the CPC since 2002. Similar to the last chapter, the third 
part of this chapter will also characterise the welfare mix and the stratification during 2002-2011, 
while the last part is aimed to address the issue of political ideologies which were refreshed to 
emphasize social development.  
 
Political economy of the welfare system  
Background 
Due to the continuous economic growth in the past years, there has been great progress in 
poverty reduction. Based on the consumption threshold of ‘$1.08 a day’ using 1993 PPP, World 
Bank (2009, p4) tracked a reduction of those living in absolute poverty from 652 million in 1981 
to 135 million in 2004 across the country. Similarly, the anti-poverty performance remains 
remarkable even when measured by the new standard of ‘$1.25 a day’ at 2005 PPP. The number 
in absolute poverty by this mew measure dropped from 848 million in 1981 to 351 million in 
2004.  
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 However, economic growth was not always an unmitigated success for the lower income groups. 
Although there was a marked income growth for the poorest decile during 1993-1996, there were 
more years when income growth of the bottom decile lagged or even declined, such as during 
1990-1993 and 1999-2003. Meanwhile, the response of economic growth to poverty in the 
period of 2001-2005 was only about 40% as it was in the early 1980s (World Bank 2009, p14; 
p32). 
 
This suggests that economic development did not benefit all the people equally. In reference to 
the Gini coefficient, the national figure for China rose from 0.309 in 1981 to 0.453 in 2003. 
Moreover, in 2003 the income possessed by the top 10% (29.9%) was roughly equivalent to that 
of the bottom 60% (30.2%; World Bank 2009, p33-34). Particularly in urban areas, it is shown 
that expenditure grew by 51.01% and 56.73% for the top 10th and 20th of the population during 
1992-1998, which was much higher than the increases of 14.03% and 17.42% for the last 10th 
and 20th (Fang et al.’s, 2002). 
 
Despite the further decline in absolute poverty, the growing inequality offset the significance of 
economic growth on poverty reduction. Ravallion and Chen’s (2007) demonstrate that if there 
had been no increasing inequality during the economic reform, urban poverty would have almost 
been eliminated and poverty incidence in rural areas would have been reduced to 2.04% in 2001 
rather than the current estimate of 12.5%. Likewise, Meng et al. (2005) found that although 
every 10% increase in income reduced poverty by between 19 to 39 per cent during 1986-2000, 
growing income inequality mitigated some of the benefits of the reduced poverty levels.   
 
Other than inequality, the occurrence of urban poverty in the 1990s drew the Party’s attention. 
Research has shown that the tendency of urban poverty may fluctuate and even increase during 
some years. Based on the large-scale data from the Urban Household Survey (UHS), Ravallion 
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 and Chen (2007) found that the proportion of urban population living in poverty was reduced 
from 6.01% in 1981 to 0.54% in 2002. However, when compared to the previous year, it is 
notable that the poverty incidence frequently increased after the mid-1990s, such as in 1994, 
1997, 1998, 2000 and 2002. Moreover, relying on the UHS data from 15 provinces, Meng and 
Gregory (2007) estimate that the incidence of urban poverty at household level increased from 
3% to 11% during 1986-1993. It was not until 1998 that the incidence began to fall, but the 
figure only reduced slightly from its peak of 11% to 8% by 2000. Evidence produced by Khan 
and Riskin (2001, p71-72) is more pessimistic. It showed that the index of urban poverty only 
decreased modestly from 8.2% in 1988 to 8.0% in 1995. Much worse, it would rise from 2.7% to 
4.1% if 80% of the original poverty line was adopted. Similarly, the adoption of 70% of the 
original poverty line would raise the poverty incidence from 1.3% to 2.7%.  
 
The aggravating problem of urban unemployment can be regarded as the main cause of rising 
inequality and worsening poverty in cities. As there are significant deficiencies of the criteria for 
counting the unemployed population, Xue and Zhong (2006) re-calculate the official estimates 
and show that the ratio of urban unemployment rose quickly from the 1990s. When the official 
figures remained 3.1% from 1997 to 2000, the estimates increased from 9.2% to 11.5%, which 
was equivalent to an unemployed population of at least 20 million. Furthermore, it can be shown 
that the households with unemployed workers were more likely to suffer losses in their 
livelihoods. After examining the national survey conducted by the Institute of Economics in 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in 1999, Li (2006) identifies the status of ‘disabled, 
injury/chronic disease’, ‘laid-off’ and ‘unemployment’  as the most significant contributions for 
the occurrence of urban poverty. Meanwhile, these three characteristics also have the highest 
probabilities to predict the impoverishement of urban residents into poverty.  
 
Likewise, Meng (2006) also reveals the growing importance of unemployment in accounting for 
urban poverty and inequality. Around 50% of the households with two or more unemployed 
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 members were located at the bottom decile of the income distribution in the CAAS survey 1999 
and about 30% of these households were concentrated in the lowest 5 percentiles. However, 
there was only 25% of this kind of households located in the bottom 10 percentiles in the CAAS 
survey 1995. In addition, the most important factor contributing to income inequality changed 
from ‘household composition’ in the CAAS survey 1988 to ‘regional effect’ in 1995, and finally 
to ‘economic restructuring effect’ in 1999. This factor of ‘economic restructuring effect’ was 
composed by the elements related to job status: household member being unemployed, working 
in a loss-making firm, and their sector of employment.  
 
Lastly, enlarging income disparities and the growing population of urban poverty seriously 
restricted domestic consumption. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (2010a), the 
contribution of consumption to GDP reduced from a peak of 85.5% in 1985 to 35.8% in 2003. In 
detail, it can be shown by Diagram 6.1 that except for 2000, the growth rate of consumption 
(including urban and rural residents) fell below those of GDP during 1997-2002. This implies 
that the tendency of turning the wealth created by economic growth to the improvement of 
people’s living standards had been weakening in past years.  




















Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2010b; 2010c 
 
In summary, in contrast to the Party’s expectation, China’s experience indicates that not all the 
people could have an equal income increase during the period of economic growth. The poor 
people not only benefited least from economic development but were also severely affected by 
 136
 income inequality. Moreover, the massive redundancy of urban workers contributed to the 
increased poverty in cities. After more than two decades of economic reform, it is found that 
economic growth did not necessarily improve most of the people’s living standards. This 
background poses serious challenges to the Party’s promise of ‘common prosperity’ at the launch 
of the economic reform, which in return, forced the Party to face up these problems and made 
serious responses.   
 
The Sixteenth National Congr ess of the CPC (2002-20 0 7 ) 
The Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC proposed a major change of the Party’s emphasis 
from previous periods. Unlike the focus of the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth National Congress of 
the CPC on the establishment the socialist market economy, Jiang Ze-min (2002) highlighted the 
development of the social system and pledged for ‘building a moderately prosperous society 
( xiaokang shehui ) in an all-round way’ in the Sixteenth CPC National Congress. Firstly, he 
proposed the important thoughts of Three Represents (sange daibiao) as one of the guiding 
ideologies of the Party. According to his interpretation, ‘the foundation for building the Party, 
the cornerstone for its exercise of state power and a source of its strength’ rested on Three 
Represents: ‘It always represents the development trend of China’s advanced productive forces, 
the orientation of China’s advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming 
majority of the Chinese people.’ Therefore, the Party should constantly improve the leadership 
for maintaining its advanced nature in accordance to the requirements of Three Represents (Jiang, 
2001).  
 
Secondly, it was declared that the first and the second phases of socialist modernisation, which 
were designed in the Thirteenth National Congress of the CPC, had been accomplished because a 
moderate level of people’s living standards was generally realised. Before the ultimate third 
phase of achieving socialist modernisation by the middle of the twenty-first century, an 
intermediate stage of ‘building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way’ was 
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 designed for 2000-2020. The specific objectives of ‘an all-round way’ not only included 
economic growth as before, such as ‘on the basis of optimised structure and better economic 
returns…to quadruple the GDP of the year 2000 by 2020’; they also consisted of additional 
elements of social development in regional development, social security system, income 
distribution, employment, heath service, education and environmental protection (Jiang, 2002). 
The proportion of urban population will go up considerably and the trend of widening 
differences between industry and agriculture, between urban and rural areas and between 
regions will be reversed step by step. We will have a fairly sound social security system. 
There will be a higher degree of employment. People will have more family property 
and lead a more prosperous life.  
 Nationwide medical and health systems will take into shape. People will have access to 
better education. We will make senior secondary education basically universal in the 
country and eliminate illiteracy. The capability of sustainable development will be 
steadily enhanced. The ecological environment will be improved. The efficiency of 
using resources will be increased significantly. 
 
Thirdly, the Party offered a more progressive view towards the role of state redistribution in 
narrowing income gaps. Although still mentioning the principle of ‘priority to efficiency with 
due consideration to fairness’, it was the first time the Party clarified the relation between 
‘efficiency’ and ‘fairness’ since its official proposal in the Fourteenth National Congress of the 
CPC. The previous subordination of ‘fairness’ to ‘efficiency’ was re-balanced. It was maintained 
that more attention should be given to ‘fairness’ in the redistribution (Jiang, 2002).   
Stick to giving priority to efficiency with due consideration to fairness… In primary 
distribution, we should pay more attention to efficiency, bringing the market forces into 
play and encouraging part of operations. In redistribution, we should pay more attention 
to fairness and strengthen the function of the government in regulating income 
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 distribution and narrow the gap if it is too wide. We should standardise the order of 
income distribution, properly regulate the excessively high income of some monopoly 
industries and outlaw illegal gains. Bearing in mind the objective of common prosperity, 
we should try to raise the proportion of the middle-income group and increase the  
income of the low-income group. 
 
According to the suggestions in the Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC, the coverage of the 
social security system should be greatly expanded, especially in rural areas. It was proposed that 
a new scheme of pension, a new type of co-operative medical care and the RMLSG were needed 
to be institutionalised, wherever conditions permitted, in rural areas (Jiang, 2002). Later, it was 
announced in Decision by the Central Committee about Several Important Problems o n Building 
a Harmonious Socialist Society  that a social security system covering both urban and rural 
residents will be basically established by 2020 (The Sixteenth CPC Central Committee, 2006). 
This was the first time for the Party to explicitly show its determination to bring rural social 
welfare system into conformity with the one in urban areas.  
 
The first breakthrough in the rural social welfare system was related to the regular scheme of 
Five-Guarantee Household. It was re-legislated in 2006 that the funding of Five-Guarantee 
Household would be guaranteed by local governments instead of collective-raised funds any 
more (State Council, 2006a). Secondly, although the providers of elderly support were still 
defined as ‘mainly relying on family, supplemented by community and the state’, there was a 
progress in poverty relief that ‘wherever conditions permitted was encouraged to establish the 
RMLSG scheme’ (The Sixteenth CPC Central Committee, 2003). By 2006, the RMLSG had 
been implemented across twenty-five provinces with 15.09 million beneficiaries (Wen, 2007) 
and it was finally institutionalised across the country in 2007 (State Council, 2007a). The third 
improvement referred to the ambitions of the Party to enforce compulsory education in rural 
areas. It was decided that with an expenditure of 10 billion yuan by the central government, the 
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 nine-year compulsory education would be made universal in Western regions (Wen, 2004a) and 
finally across all the rural areas in 2010 (State Council, 2005a). 
 
Regarding the fourth breakthrough, the new-type scheme of co-operative medical care and 
medical assistance was called on to establish in all villages in 2002. Different from the previous 
co-operative medical scheme in rural areas, it was a milestone for the state to sponsor health 
service in rural areas. Partially contributed by peasants, local governments needed to pay no less 
than ten yuan per capita per year for participants. Moreover, the central government would 
subsidise ten yuan per capita per year to Middle and Western regions (The CPC Central 
Committee and State Council, 2002). By 2005, the new-type scheme of co-operative medical 
care had covered 177 million peasants. It was even more progressive for the central government 
to set the target of aiming at 40% of all the counties in 2006 and ultimately covering all of them 
by 2008. Meanwhile, the subsidy for each peasant would double from 20 to 40 yuan in 2006, 
which would produce an estimated budget of 4.2 billion yuan from the central government (Wen, 
2006). 
 
In urban areas, a special pension scheme was provided to those people based on a non-regular-
work basis, such as the self-employed and casual workers (State Council, 2005b). Likewise, 
another special scheme of medical insurance was initiated for the urban residents without 
employment, such as children, students or unemployed people. This scheme was designed to 
guarantee most of the reimbursement of hospitalisation and out-patient service for serious illness. 
Meanwhile, this scheme was aimed to cover 80% of the cities by 2009 and reach all the cities by 
2010. Furthermore, local governments should sponsor no less than 40 yuan for every participant 
per year and the minimum standard for the impoverished people (e.g. UMLSG beneficiaries) 
could be as high as 60 yuan. In particular, the central government would finance the Middle and 
Western regions half of the funding that they would need (State Council, 2007b). Last but not 
least, migrant workers were the highlighted targets of industrial injury insurance. It was also 
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 maintained that specific schemes of pension and medical insurance for serious illness would be 
provided to them (State Council, 2006b).  
 
In regard to laid-off workers from national enterprises, massive public funding had been invested 
to guarantee their living standards. For example, the central government spent 59.4 billion yuan 
on both ‘two ensures’ and the UMLSG, which was 6.2 times as much as in 1998. Thus, it was 
asserted that those impoverished families eligible for the UMLSG had mostly been covered (Zhu, 
2003). Meanwhile, as one of the ‘three guaranteed thresholds’, basic living expenses was 
gradually cancelled. Instead, laid-off workers would claim unemployment benefit directly. By 
2005 seventeen provinces had accomplished the incorporation of basic living expenses into 
unemployment insurance (Wen, 2006) and this task was finally completed in 2006 (Wen, 2007). 
Moreover, originally introduced as an income maintenance program, more non-monetary aspects 
were added into the UMLSG, such as assistance to housing, education, medical care and heating 
service (Zhu, 2003; Wen, 2004a). For example, an ambitious goal was announced that those 
UMLSG families struggling with housing problem would be provided with low-rent apartments 
or housing subsidies by 2007 and the coverage would be extended to nationwide Low-Income 
families by 2010 (State Council, 2007c).    
 
During 2002-2007, the Party significantly changed its path of development and embraced 
‘building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way’ for 2002-2020. The highlight of 
this design resulted in the initiation of social development, especially in terms of the extension of 
the social security system to the previously unprotected people in urban and rural areas.  
 
The Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC (2007-2 0 1 1 ) 
The Scientific Outlook on Development was the major theme of the Seventeenth National 
Congress of the CPC, which can be summarised as ‘taking development as its essence, putting 
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 people first as its core, comprehensive, balanced and sustainable development as its basic 
requirement, and overall consideration as its fundamental approach’ (Hu, 2007). Together with 
Deng Xiao-ping Theory and the important thought of Three Represents, The Scientific Outlook 
on Development was mentioned as the one of the three components in the theory of socialism 
with Chinese characteristics.  
 
In order to reverse the growing income disparity, the Party attached more significance to the 
relationship between fairness and efficiency. In comparison to the Sixteenth National Congress 
of the CPC, the view towards fairness was even more progressive because fairness was 
reinforced in both primary distribution and redistribution: ‘A proper balance will be struck 
between efficiency and fairness in both primary distribution and redistribution, with particular 
emphasis on fairness in redistribution.’ Also, it is significant to note the announcement ‘to 
accelerate the establishment of a social security system covering both urban and rural residents’. 
A sound social security system was further clarified as the one ‘based on social insurance, 
assistance and welfare, with basic old-age pension, basic medical insurance and the MLSG as the 
backbone, and supplemented by charity and commercial insurance’. Particularly, greater efforts 
were demanded to institutionalise pension, new-type scheme of co-operative medical care and 
the RMLSG in rural areas. Moreover, the proposal of ‘guaranteeing old-age care’ (lao you suo 
yang) indicated a clear departure of previous strategy about social welfare (Hu, 2007).  
 
In response to these calls, the implementations of the social security system in rural areas were 
accelerated. For example, there were 34.52 million rural residents on the RMLSG rolls in 2007, a 
figure more than double than the previous year (Wen, 2008). Meanwhile 814 million peasants 
(91.5% of the rural population) had joined the new-type scheme of co-operative medical care by 
2008 (Wen, 2009a). Furthermore, due to the guaranteed funding from the central government, it 
was maintained that compulsory education in rural areas had been fully implemented in 2007 
(Wen, 2008).  
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 Lastly, the most significant breakthrough referred to the re-start of the rural pension scheme. It 
was aimed to cover 10% of rural areas in 2009 and all the villages by 2020. The future pension 
benefit for claimants will be composed of both personal and socially-pooled accounts. Other than 
personal savings, local governments needed to contribute no less than 30 yuan into a personal 
account each year. Regarding the socially-pooled account, the central government would 
guarantee all the funding for Middle and Western regions and 50% for Eastern Region. 
Significantly, even though peasants over the age of 60 did not contribute to the scheme at all, 
they would be qualified to claim benefits provided their children join the scheme (State Council, 
2009).  
 
In urban areas, the goal of ‘guaranteeing old-age care’ in social welfare created the leading roles 
of the government, especially in terms of fiscal input. For example, between 2009 and 2010 500 
million yuan was spent in the pioneer experiment of home care in twelve provinces, which was 
the first time the central government supported local services for older people (Dou, 2010). 
Furthermore, it was clearly stated by the Ministry of Civil Affairs (2011) that the revitalisation of 
state funding is aimed at supporting low-income older people in need and activating social 
organisations to provide relevant services. Finally, it was instructed by the State Council (2008) 
that the tuition fees of migrant workers’ children should be exempted as for other urban residents  
 
During 2007-2011, the proposal of The Scientific Outlook on Development accelerated the 
development of the social welfare system, especially in rural areas. Guaranteed by massive state 
funding, schemes of the RMLSG, pension and co-operative medical care were all established in 
rural areas. Similarly, compulsory education was finally made universal for the children of rural 
residents and migrant workers. Moreover, the revitalisation of state funding can also be found in 
social welfare. It seems that ‘socialisation’ was no longer just rhetoric as the providers of family 




In short, influenced by ‘Three Represents’ and ‘The Scientific Outlook on Development’, the 
main themes of the Sixteen and the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC no longer rested 
on the imperative pursuit of economic development. Rather, the highlights changed to the 
initiation of social development, especially the improvement of the welfare system in rural areas. 
The next section summarises these social developments based on the discussion above. 
 
Welfare mix and stratification 
Figure 6.1 provides an overview of the welfare system during 2002-2011. The most significant 
breakthrough referred to the promotion of welfare programs in rural areas. The number of the 
RMLSG beneficiaries increased from 8.25 million in 2005 to 15.93 million in the next year. It 
more than doubled to 35.66 million when the RMLSG was fully established in 2007. By 2009, 
the number climbed to as high as 47.6 million (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2010c). Similarly for 
social insurance, 814 million peasants, equivalent to 91.5% of the rural population, had joined 
the new-type scheme of co-operative medical care by 2008 (Wen, 2009a). Meanwhile, the new-
type scheme of rural pension, institutionalised in 2009, covered 72.77 million peasants (National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2010d). Finally, it was maintained that compulsory education in rural areas 

















Items Urban Areas Migrant Workers Rural Areas 
Pension Pension scheme for urban employees: contributed by 
employees (8% of the wage) and their employers(about 20% 
of the wage). 
Danwei system for most of government bodies, non-profit 
government institutions.  
Pension scheme for urban residents (2005): contributed by 
self-employed persons (20% of the average wage at locality) 
and state subsidies. 
New-type scheme of rural 
pension (2009) with state 
funding. 
Unemployment Insurance Contributed by employees (1% of the wage) and their 
employers (2% of the wage). 
Public servants excluded.  
None. 
Medical Insurance Medical insurance for urban employees: contributed by all 
kinds of employees (2% of the wage) and their employers 
(about 6% of the wage). 
Extra medical aid for public servants.   
Medical Insurance for Urban Residents (2007): contributed 
by families of children, students, self-employed persons and 
state subsidies.  
New-type scheme of co-
operative medical care (2002) 
with state funding. 
Industrial Injury Insurance Contributed by employers. None. 
Maternity Insurance Contributed by employers. 
Migrant workers were the highlighted 
targets of social insurance, especially for 
industrial injury insurance. Specific 
schemes of medical insurance (mainly for 
serious illness) and pension were provided 
to them in certain areas.  
 
None. 
A comprehensive program of the UMLSG including 
additional assistance to housing, education, medical care 
(2005), etc.  
Basic living expenses for laid-off workers were called off 
from 2006.  
None Five-Guarantee Household with 
state funding (2006). 
RMLSG (2007). 
Other temporary assistance. 
Social Assistance  
 
 
Disaster relief for victims.  
Social Welfare State residential homes for three nos. 
Elderly service for low-income older people and the 
activation of community organisations sponsored by the state  
None Respect homes for the aged with 
state funding (2006) 
Preferential Treatment and 
Settlement 




































Mutual Help Socialisation of social welfare for urban dwellers 
Welfare lotteries or welfare donations 
Housing Privatisation. 
Accumulative housing fund: contributed by employees and 
their employers. 
Low-rent Apartments for the UMLSG or Low-Income 
families (2007). 
None None 
Education Nine-year compulsory education. Same entitlement as urban residents (2008) Should be universal with state 
funding by 2010  
 
 The full establishment of the RMLSG, social insurance and education in rural areas were 
consequential all owed to the massive subsidy by the state. Different from previous collective 
support, traditional Five-Guarantee Household and respect homes for the aged were renewed as 
state-sponsored schemes. Meanwhile, the main effort of relieving rural poverty shifted to the 
official RMLSG scheme. Therefore, as indicated by Diagram 6.2, the fund of social relief in rural 
areas (excluding disaster relief) increased substantially, especially after the RMLSG was 
institutionalised in 2007. The other relevant evidence is that the spending in just one year of 
2006 was more than the total funding of 12.76 billion during 1995-2000. The fiscal increase was 
largely due to transfers by the central government. For example, compared to previous year, the 
central government spent 172.9% more in the RMLSG in 2009 (Ministry of Finance 2010, p190). 
Diagram 6.2: Funding of Social Relief in Rural Areas  
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Source: Ministry of Civil Affairs (2010d) 
 
The same situation can be found in compulsory education. In 2008, 91% of the costs for 
compulsory education in rural areas were contributed by public budgets, while the same figure 
was only 67% in 1999. At nearly 17.59 billion yuan, the share of the central government was 
higher than 15.28 billion yuan invested by local governments during 2006-2009 (Ministry of 
Finance 2010, p128). In short, compared to the marginal role before, the state became a far more 
significant player in the welfare mix in rural areas. 
 
Regarding migrant workers, the progress was not made as fast as expected even though 
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 suggestions were constantly reasserted by the central government. According to the National 
Bureau of Statistics (2009), the number of migrant worker consistently rose to 145.33 million by 
2009. However, only 42.8% of them had a signed contract with their employers. Much worse, 
the coverage by social insurance for migrant workers was quite insignificant. For example, as the 
key scheme promoted by the authorities for migrant workers, the proportion for industrial injury 
insurance was just 21.8%. The other schemes performed even worse: 7.6% for pension, 12.2% 
for medical insurance, 3.9% for unemployment insurance and 2.3% for maternity insurance. 
Moreover, migrant workers were still deprived of the rights to the UMLSG and social welfare. 
Although it was claimed that compulsory education should be provided to the children of 
migrant workers as ordinary urban residents, the actual implementation of policy has not been 
completed.    
 
In relation to urban residents, there was a registered population of 450.29 million by 2009 
(Department of Population and Employment Statistics, 2010). The coverage of social insurance 
was expanding among the urban population. By 2009, the figures for pension, medical insurance 
and unemployment insurance reached a peak of 235.5, 219.37 and 127.15 million participants, 
respectively. Likewise, industrial injury insurance and maternity insurance also had reached 
significant totals of 148.96 and 108.76 million contributors respectively.  
 
The growing intervention by the state in cities can be illustrated by the following three schemes. 
Firstly, it seemed that the ‘socialisation of social welfare’ was not more than rhetoric. As argued 
before, it can be foreseen in the near future that community service for home care - which 
includes the economically disadvantaged group - will be supported by state funding. Secondly, 
the population excluded by work-based social insurance could be sponsored by the state to join 
other specific schemes, such as pension or medical insurance for urban residents. For example, 
up to 2009, a huge number of 182.1 million joined the medical insurance for urban residents 
(Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, 2009).  
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 Last but not least, the UMLSG evolved from simply income maintenance to a comprehensive 
system including assistance to housing, medical care amd education. Due to the goal of ‘covering 
whoever is eligible’, the number of the UMLSG beneficiaries nearly tripled from 4.03 million to 
11.71 million during 2000-2001 and it increased to 20.65 million in the next year. Ultimately, the 
figure of 23.46 million claimants in 2009 was almost ten times as many as in 1999 when the 
UMLSG was formally institutionalised (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2010a). This dramatic increase 
of UMLSG beneficiaries was guaranteed by the substantial fiscal budgets after 2001, which can 
be shown by Diagram 6.3.  
Diagram 6.3: Funding of the UMLSG (Billion Yuan) 
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Source: Ministry of Civil Affairs (2010c) 
 
In summary, the system of household registration was still the most influential factor to 
determine the welfare mix during 2002-2011. On the one hand, in rural areas, the role of the state 
increased because traditional collective provision of welfare was strengthened or substituted by 
state support. Despite this breakthrough, the functions of self-reliance and role of the family 
should not be underestimated. This is because peasants were also responsible for partial 
contributions to pension or co-operative medical care. In terms of the RMLSG, state intervention 
would not be valid until the unit of family broke down. Furthermore, there was little significant 
improvement when peasants resided in cities as migrant workers. The only possible change may 
be the entitlement to the nine-year compulsory education, but its full implementation is still 
unknown. Therefore, self-reliance and family support remained mainstays for migrant workers. 
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 On the other hand, along with the expanding coverage, social insurance contributed by 
employees and employers was becoming vitally important for the urban working population. The 
population engaged in non-regular work was sponsored by the state for special schemes of 
pension and medical insurance. Meanwhile, it is more likely that the disadvantaged older people 
or poor people could benefit more from the improvement of ‘socialisation of social welfare’ and 
a comprehensive institution of social assistance. However, similar to the situation in rural areas, 
the increasing significance attached to the state in the urban welfare mix did not necessarily 
undermine the functions of private channels. After all, the UMLSG was the last choice for the 
poor people in the welfare mix unless occupational units, family, community organisations all 
failed.   
 
The stratifications produced by China’s welfare regime after 2002 were related to peasants, 
migrant workers, working urban residents, urban and rural residents with difficult living, and 
public servants. In comparison to the previous phase during 1978-2002, there were similarities in 
under-protection of migrant workers, primacy of social insurance for working urban residents, 
‘socialisation’ of personal services, and privilege of public servants and other government 
employees. By contrast, major differences were credited to the revitalisation of state support. 
With the sponsorship by the state, co-operative medical care was finally implemented in rural 
areas and it can be anticipated that full coverage of new-type scheme of pension is forthcoming. 
Likewise, the state also made great efforts to connect the urban population that had been 
excluded from social insurance to special schemes. The most significant change may refer to an 
enlarging poverty group covered by a comprehensive program of social assistance. For example, 
this consisted of 47.6 million RMLSG beneficiaries and 23.46 million UMLSG beneficiaries by 





 Political Ideologies 
In relation to state protection for the disadvantaged group and full development of welfare 
programs especially in rural areas, what political ideologies were these institutional 
improvements linking to? This section proposes a discursive system of ‘social China’ for 2002-
2011, which was distinctive from previous title of ‘economic China’. ‘Social China’ contains 
three sets of ideologies: ‘Three Represents, The Scientific Outlook on Development and 
harmonious socialist society’, ‘legitimacy of the CPC’ and ‘primary stage of socialism’. 
 
Three Represents, The Scientific Outlook on Development and ‘harmonious socialist society’ 
In 2002, the advocacy of ‘building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way’ in the 
Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC clearly indicated the departure from the previous sole 
focus on economic development. This call was backed up by Jiang Ze-min’s important thoughts 
of Three Represents. Its fundamental nature was summarised as: ‘The implementation of the 
important thought of Three Represents is, in essence, to keep pace with the times, maintain the 
Party’s progressiveness and exercise governance for the people (Jiang, 2002).’ 
 
Later, the new generation of the CPC leaders Hu Jin-tao and Wen Jia-bao proposed The 
Scientific Outlook on Development (kexue fazhan guan ) and ‘harmonious socialist society’ 
(shehui zhuyi hexie shehui ) as the guidance of social development. In order to strive for a better 
integration of social and economic systems, the concept of The Scientific Outlook on 
Development was constituted by ‘five co-ordinates’ and one principle: ‘to co-ordinate urban and 
rural development, development among regions, economic and social development, relations 
between man and nature, domestic development and opening-up’ (Wen, 2004b) by adhering to 
the principle of ‘putting people first, establishing comprehensive, balanced and sustainable 
development, facilitating the full development of economy, society and people’ (The Sixteenth 
CPC Central Committee, 2003). 
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 Wen Jia-bao (2004b) once outlined the contents of The Scientific Outlook on Development: 1) 
Maintaining the centre on economic development. Apart from a consistent growth, a new road of 
industrialisation was required in feature of ‘high scientific and technological contents, good 
economic returns, low resources consumption, little environmental pollution and a full display of 
advantages in human resources’. 2) Maintaining the co-ordination of economic and social 
development. It was pointed out that social development referred to ‘the development of 
technology, education, culture, health care, sports, employment, social security, social justice, 
law of order, social administration, social harmony, and the improvement of social structure and 
institution’. 3) Maintaining the co-ordination of urban and rural development. Great efforts 
should be made to boost the growth of rural economy. 4) Maintaining the co-ordination of 
regional development. Similarly, the work of narrowing the regional gap was highlighted by 
largely developing the Western region, rejuvenating northeast China and other old industrial 
bases in an all-round way, stimulating the development of the central region and supporting the 
Eastern region in taking the lead in development. 5) Maintaining sustainable development. This 
led to the need of balancing the relationships between economic growth, population and 
environmental protection. 6) Maintaining reform and opening-up. 7) Maintaining putting people 
first. As the core of The Scientific Outlook on Development, putting people first was closely 
related to the interests of the masses, such as the problems of employment, social security and 
livelihoods of poverty-stricken people.  
 
Another crucial ideology of ‘harmonious socialist society’ provided more elaboration for social 
development. According to Hu Jin-tao (2005), ‘harmonious socialist society’ was in 
characteristics of ‘democracy and the rule of law, fairness and justice, honesty and fraternity, 
vigour and vitality, stability and order, and harmony between man and nature’. Corresponding to 
these six elements, specific tasks were issued by the Decision by the Central Committee about 
Several Important Problems on Build ing a Harmonious Socialist Society . The design of these 
tasks was aimed to achieve a harmonious socialist society by 2020, ‘in which all people do their 
best, find their proper places in society and live together in harmony (The Sixteenth CPC Central 
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 Committee, 2006)’: 
The socialist democratic and legal systems will be improved. The rule of law will be 
carried out completely as a fundamental principle. The rights of the people will be 
respected and guaranteed. The tendency of the widening urban-rural and interregional 
gaps in development will be constantly changed.  
A reasonable and orderly pattern of income distribution will be basically in place. The 
property of families will be generally increased and people will lead a more prosperous 
life. There will be a higher rate of employment and a fairly sound social security system. 
The basic public services will be more comprehensive and the standards of public 
administration and service will be largely enhanced.  
The ideological and ethical standards, the scientific and cultural qualities, and the health 
of the whole people will be enhanced notably. Fine moral ethics and harmonious 
personal relationships will be further established.  
The creativity of the whole society will be significantly strengthened and an innovative 
country will be established.  
The system of social administration will be made better with good social order.  
The efficiency of utilising recourses will be significantly improved and the ecological 
environment will improve. 
 
The upholding of the important thoughts of Three Represents, The Scientific Outlook on 
Development and ‘harmonious socialist society’ all refreshed the ideologies of the CPC. 
Particularly, there are four types of elements in close relation to justify China’s welfare regime 
after 2002. Firstly, from the perspective of Three Represents, the further development of the 
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 welfare system complied with the requirement of ‘exercising governance for the people’. It was 
argued that state redistribution to impoverished people was the key to show one of the represents 
roles of the Party with regard to ‘the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the 
people:  
We should protect the vitality for further growth of the developed regions, strong 
industries, people who have become rich first through hard work and lawful business 
operations, and encouraging them to create social wealth. More importantly, we must 
pay great attention to less developed areas and the industries and people in straitened 
circumstances and show concern for them. In particular, we must see to it that the people 
in financial difficulties have subsistence allowances, and we must take effective 
measures to help them find jobs and improve their living conditions so that they will 
truly feel the warmth of our socialist society (Jiang, 2002). 
 
Secondly, ‘co-ordination of economic and social development’ was one of the demands proposed 
by The Scientific Outlook on Development. According to Wen Jia-bao (2004b), its actualisation 
depended on overall consideration (tongchou jiangu ) and the enhancement of the Party’s 
governance capacity. This required that the functions of government should embody four aspects: 
regulation of economy, supervision of the market, social administration (e.g. income 
redistribution; social stability) and public services (e.g. social security; health service; education), 
In addition, Wen Jia-bao stressed that, ‘More emphasis should be laid on social administration 
and public services; more strength should be put on social programs and the livelihoods of 
people.’ Meanwhile, he demanded that a correct view on evaluating cadres’ performances should 
be developed on a basis of the overall perspective on the comprehensive, balanced and 
sustainable development of economy and society. 
 
The Eleventh Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development  (2005-2010) highlighted 
that: ‘Economic and social development should be placed into the path of comprehensive, 
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 balanced and sustainable development.’ Particularly, more importance of social development was 
recognised: ‘Social development is a necessary condition and vital guarantee for economic 
development. In order to meet the need of establishing a moderately prosperous society in an all-
round way, more emphasis should be put on the comprehensive progress of society along with 
the process of developing economy (Wen, 2005).’ 
 
Thirdly, it is critical to understand one of the components of ‘harmonious socialist society’: 
‘fairness and justice’. According to Hu Jin-tao (2005), ‘Fairness and justice refers to properly 
balancing the interests of all quarters and correctly handle the contradictions among the people 
and other social contradictions.’ Meanwhile, he advocated that, ‘The system of fairness in rights, 
opportunities, rules and distribution should be gradually established, so that all the people can 
benefit from reform and development.’ Moreover, ‘fairness’ should be guaranteed by more active 
intervention of the state: 
As well as maintaining economic growth, the problem of the widening income gap 
between regions and some people would be gradually solved by reforming tax policies, 
increasing public expenditures and intensifying transferred payments. …We should 
further improve the social security system, gradually expand its coverage, and guarantee 
the basic livelihoods of those people in difficult situations. …Social members should be 
gradually entitled to education, enable to work, have equal access to participate in the 
market competition and social life, and able to defend their interests by laws and 
institutions (Hu, 2005). 
 
Unlike the subordination in the 1990s, fairness and justice were now seen as important as 
efficiency. This can be demonstrated by Hu Jin-tao’s (2008) address on the memorial conference 
of the 30th anniversary of the Third plenary Session of the Eleventh National Congress of the 
CPC. One of the ten experiences summarised by Hu Jin-tao was ‘integrating efficiency and 
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 social fairness, enabling massive people to share the benefits of reform on the basis of economic 
growth, pushing the building of harmonious socialist society’. This is because: ‘The actualisation 
of social fairness and justice is the inherent requirement of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics. …Efficiency can increase vigour, while fairness can contribute to harmony. The 
essence of socialism can be better demonstrated by the integration between efficiency and 
fairness.’ 
 
The implementation of fairness and justice can be illustrated by the launch of new-type scheme 
of rural pension. Wen Jia-bao (2009b) not only acknowledged the presumption that ‘social 
fairness and justice is the inherent nature of socialism with Chinese characteristics’, but also 
argued that the extension of pension into rural areas was ‘an important step of pushing the state 
towards social fairness and justice, eliminating the urban-rural disparity and gradually achieving 
the equality of basic public services’. Moreover, the ideology of social fairness and justice seems 
to outweigh the one of familism which has been upheld for the elderly support in rural areas. 
Although Wen Jia-bao still advocated the commitment of the children to support their parents, he 
considered the new-type scheme of rural pension as an active means to strengthen the economic 
capability of the older people, lessen their children’s burden and relieve the difficulty of raising 
funding by collectives.   
 
Fourthly, the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC in 2007 expressed the most positive 
view about social development so far. Rather than being included in the chapter of economic 
development as before, the Party arranged an independent chapter of social development for the 
first time in history, arguing ‘accelerating social development with the focus on improving 
people’s livelihoods’ (min sheng). The rational of ‘improving people’s livelihoods’ was quite 
inspiring as it called on to strive for the entitlements of education, employment, health service, 
elderly care and housing for all the people. 
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 Social development is closely related to people’s livelihoods. On the basis of economic 
growth, more importance must be attached to social development in terms of 
guaranteeing and improving people’s livelihoods, carrying out the restructuring of social 
system, expanding public services, improving social administration and promoting social 
fairness and justice. We must do our best to ensure that all our people enjoy their 
entitlements to education, employment, health service, elderly care and housing, so that 
the building of a harmonious society will be promoted (Hu, 2007). 
 
In the forthcoming Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2010-2015), the focus on people’s livelihoods was 
raised to an even higher level. According to its outline, the theme of the next five years shall be 
‘changing the pattern of economic growth’, while ‘the fundamental aim and the ultimate goal of 
changing the pattern of economic growth rests on the adherence to guarantee and improve 
people’s livelihoods’. 
 
In short, Three Represents, The Scientific Outlook on Development and ‘harmonious socialist 
society’ all supported a much stronger emphasis attached to social development than ever before. 
Included was the representation that ‘the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of 
the people’ requires the Party of ‘exercising governance for the people’. As a result, ‘co-
ordination of economic and social development’ as well as balance between efficiency and 
fairness ultimately contributed to improve people’s livelihoods.    
 
Legitimacy of the CPC 
The upholding ideologies of the important thoughts of Three Represents, The Scientific Outlook 
on Development and ‘harmonious socialist society’ were all linked to the legitimacy of the Party. 
Argued as the ‘foundation for building our Party, the cornerstone for its governance and the 
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 source of its strength’, Three Represents was expected to provide theoretical accounts for the 
leadership of the Party, the one which had ‘evolved from a party that led the people in fighting 
for state power to a party that has led the people in exercising the power and has long remained 
in power’ (Jiang, 2002). The Party believed that its power would still be legitimate as long as the 
ideology of Three Represents could be carried out in every aspect of its work. This is because of 
its essence lay in ‘building the Party for public interests (li dang wei gong) and exercising 
governance for the people (zhi zheng wei min;  Hu, 2003)’.  
 
For example, ‘building the Party for public interests and exercising governance for the people’ 
triggered the call of the Party to consolidate its legitimacy by strengthening its capability of 
governance: 
It is not easy for the proletariat party to seize the power, and it is even more difficult to 
exercise the power especially in a long term sense. The position for the party to exercise 
the power is neither inherently innate nor once for all. We must…seriously learn the 
successful and unsuccessful lessons of some parties exercising power in the world, 
strengthen the governance capability of the Party with more self consciousness, and 
exercise the good governance and the good power for the people all the time (The 
Sixteenth CPC Central Committee, 2004). 
 
Later, Wen Jia-bao (2004b) pointed out the relation between The Scientific Outlook on 
Development and the current socio-economic background. At the stage where GDP per capita 
exceeded one thousand dollars, the intention of The Scientific Outlook on Development was to 
eliminate possible negative consequences during the process of modernisation, such as ‘huge 
wealth gap, massive unemployment, greater urban-rural disparity, acute social conflicts, 
worsening ecological environment, stagnant economic and social development and even 
instability society’. Meanwhile, former deputy Chairman Zeng Qing-hong attributed the function 
of harmonious society to solve contradictions and reconcile conflicts for the Party in rule. 
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 A harmonious socialist society is able to provide the institutions for solving 
contradictions and reconciling conflicts. The institutions include fluent social 
mobilisation, proper interest co-ordination, safe social security and effective 
contradiction reconciliation. As a Party in rule, we should not only frankly admit social 
contradictions especially the one of income disparity, but also strive to solve these 
contradictions and narrow the disparity (Zeng, 2005).  
 
Finally, the recent words of Wen Jia-bao in press conferences after the National People’s 
Congress can be used to demonstrate the relation between these new ideologies and legitimacy of 
the CPC.  In regard to the question about his attitudes to social fairness and justice, Wen Jia-bao 
(2010) directly pointed out its importance as the foundation of social stability: 
The development of our state is not only to develop economy, but also to promote social 
fairness and justice and facilitate the comprehensive and free development of human 
beings. …Social fairness and justice is the foundation of social stability. I believe that 
fairness and justice shall be more shining than the sun.  
 
Similarly, Wen Jia-bao (2011) re-asserted in the next year: ‘Fairness and justice is the essential 
nature of socialism and the foundation of social stability as well.’ He offered more details about 
its actualisation: ‘We should not only achieve the fairness of income distribution and gradually 
reduce the widening income gap; but also need to solve the unfairness in education, health 
service and so on. By doing this can people share the benefits of the reform and opening-up.’ 
 
When asked about his opinion about social uprisings in North Africa in early 2011, Wen Jia-bao 
(2011) commented: ‘The comparison between China and those North African Countries of 
political instability is incorrect.’ He argued that this was because a development path compatible 
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 with the actual situation of China was chosen:  
The characteristics of this path are: firstly, we must adhere to the centre on economic 
development and largely promote economic development and social progress; secondly, 
we must put people first and establish comprehensive, balanced and sustainable 
development; thirdly, we must adhere to social fairness and  justice so as to maintain the 
harmony and stability of society; fourthly, we must guarantee the democratic rights of 
people, facilitate the full development of human beings and further motivate  people’s 
activity and creativity.  
 
Primary stage of socialism 
However, it cannot be ignored that the principle of ‘primary stage of socialism’ was still held to 
constrain the over-rapid development of welfare programs, though it appeared to be no stronger 
than before. For example, Wen Jia-bao suggested that social development ‘only refers to the 
constant process of development and progress, instead of being accomplished in a short time’. 
Likewise, Zeng Qing-hong supplemented, ‘It will be a long-term process for the actualisation of 
social fairness and justice.’  
From the view of the whole society, in order to better satisfy the multiple needs of 
people and actualise the full development of people, there must be correlated material 
foundation and social conditions. This only refers to the constant process of development 
and progress, instead of being accomplished in a short time. As our country is still at the 
primary stage of socialism…it is impossible to accomplish the goals of satisfying the 
multiple needs of people and actualising the full development of human being (Wen, 
2004b). 
According to Marxist historical materialism, social fairness and justice is relative and 
concrete. It will be a long-term process for the actualisation of social fairness and justice, 
159 
 
 which should be compatible with the stage of economic and social development as well 
as with the level of productive forces. On the basis of the primary stage of socialism in 
characteristic of undeveloped productive forces, we should try our best but cut our coat 
according to cloth; we should put enough emphasis and serious treatment but not go 
beyond the current stage; we should focus on visiting the poor but not ignore the talents 
(Zeng, 2005).  
 
Conclusion 
As argued in Chapter Five, the grounds for launching the economic reform lay in the Party’s 
promise of ‘superiority of socialism’: improving people’s living standards while preventing 
polarisation. However, the occurrence of three major problems - inequality, urban poverty and 
restrained domestic consumption - severely undermined the legitimacy of the CPC. Accordingly, 
the Party decided to expand its sole focus on economic development to the initiation of social 
development. The active role of the state in the welfare system was definitely the highlight after 
2002. Massive state legislations and funding guaranteed the re-establishment of the rural welfare 
system and the protection to the populations of difficult living in both urban and rural areas. 
 
These comprehensive social developments corresponded to the refreshed ideologies of the Party, 
such as ‘Three Represents, The Scientific Outlook on Development and harmonious socialist 
society’. The ultimate purpose of these dominant ideologies served to solve the crisis of 
‘legitimacy of the CPC’. Despite the optimistic prospect for the development of the welfare 
system, it is very possible for the standards of welfare programs to be constraint by a long 






c National Bureau of Statistics only recognises the unemployed population who are: aged 
between 16-45 for women and 16-50 for men plus who have been officially registered in 




 Chapter Seven 
 Standards of the Urban Minimum Living Standard Guarantee 
 
Introduction 
The last three chapters have conducted a historical review about the welfare system, welfare mix, 
stratification and political ideologies in the phases of ‘communist China’, ‘economic China’ and 
‘social China’. According to the research design in Chapter Three, there are two main functions 
of the following Chapter Seven, Chapter Eight and Chapter Nine in this study. The first intention 
is to select the UMLSG scheme as a case study and investigate the welfare outcomes in China’s 
current welfare regime. The other one is to test if the UMLSG - as an instrumental means - can 
really achieve the socialist ideologies which have been proclaimed by the CPC since 2002. This 
chapter will initiate an inquiry about the standards of the UMLSG thresholds. It will first give 
some background information about the UMLSG and examine how the rationale of the UMLSG 
was shaped by the political ideologies in ‘economic China’ and ‘social China’. Next, in order to 
assess the principles of de-commodification and social programs in the welfare outcomes, this 
chapter will reveal the meaning behind the UMLSG thresholds by comparing them with four 
indicators. Meanwhile, opinions of the poor people towards the guaranteed standard will be 
provided. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the effects of the UMLSG after it was 
improved to a comprehensive assistance. Also, voices of the users will be included to enrich the 
discussion.  
 
Background of the UMLSG 
First trialed in Shanghai City in 1993, the UMLSG scheme was promoted to nearly one third of 
all Chinese cities in 1995 and it was finally institutionalised across all urban areas in 1999 (Tang, 
2002; 2005). The UMLSG is a highly decentralised institution and the authorities at municipal or 
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 even district levels are supposed to be responsible for raising funding, designing thresholds, and 
implementing relevant policies. As a result, there can be a wide range of local UMLSG 
thresholds across urban China, which leads to a wide variation in the amounts of benefit paid. 
For example, as averaged from their subordinate cities, the monthly UMLSG thresholds varied 
from 169.7 to 430 yuan among different provinces in 2009 (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2010e). 
Similarly, regarding the 36 principle cities across the country, the UMLSG ranged broadly from 
156 to 450 yuan up to June 2010 (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2010b).  
 
Lastly, throughout China, eligibility for the UMLSG and the amount of benefit given is 
calculated in the same way - that is, a poverty threshold is established, below which families can 
claim the benefit, and then the benefit is calculated as the difference between the average income 
of the family and that threshold - in other words, it is a means-tested, ‘top-up’ benefit, a monthly 
subsidy on a family basis①. Other than the UMLSG subsidy, beneficiaries could now receive a 
series of price concessions in related to social programs once they qualify the conditions. The 
complementory effects of these price concessions to the UMLSG subsidy will be reviewed later 
in this chapter.  
 
Rationale of the UMLSG 
Although there is such a large degree of difference between cities, the rationale behind the 
methods of calculating the UMLSG is often similar, and can be related to political and 
ideological pressures coming from the national level. We have already seen how such pressures 
were important in the institution of the UMLSG in the first place. Chapter Six has identified the 
newly-emerging problem of urban poverty - which was caused by the massive unemployment of 
state workers in the 1990s - as one of the main contradictions in the promise of ‘common 
prosperity’. The failure to achieve this promise created a crisis in the CPC’s legitimacy in China. 
As a socialist party (at least at the ideological level), the CPC needed to show more of its 
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 determination to ‘enhance people’s living standards’ and ‘achieve common prosperity’. The 
UMLSG scheme, which attempts to accomplish the unfulfilled promises, has become one of the 
early breakthroughs in the welfare system. As explained in Chapter Three, it is an ideal case 
study to reflect on the attitudes of the CPC towards the welfare system as well as the welfare 
outcomes produced by China’s current welfare regime.   
 
The guidance of the UMLSG has been developed under the dominant political ideologies 
discussed in Chapter Five - ‘economic China’ and Chapter Six - ‘social China’. The first guiding 
principle is related to the ‘legitimacy of the CPC’. As former Deputy Minister of Civil Affairs 
Fan Bao-jun (1997, p1733) pointed out, ‘This scheme is a project corresponding to popular 
aspirations, a cohesion project, a big and good thing done by the government for the 
masses. …The money spent on the UMLSG not only reassures people and stabilises society, but 
also supports economic development. All of these prove the importance of the UMLSG.’ 
Similarly, Li Peng (1997) showed strong appreciation for the UMLSG, ‘This is a very effective 
policy for social stability, which has remarkably good consequences, but which also costs little 
money.’ 
 
If the institution of the UMLSG has been of vital importance to the legitimacy of the CPC, the 
level at which the UMLSG threshold is set, although it is given to functionaries at a local level, is 
also conditioned by national political factors, connected to the ideology of ‘subordination of 
social system to economic system’. The ‘primary stage of socialism’ and a misleading image of 
the UMLSG beneficiaries as ‘lazy people’ are the two discourses promoted to justify the choice 
of lower thresholds. These two points can be illustrated by former Premier Zhu Rong-ji’s (2002b) 
remark:  
The key is to confirm the UMLSG thresholds and the subsidies of recipients reasonably. 
A high level would not only lead to the over-burdening of the state but also produce a 
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 system of ‘raising lazy people’, which would undermine the possibility of employment. 
Some countries have to re-adjust now because they have established so high a standard 
of social security and welfare that they cannot live up to them. It is absolutely impossible 
for our country to set a high standard of social security given the weak foundation and 
the huge population. Otherwise, this would drag down the development of enterprises 
and the state. 
 
Similarly, based on the ‘priority given to efficiency with due consideration to fairness’, former 
Minister of Civil Affairs Duoji Cairang (2001, p85-86) insisted that, ‘In order to prevent the 
deficiency of raising lazy people, the MLSG thresholds should be lower than incomes possibly 
derived from working’. Therefore, Duoji Cairang suggested the MLSG benefit levels should not 
exceed those of social insurance, Five-Guarantee Household (in rural areas) and preferential 
treatment for veterans. Otherwise, the MLSG beneficiaries would be those people with incomes 
or the ability to work, who did not, however, fulfil their self-responsibility or obligations to the 
state. 
 
Despite the lack of convincing evidence to support the worries about the ‘burden on economic 
development’ and ‘raising lazy people’, both of these two claims put forward by the authorities 
have constantly been reinforced by one-sided statistics and academic studies. For instance, a 
profile of the UMLSG beneficiaries is published by the Ministry of Civil Affairs every year. As 
shown in Table 7.1, this official profile mainly categorised its subjects by job status during 2002-
2006. Although during 2007-2009 two specific criteria of ‘disabled’ and ‘students’ were added to 
indicate more details about non-working population, it is suggested by Table 7.2 that the majority 
of beneficiaries still belonged to those people with unemployed status. Therefore, the official 
statistics seem to imply that the UMLSG beneficiaries are largely comprised of people with the 




 However, this may be just a myth produced by insufficient statistics. As will be indicated in 
Chapter Eight, local bureaucrats have already strictly implemented an informal principle of ‘the 
ability to work’ to maximally exclude applicants that are actually able to work from receiving the 
UMLSG benefits. In other words, the most common characteristics of the UMLSG beneficiaries 
- at least as shown in the fieldwork of the current study - are probably those applicants who are 
incapable of working instead of those who are unemployed but able to work.  
 
The depiction of the UMLSG beneficiaries as ‘lazy people’ by academics can be illustrated by a 
background paper about voluntary labour - a Chinese version of ‘workfare’ for the UMLSG 
beneficiaries (Ge, 2005). This paper was written by a scholar from the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, which is the highest-level official research institute. Without convincing 
evidence, it is claimed that a quarter of the UMLSG beneficiaries at this time were ‘rich people’ 
who took advantage of the assistance. They often dressed well, consumed extravagantly, or even 
drove their automobiles to the place where they claimed their benefits. Meanwhile, it was 
common for beneficiaries to be ‘decadent in spirit and demoralised in personality’, based on the 
facts that they either just stayed at home or rioted in public. In addition, the paper claimed that 
the UMLSG subsidy offsets the motivation of beneficiaries to work and thus creates welfare 
dependency.     
 
Table 7.1: An Official Profile of the UMLSG Beneficiaries during 2002-2006 
(Million People) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total Number 20.647 22.468 22.05 22.342 22.401
Working 1.868 1.793 1.41 1.141 0.976
Laid-Off 5.545 5.184 4.689 4.307 3.5
Retired 0.908 0.907 0.731 0.613 0.532
Unemployed 3.583 4.09 4.231 4.101 4.208
Three Nos 0.919 0.999 0.954 0.958 0.931
Others 7.831 9.493 10.035 11.221 12.253




Table 7.2: An Official Profile of the UMLSG Beneficiaries during 2007-2009 
(Million People) 
 2007 2008 2009
Total Number 22.721 23.348  23.456 
Disabled 1.61 1.691  1.81 
Three Nos 1.258 1.069  0.941 
Old Age 2.984 3.167  3.335 
Working 0.939 0.822  0.79 
Self-Employed 3.438 3.817  4.322 
 Unemployed (Registered)  6.272 5.643  5.102 
 Unemployed (unregistered) 3.643 4.022  4.109 
Students 3.216 3.581  3.691 
Others 2.23 2.296  2.107 
Source: Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2010a 
 
The focus on the ‘burden on economic development’ and ‘raising lazy people’ by both national 
politicians and national academics leads to the tendency for the regional authorities to choose 
extremely low levels of benefits in reality. There are two ways in which this pressure can be seen 
to operate. Firstly, the thresholds of the UMLSG are required to be lower than the minimum 
wage, basic living expenses for laid-off workers and unemployment benefit (State Council, 
2001). As illustrated in Table 7.3, the UMLSG threshold as a ratio of the minimum wage 
gradually decreased from 63.08% to 39.59% in Shanghai during 1993-2007. In comparison to 
the rapid rise of the minimum wage, the UMLSG threshold in Shanghai had just a modest 
increase, which was intended to create more motivation for the UMLSG beneficiaries to work.   
 
Another way in which the pressure of national ideologies can be seen to affect the local 
calculations of the UMLSG thresholds is in the way that they are normally targeted to achieve 
only a ‘minimum’ level of living standards. Duoji Cairang (1997b, p253) defined this ‘minimum’ 
level as the ‘minimum needs of the poor population for getting rid of hunger and coldness’; 
while Zhu Rong-ji (2000) perceived it as the ‘basic survival ( jiben shengcun ) conditions for 
poverty-stricken families’. Likewise, former State Councillor Li Gui-xian (1997, p278) 
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 suggested that local governments should flexibly adopt lower thresholds based on how much the 
authority could afford to pay:  
Due to the principles of guaranteeing basic livelihoods and preventing dependency, 
every locality should establish the threshold based on actual conditions of necessary 
costs and fiscal affordability. …Our country is still at the primary stage of socialism with 
limited public budgets. Therefore, the standard of threshold must not be set too high; it is 
preferable to aim at a low rather than a high level at the beginning. Otherwise, it would 
not be affordable for public budgets as well as causing dependency amongst the 
beneficiaries. 
 
Table 7.3: Minimum Wage and the UMLSG Threshold in Shanghai (Yuan) 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
UMLSG threshold 120 135 165 185 195 
Minimum Wage 210 220 270 300 315 
Ratio 57.14% 61.36% 61.11% 61.67% 61.90% 
 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
UMLSG threshold 205 215 280 280 290 
Minimum Wage 325 370 445 490 535 
Ratio 63.08% 58.11% 62.92% 57.14% 54.21% 
 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
UMLSG threshold 290 290 300 320 350 
Minimum Wage 570 635 690 750 884 
Ratio 50.88% 45.67% 43.48% 42.67% 39.59% 
Source: Shen 2009, p76 
 
In summary, the importance of the UMLSG in consolidating its legitimacy is recognised by the 
Party, but the UMLSG standards are still subordinated to the imperative guidance of the 
‘subordination of the social system to the economic system’. Fears about the ‘burden on 
economic development’ and ‘raising lazy people’ have always been expressed by the authorities. 
Also, these myths have constantly been reproduced by official statistics and academic research 
168 
 
 and they have been implemented in policy. As a result, the ‘ideal’ level of the UMLSG thresholds 
suggested by the authorities is one that is lower than the minimum wage and unemployment 
benefit, aiming only to assure a ‘minimum’ or ‘survival’ level of living standard.      
 
Assessment of the UMLSG thresholds 
It has been argued that the rationle of the UMLSG has been deeply affected by the political 
ideologies in regard to the welfare system in ‘economic China’ and ‘social China’. This has led 
to a very important consequence, which is that the authorities tend to adopt a ‘minimum’ level 
for the UMLSG thresholds. However, what does the ‘minimum’ level of living standard mean? 
How does it deviate from the normal standards of ordinary residents? In order to reveal the 
meaning behind the UMLSG thresholds, this section develops an assessment that compares the 
UMLSG thresholds to four indicators that can be used to define poverty: the World Bank’s 
absolute standard, a set of Chinese academic assessments of national poverty that rely on a ‘cost 
of basic needs’ method, a comparison with average Chinese wages - the ‘relative income’ method, 
and a more sophisticated study of a number of localities in China that has been carried out using 
the ‘comprehensive’ method.  
 
The rationale behind developing this assessment here can be explained as follows. Since there 
are various UMLSG thresholds in different localities within China and the process of policy 
making is usually not disclosed, it is impossible to analyse how each UMLSG threshold was 
calculated based on their original official documents. However, the UMLSG thresholds can be 
compared with ‘poverty lines’ produced by other bodies of poverty thresholds whose methods of 
calculation have been clearly described. If they are both at a similar level in the comparison, it 
can be assumed that the UMLSG thresholds must share similar characteristics with these other 
poverty thresholds and these characteristics can be revealed by studying the methods of 
calculating these poverty thresholds.   
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 It must be noted that the following analysis will rely on the national figures of the UMLSG 
thresholds in various years. These figures are published by the Ministry of Civil Affairs every 
year. As an average set of figures, this indicator may overlook the variety in the UMLSG 
thresholds among different cities as suggested by the above discussion. Therefore, it is very 
likely for the national figures to overestimate the actual level of the UMLSG thresholds in most 
of the localitites. However, the shortcoming of this indicator will not affect the comparision in 
this chapter, because if the national average figures can be demonstrated as being set at a very 
low level, other local thresholds that are lower than these average figures must be set at an even 
lower level. 
 
Moreover, the poverty lines were set at 2003 prices in the comparisons with the World Bank’s 
absolute standard and the ‘costs of basic needs’ method by using the Urban Consumer Price 
Index (CPI; National Bureau of Statistics, 2010e) with 1995 as the benchmark at 100 (See Table 
7.4). This is related to the announcement that ‘whoever is eligible is covered’ in 2003. Since that 
time, the number of the UMLSG beneficiaries has become quite stable. In this circumstance, the 
analysis of the national figures for 2003 can be used to show to what extent poverty in China has 
actually been covered by the UMLSG.  
 
$1.08 standard and $ 1.25 standard 
The first indicator that will be used for comparision is the absolute standard proposed by the 
World Bank. Ravallion et al. (1991) discovered that, looking at worldwide levels of poverty, in 
the richer countries above a certain point, poverty lines tended to rise sharply with per-capita 
consumption; while this correlation was rather unpredictable below that level, aggregated by the 
poorest countries. Therefore, a lower tier of $23, which covered the poverty thresholds in the 
seven lowest-income countries②, and a high tier of $31 per person per month (based on 1985 
PPP) were employed as yardsticks for global comparison. Later, this minimum absolute standard 
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 of ‘$1 a day’ was updated to ‘$1.08 a day’ ($32.74 per month; 1993 PPP) and a higher standard 
of ‘$2.15 a day’ ($65.48 per month; 1993 PPP) was proposed for middle-income developing 
countries (Chen and Ravallion, 2007; 2001). Recently, the minimum absolute standard was 
revised again to $1.25 per day or $37.98 per month using the 2005 PPP, which represented the 
poverty lines of the fifteen poorest countries③ (Ravallion et al., 2008).  
 
China is a lower middle income country. However, the national figure of the UMLSG threshold 
is no better than the international absolute standard poverty line, as set most recently. If ‘$1.08 a 
day’ (1993 PPP) and ‘$1.25 a day’ (2005 PPP) are adjusted to the same 2003 prices, the UMLSG 
threshold of 1,788 yuan in 2003 significantly exceeded the ‘$1.08 a day’ standard poverty line of 
the 1993 PPP - equivalent to 1,124 yuan  (World Bank 2009, p5). However, this threshold of 
1,788 yuan was still lower than the new standard of ‘$1.25 a day’, or 2,205 yuan, which was set 
using at 2005 PPP④ (Table 7.4).  
 
The similar level of the UMLSG thresholds to the absolute standard of the World Bank poverty 
line suggests that their methods of calculation should share common characteristics with each 
other. The World Bank’s minimum standard refers to the absolute level of the living standards in 
the poorest countries in the world. Considering China’s persistent economic growth, however, 
there is definitely no reason to believe that China should maintain its poverty line at the same 
level as the poorest countries in the world. Although China’s GDP per capita (current prices) 
ranked 98 out of 183 countries in 2009, it was still much higher than those fifteen poorest 
countries in the World Bank’s research for the new ‘$1.25 a day’ standard. For example, the two 
of those countries which came closest to China in per-capita GDP, Chad and Tajikistan ranked 




 Furthermore, there have been some criticisms of World Bank’s method of calculating its absolute 
standard.  For example, a key feature of the World Bank’s absolute standard is the failure to 
account for social programs, such as housing, education or health service. Even the World Bank 
experts admitted that the ‘best consumption data need not adequately reflect certain “non-
market” dimensions of welfare, such as access to certain public services’ (Ravallion and Chen 
2007, p4).  
 
In summary, the fact that the UMLSG thresholds are equivalent to the World Bank’s absolute 
standard poverty line means that the methods used for calculating them probably take as little 
account of the provision of public service for the poor as those used for calculating the World 
Bank’s absolute standard. In addition, it is no longer appropriate to compare China’s urban 
poverty with the worst situation in the world.  
 
‘Cost of basic needs’ method 
The second approach of this analysis is to contrast the national UMLSG thresholds with 
estimates of Chinese poverty levels made in a number of academic studies that have been 
produced using national statistics. There are two technical points that need to be clarified. On the 
one hand, the aim of the poverty studies that are compared in Table 7.4 was to estimate the 
number of people living in poverty in urban China. To do this, a Chinese poverty line had to be 
calculated by these researchers. In the first cohort, Ravallion and Chen (2007), Meng et al. 
(2005), Yao (2004) and Wang (2002) all used the ‘cost of basic needs’ method. Generally, this 
method consists of five steps. 1) A nutritional requirement of 2100 kilo calories per person per 
day is set. 2) The food poverty line is the result of this normative amount of food energy 
multiplied by the actual food costs of the bottom income group. 3) Those households whose total 
expenditures are below the food poverty line are identified as living in food poverty. 4) The non-
food expenses spent by these food poor families are assumed to be necessary and minimum, 
because these expenses are squeezed from food costs. 5) A general poverty line is the sum of 
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 food costs and non-food costs (Ravallion, 1998).  
 
On the other hand, a second cohort of researchers, who were also interested in establishing levels 
of poverty in China, the National Survey Team of Urban Cities (1997), Hussain (2003), Li 
(2006), and Khan and Riskin (2001) all modified the last two steps in the ‘cost of basic needs’ 
method by introducing the Engel’s Coefficient. The Engel’s co-efficient is an indicator that 
makes estimates about poverty lines based on assumptions about the proportion of food costs in 
the total expenditure. The higher an Engel’s co-efficient is, i.e., the greater a proportion of 
income is spent on food, the lower the living standard it usually suggests. The food costs of these 
four poverty lines in the second cohort were calculated following the first three steps of the ‘cost 
of basic needs’ method, but the poverty lines were derived by the formula: ‘food costs/Engel’s 
Coefficient’.  
 
The high or low level of the Engel’s Coefficient tends to determine the levels of the estimated 
poverty lines. It can be found in Table 7.4. that the results of these two groups of researchers are 
distinctively different. The first cohort, which consists of those studies that were entirely 
following the ‘cost of basic needs’ method, all estimate the poverty line as below 2,000 yuan per 
year at 2003 prices. By introducing the Engel’s Coefficient in the calculation, the studies in the 
second cohort are distinguished by their higher levels, starting from at least 2,045 yuan to about 
2,500 yuan per year. When compared to the Chinese poverty line suggested in the first cohort, 
the national average UMLSG threshold in 2003 (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2010f) is higher than 
that of Ravallion and Chen (2007) and very close to those of Meng et al. (2005), Yao (2004) and 
Wang (2002). Therefore, the key question is: what do the poverty lines proposed by the first 





 Table 7.4: Comparison of Urban Poverty Lines (Person/Year/Yuan) 
 1995 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 
Urban CPI 100 111 110 111 111 112 
‘$1 a day’ consumption 
with 1993 PPP 
     1,124 
(N/A) 
‘$1.25 a day’ 
consumption with 2005 
PPP 
     2,205 
(N/A) 
First Cohort 
1,211 Ravallion and Chen 
(2007) 
















1,795 Meng et al. 
(2005) 
















2,045 National Survey Team 



















    
Notes: 1. In Ravallion and Chen’s (2007) study, the reference group of the food bundles was the poorest 15%-25%. 
Data from the UHS 1980-2001 covering 30,000-40,000 samples in all provinces each year. 
           2. In Meng et al.’s (2005) study, the reference group of the food bundles was the poorest 20%. Data from the 
UHS 1986-2000 covering 12,409-16,905 samples in 29 provinces. 
           3. Yao (2004) calculated the national urban food poverty line and the general poverty line based on the data 
from the UHS 1998. 
          4. Wang’s (2002) study drew the data from the UHS 2000 covering 17,000 samples. 
          5. In the National Survey Team of Urban Cities’ (1997) study, the reference group of the food bundles was the 
poorest 40%. Data from the UHS 1995 covering 35,520 samples. 
          6. In Hussain’s (2003) study, the reference group was the bottom 20%. Data from the UHS 1998 covering 
17,000 samples in all 31 provinces. 
        7. I averaged the general poverty lines in the six provinces from Li’s study. 
        8. Khan and Riskin (2001) drew the data from a survey conducted separately in 1988 in 10 provinces  
               (9,009 households) and in 1995 in 11 provinces (6,931 households). 
          9. The proportions in bracket are the Engle’s Coefficients calculated by me based on the food  
poverty lines provided in the original articles, except for the numbers of Ravallion and Chen (2007) 
(873 yuan) and Meng et al. (2005) (1,316 yuan) are retrieved from World Bank (2009, p71). 
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 It can be argued that the ‘cost of basic needs’ method used by these researchers suffers three 
main deficiencies. The first is linked to the minimal nutritional intake, which is assumed by these 
researchers to be 2,100 kilo calories per day. According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs et al.’s 
(2011) definition, this amount of nutrition can only support body functions for light physical 
labour. The question of what sort of labour poor people usually conduct in China is not going to 
be raised here; instead, the point to make is that the adoption of an ‘appropriate’ nutritional 
intake for a particular social group can be socially constructed. For instance, in order to prove the 
determination of the Chinese authorities to protect human rights, it has been asserted that the 
amount of nutritional intake for prisoners was 3,343 kilo calories per day in 1997 (Wang, 1998). 
This suggests that it is not impossible for the Chinese authorities to protect a vulnerable group by 
choosing a higher nutritional standard. However, the controversial question is: why are poor 
people less humanely treated than prisoners? 
 
The second shortcoming of the ‘cost of basic needs’ method rests on the use of a price index that 
is related only to the expenses of a particular lowest-income group. This commits a logical 
fallacy in that rather than identifying in absolute terms the numbers of poor people by research, 
the poverty line is utilised to justify a particular lifestyle for those who have already been 
assumed to be ‘poor’ (e.g. no more than 5%, 10% or 20% of the whole population). Moreover, 
the reproduction of the lifestyle of the poorest decile will marginalise the UMLSG beneficiaries 
from the mainstream, at least in terms of food consumption. This can be contrasted with 
Orshansky’s (1965) pioneering study on the poverty line in the United States, where it was the 
national average price that was employed. This clearly delivers the message that the living 
standards of poor people, even if purely in monetary terms of food, should be measured 
according to a ‘normal’ standard.   
 
The third flaw of the ‘cost of basic needs’ method is the ignoring of non-food costs. While the 
first cohort of studies did not employ the Engel’s Coefficient - the calculation of food costs as a 
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 percentage of overall consumption - as part of their methodology for estimating the Chinese 
poverty line, this can be applied in retrospect to the data contained in their research. If this is 
done, it can be seen that the Engel’s Coefficients for Ravallion and Chen (2007), Meng et al. 
(2005) and Yao (2004) were as high as 73%, 74% and 75% (see Table 7.4). However, if an 
assumption is made that food costs have a smaller share of the total consumption, the poverty 
lines produced tend to be higher. This can be demonstrated by the second cohort. Based on a 
similar ‘cost of basic needs’ method to calculate the food component of the poverty estimate, The 
National Survey Team of Urban Cities (1997), Hussain (2003), Li (2006), and Khan and Riskin 
(2001) produced higher thresholds because of using lower Engel’s Coefficients of 60%, 60%, 
53% and 55%.. 
 
If the UMLSG thresholds turn out to be similar to the poverty lines established in the first cohort, 
the UMLSG thresholds can be expected to have a similarly high Engel’s Coefficient. For 
instance, the UMLSG threshold in 2004 was 1,824 yuan on a nationwide average (Table 7.5), 
while the food poverty line was set at 1,614 yuan by one of the researchers in this first cohort, 
the National Bureau of Statistics (Wang, 2006). This means that the Engel’s Coefficient for the 
UMLSG in 2004, using the figures quoted as food costs by the National Bureau of Statistics, 
may be as high as 88%, a proportion that would be appropriate only where the level of poverty 
was extreme. Ironically, the generation of such a high Engel’s Coefficient in China’s poverty 
measurement contradicts the actual living conditions. Even the official statistics recorded a lower 
proportion of food costs to non-food costs of 47.72% or 48.59% for the poorest 10% or 5% 
urban households in 2003 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010f). In other words, the ‘cost of 
basic needs’ method is based on assumptions which relate to living conditions of less than the 
poorest 5% urban households. 
 
In short, the ‘cost of basic needs’ method in China can be criticised for its harsh choice of 
nutritional intake, arbitrary definition of the poor group, exclusion of poor people from 
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 mainstream food purchasing, and ignoring of non-food costs. 
 
Relative income 
After reviewing the UMLSG thresholds by comparing them to the World Bank’s absolute 
standard and the ‘cost of basic needs’ method, the next two indicators provide a relative 
perspective. It can be seen from Table 7.5 that the ratios between the national UMLSG thresholds 
and average disposable incomes for the urban population decreased steadily from 30.5% to 
15.6 % during 1999-2008 and it only had a weak recovery to 15.9% in 2009. By comparison, the 
same indicator in the European developed countries is generally located at 50 per cent (Atkinson, 
1991).  
 
The decreasing ratios of the UMLSG thresholds to average disposable incomes reflect the fact, 
already discussed in Chapter Six, that poor people have been adversely affected by a growing 
income inequality during the period of economic growth. Also, it indicates that the relative 
perspective for defining ‘poverty’ in China has been ignored by the authorities. 
 
‘Comprehensive’ method 
The fourth set of calculations that can be used to help understand the methodology that lies 
behind the estimation of the UMLSG thresholds, are those produced by Tang Jun (1998), another 
high-profile expert on the UMLSG at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. In a number of 
city-specific studies, which are publicly available, he proposed a ‘comprehensive’ method for 
estimating the poverty-line, which he claimed synthesised Townsend’s (1979) ‘relative 
deprivation’ and the ‘costs of basic needs’ methods. It is said that this ‘comprehensive’ method 
was recommended by the Ministry of Civil Affairs and promoted in some cities such as Beijing, 
Nanjing, Changchun, Suzhou, Ji’an, Changzhou and Yancheng (Tang 1998, p129), so it can be 
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 assumed to have had a direct influence on the calculation of UMLSG thresholds, at least in these 
cities. 
 
Table 7.5: Comparison between the National UMLSG Thresholds and  
Average Disposable Incomes 1999-2008 
Year National UMLSG thresholds
(Person/Year/RMB) 




1999 1,788 5,854 30.5 
2000     1,884     6,280 30.0 
2001 1,764 6,860 25.7 
2002 1,776 7,703 23.1 
2003 1,788 8,472 21.1 
2004 1,824 9,422 19.4 
2005 1,872 10,493 17.8 
2006 2,035.2 11,759 17.3 
2007 2,188.8 13,786 15.9 
2008 2,463.6 15,781 15.6 
2009 2,733.6 17,175 15.9 
Source: Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2010f; National Bureau of Statistics, 2010g 
 
Tang (1998) conducted the first test in Yiyang City in 1994. His method can be described briefly 
as follows. The first stage was related to the idea of ‘relative deprivation’ part: 1) an ‘index of 
deprivation’ - ranging from food, household appliances to social life - was developed by officers, 
experts and users to assess the items that could enable social participation but were lacking in 
reality; 2) after interviewing ordinary residents, eight out of the 22 indicators, which had both a 
frequency of more than 50% and a factor loading of more than 60%, were selected; 3) those 
households containing at least seven out of these eight indicators were defined as poor 
households. The second stage turned to the ‘cost of basic needs’ part: 4) these identified poor 
were surveyed, in order to observe their monthly consumption levels; 5) three kinds of monthly 
thresholds were confirmed by the subjective selection of some items from the consumption list: 
A. the survival line (shengcun xian): 95 yuan including food, accommodation and transportation; 
B. the subsistence line (wenbao xian): 107 yuan when clothes, daily  necessities and medical care 
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 were added; C. the developmental line (fazhan xian): 130 yuan, which included education costs 
amongst others. 
 
A further study in Beijing in 1995 followed almost all the procedures in Yiyang, only differing at 
the fourth step: a reference group with a slightly higher income than the people who were 
identified as poor in the ‘relative deprivation’ part was chosen for consumption assessment (250 
yuan per month rather than 189.65 yuan per month). Also, this time three slightly different levels 
of poverty lines were proposed: A. the survival line: 155 yuan including food, accommodation 
and daily necessities; B. the subsistence line: 190 yuan when transportation and clothes were 
added; C. the developmental line: 210 yuan, which included education and medical care 
(Research Team of the Reform of Urban Social Relief Institute, 1995). 
 
A similar system was implemented in Changzhou and Yancheng in 1995, but this time Tang 
(1998) chose five indicators from a total of 22 in the deprivation index, which had relatively 
higher public perception but lower personal perception⑤. Here the identification of the poverty 
line was determined by the consumption of those households which were deprived of no less 
than four out of five indicators. The poverty thresholds were designed as follows: A. the survival 
line was 140 yuan for Changzhou and 110 yuan for Yancheng, including food, accommodation, 
daily necessities and medical care; B. the subsistence line was 170 yuan for Changzhou and 130 
yuan for Yancheng, adding clothes and transportation; C. the developmental line was 210 yuan 
for Changzhou and 160 yuan for Yancheng, including education and other costs.    
 
Even in recent years, this ‘comprehensive’ method has still had an influence on policy making. 
This can be illustrated by the research conducted by the Guangzhou Municipal Bureau of Civil 
Affairs in collaboration with the Department of Sociology at Sun Yat-sen University (2004), 
which was aimed to provide suggestions to the design of the UMLSG threshold in Guangzhou. 
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 This research also started with a deprivation index from which ten out of 28 indicators were 
recognised, all of which had a frequency of more than 65% plus a factor loading of more than 
60% when applied to ‘ordinary’ households. Next, some of these households were classified as 
‘poor’, since they complied with at least eight out of the ten deprivation indicators. Eventually, 
according to the combinations of consumption goods of these households, three kinds of poverty 
lines were established: 1) the survival line: 255.8 yuan including food, accommodation, daily 
necessities and durable goods of consumption; 2) the subsistence line: 346.9 yuan, including 
medical care, transportation and clothes; 3) the developmental line: 441.4 yuan, adding education 
and communication. 
 
Using the above examples, what can be inferred about the application of this ‘comprehensive’ 
method in China? If these studies are compared to Gordon et al.’s (2000) study of relative 
deprivation in the UK, the poverty thresholds produced by the Chinese method were greatly 
underestimated because of some important technical changes. Firstly, at the second step of 
choosing indicators that could indicate poverty from the deprivation index, a frequency of only 
50 per cent or above was adopted in the UK. But Chinese scholars did not justify why a higher 
frequency and factor loading were set as dual criteria, such as ‘50 per cent & 60 per cent’ in 
Yiyang and Beijing, and ‘65 per cent & 60 per cent’ in Guangzhou. This modification meant that 
some potential indicators in the deprivation index, which could also be used to indicate ‘poverty’, 
would have been overlooked. 
 
Secondly, at the third step of identifying ‘the poor’ by selected indicators, it seems that the 
decision about the number of deprived items, which was significant to distinguish the poor from 
the non-poor groups, was again made arbitrarily by the Chinese scholars. In fact, statistical 
techniques such as regression models were required to discover the optimum number of 
deprivation indicators that should be used for poverty identification. Moreover, this number 
adopted by Chinese scholars appeared to be very high, such as seven in eight indicators in 
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 Yiyang and Beijing, four in five in Yangchang and Changzhou, or eight in ten in Guangzhou. In 
contrast, only two out of 35 items were the standard for Gordon et al.’s (2000) survey. By 
arbitrarily adopting a very strict criterion for the optimum number of poverty indicators for 
poverty identification, the Chinese scholars ensured that the numbers of people living in poverty 
would be underestimated at this stage.    
 
 The third step of Gordon et al.’s (2000) research was to survey the aggregated income of the 
respondents who had the exact optimum number of deprivation indicators, and this aggregated 
income could serve as the poverty line. However, claiming that this was an innovative idea, 
Chinese scholars derived poverty lines from a further stage of studying the consumption list of 
‘the poor’ who had been identified at the ‘relative deprivation’ part. This additional stage not 
only committed the same mistakes as the ‘cost of basic needs’ method, such as the reference to 
the lowest-income price index; it also ultimately excluded a large proportion of poor people who 
should have been recognised as poor according to the ‘relative deprivation’ part of the research. 
 
For example, 23 per cent households in Yiyang’s test would have been classified as ‘poor’ by the 
‘relative deprivation’ part of the assessment, but after the ‘cost of basic needs’ stage, only 11 per 
cent households were officially designated as ‘poor’, i.e., falling below the ‘survival’ poverty 
lineh. This was the same situation as in the Beijing experiment: only 8.44 per cent out of an 
initial 15 per cent households were considered to fall into ‘poverty’ if the ‘subsistence’ line was 
usedi. Worst of all, both the survival line in Yiyang and the subsistence line in Beijing were 
actually confirmed as the UMLSG thresholds at that time. This suggests a serious ignorance 
about the number of the population living in poverty. Similarly, despite a lack of exact figures, a 
certain number of poor people were definitely excluded in Changzhou and Yancheng, because 
their UMLSG thresholds were established as approximately the same as the average income of 
the poor people identified at the ‘relative deprivation’ stage (Table 7.6).    
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 Fourthly, depending on the actual choice made by local UMLSG officials from the three levels of 
living standards - ‘survival’, ‘subsistence’ and ‘developmental’, some expenses may not be 
included in the UMLSG thresholds, such as transportation, medical care and especially education. 
The absence of these non-food expenses often happens in reality because the authorities prefer to 
choose lower standards. As was indicated in the diussion at the beginning of this chapter, it has 
been officially maintained that: ‘The standard of threshold must not be set too high; it is 
preferred to aim at a low rather than a high level at the beginning (Li, 1997).’ Consequently, it is 
not surprising to find that the five cities where the ‘comprehensive’ method was trialled all 
eventually adopted lower standards than recommended by the academic estimations.   
 
For example, the UMLSG threshold launched in Yiyang in 1999 was only 80 yuan per person per 
month (Yiyang Municipal Government, 1999), much lower than the survival line of 95 yuan 
estimated by Tang (1998) in 1994. Similarly, it was not until 1997 and 1999 that the UMLSG 
threshold in Beijing reached the levels of the ‘subsistence’ line and the ‘developmental’ line 
estimated in 1995 (Beijing Web, 2008). Meanwhile, the UMLSG threshold was stable at 180 
yuan in Changzhou from 1999 to 2001 (Shu, 2005), which was roughly the same as the 
subsistence line of 170 yuan in 1995. Yanchang had the exactly same situation. The UMLSG 
threshold of 130 yuan in 1999 (Jiangsu Province Government, 1999) was also the same as the 
‘subsistence’ line in 1995. Lastly, the development of the UMLSG threshold in Guangzhou was 
far behind the development recommended by the research in 2004. Despite the fact that the 
UMLSG threshold was enhanced from 300 to 330 yuan in 2005 (Guangzhou Municipal Bureau 
of Statistics, 2006), it still fell behind the ‘subsistence’ line, estimated as 346.9 yuan in 2004. It 
was not until 2010 that the threshold reached 410 yuan (Guangzhou Municipal Bureau of Civil 
Affairs, 2010), however, which was still, however, some distance from the ‘developmental’ line 





 Table 7.6: Summary of the UMLSG thresholds in Five Cities (Yuan/Person/Month) 
 Average 
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Yiyang 
(1994) 





















346.9 441.4 330 (2005) 
410 (2010) 
 
In summary, the ‘comprehensive’ method loses the strengths of the ‘relative deprivation’ 
approach. This is not only because of the unjustified technical changes at the ‘relative 
deprivation’ stage, but also largely due to the additional ‘cost of basic needs’ element of the 
calculation. By such a synthesis in methodology, a large proportion of the people initially 
identified as poor would be screened out by the ‘comprehensive’ method. Much worse, the 
preference of the authorities to choose lower thresholds from the available options once again 
indicated the exclusion of non-food costs from the UMLSG thresholds. This has severely 
damaged the value of the original ‘relative deprivation’ approach  which is intended to focus on 
the social conditions that can enable poor people to fulfil their membership of society (Townsend, 
1993).  
 
Voices from the poor 
After reviewing the ideologies and methodologies of the UMLSG thresholds, there is convincing 
evidence to validate the ‘minimum’ or ‘survival’ standard that the UMLSG thresholds are aiming 
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 at. Even the interviewees of local bureaucrats in the fieldwork admitted that the UMLSG 
standard was far from sufficient for subsistence. For example, Ms. Fan, Mr. Shen, Ms. Mo and 
Mr. Gan all made the same remark: ‘410 yuan [of the UMLSG threshold] is definitely not 
enough.’ Despite this, most of them offered an optimistic view about the need satisfaction of the 
UMLSG beneficiaries. Ms. Mo supplemented, ‘It depends on how to subsist. You can eat more 
when rich; you can also eat less when poor.’ Similarly, although Ms. Fan sympathised that ‘there 
is nothing to do with the high prices in Guangzhou’, she believed that: 
The recipients in my jurisdiction are quite satisfied since the government is treating the 
vulnerable group well. The UMLSG threshold was enhanced from 330 to 410 yuan, not 
to mention the temporary price subsidy.  
 
However, the following experiences of poor people clearly show the difficulty of sustaining 
subsistence. As can be expected from the rationale of the UMLSG thresholds, the current level of 
income maintenance provides the interviewees of poor people a very tight food budget. They can 
only afford the amount of food for minimum body functioning at the cheapest price. Furthermore, 
poor people also need to find every means to save non-food costs. In order to reduce household 
costs, they may have limited use of electrical appliances (e.g. TV or microwave) at home, not to 
mention any social life that may produce extra costs.    
We have to cut the food expenses in order to pay all kinds of bills for the apartment. We 
seldom go out for shopping and never have dinner in a restaurant (Mr. Li).  
I am clenching my teeth for subsistence. Despite being an old man, I still have to eat at 
least 30 kilos of rice per month and I spend more than 100 yuan for health costs. As 
there are bills to be paid for the household, I usually scrounge round the dustbins and 
pick cans and bottles to sell to the recycle centre. I never have any social engagements. 
The TV was a gift but I barely watch it. To speak frankly, I am so broke that I cannot 
pay the administration fee of the apartment for this year (Mr. Wang). 
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 If all costs included for making meals, our family of three people needs roughly 15 or 
20 yuan per day. This is very economical for life. For example, I bought 5 yuan for meat 
and 2 yuan for vegetables today. Plus two eggs, that’s all the food for us today. 
Furthermore, I am suffering from serious anemia but we don’t have allowance for those 
expensive tonics. Thus, I sometimes buy pig livers (2 yuan) as they are thought to enrich 
the blood in traditional medicine (Ms. Zhang). 
The meals for three people cost at least 15 yuan every day. Accordingly, I cook two 
meals at a time and I will finish the leftovers in the next morning. In order to save more 
money on dishes, I ride a bicycle to a remote market in another district, which takes me 
one and half an hour. In addition, as there is no water heater in house, I just use the cold 
water for shower while my wife and child boil a small pot of hot water. My mother-in-
law gave this microwave to us, but we never use it as the electricity will cost too much 
(Mr. Zhao). 
Vegetables are usually sold at 3.5 yuan per 500 grams. I can only afford the amount of 
vegetables worth 1 yuan. And I have to cook them separately for several days. I also 
save the used water for flushing the toilet (Ms. Shu).  
In order to save fuels, I cooked lunch and supper at a time. My tip of saving on food is 
to buy a whole chicken and cut it into small pieces. By doing this, I can eat the chicken 
for a month (Ms. Zhou). 
You know, we are from Northern provinces and we get used to eating steamed bread. As 
a result, we can save the meat for our grand-daughter (Ms. Chi).  
I spend around 100 yuan on food every month. I don’t want to eat so little and I hate 
buying the cheap food. For example, I always go to market just before it closes. This is 
because shopkeepers will sell the remained vegetables very cheap. 500 grams of 
vegetable will be discounted from 2 yuan to 1 yuan, which can support me for three 
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 meals. I really don’t want to buy food like this; I want to go there anytime I like. 
However, ‘low income’ means that you can only subsist like this; ‘low income’ means 
that instead of starving, you must find every means to survive with cheapest food. This 
is our destiny (Ms. Pan).  
Is 410 yuan enough for living? Are you kidding me?! You can have a try for a month in 
Guangzhou and then tell me! I only spend 5 yuan for meals every day. I eat two eggs (1 
yuan); vegetables (2 yuan); noodles for breakfast (0.5 yuan); rice for lunch and breakfast 
(1 yuan); oil and flavouring (0.5 yuan). You may find that there are a hi-fi and an air 
conditioner in the apartment. My friend gave them to me. But I never turn them on 
because the electricity bill will be too high for me (Ms. Xian). 
 
The above illistrations can be used to supplement the most distinctive characteristic of the 
UMLSG thresholds: the narrow focus on food costs or, to put it another way, the exclusion of 
non-food expenses. In other words, the UMLSG thresholds produce minimal effect of de-
commodification and they do not take other costs of human needs into consideration. As a result, 
the UMLSG beneficiaries, such as the ones in Guangzhou, can barely manage the food costs and 
they are leading a hard living standard in their life.   
 
Does a comprehensive scheme help? 
After the transition to ‘social China’ since 2002, it seems that the problem of the exclusion of 
non-food costs in the UMLSG thresholds was realised by authorities. This is because the 
UMLSG has been demanded to evolve from a simple subsidy-based scheme to a comprehensive 
system of assistance (Wen, 2004a; Zhu, 2003). This improvement enables the UMLSG scheme 






With the cross-check by the local bureaucrats in the fieldwork, Figure 7.1 provides an overview 
of the comprehensive system of assistance for the UMLSG and the Low-Income families in 
Guangzhou by August, 2010. As clarified in Chapter Three, the UMLSG threshold in Guangzhou 
was 410 yuan for an average family income per month when the fieldwork was conducted during 
June to September 2010. In contrast, the Low-Income threshold was aimed at those families with 
per-capita incomes lower than 490 yuan per month. There are two reasons to include the welfare 
of Low-Income families in Figure 7.1. One the one hand, there were interviewees in the 
fieldwork who failed to apply for the UMLSG and were only categorised as Low-Income 
families. On the other hand, the diffential entitlements between the UMLSG and Low-Income 
families imply possible improvement for the social assistance program, which will be discussed 
in Chapter Ten.  
 
This comprehensive system of assistance comprises of two components: basic assistance and 
specified assistance. Except ‘basic medical assistance’, the Low-Income families were entitled to 
all the items in ‘specified assistance’ on certain conditions. This included reduced costs of public 
services, low-rent apartment or housing subsidy, exempted costs occurring in compulsory 
education or one-off subsidy for university, pension for urban residents of old-age, 
reimbursement of out-patient service, vouchers from charity supermarket and perhaps most 
generous of all,  almost free health service for hospitalisation or other specific out-patient 
services. However, the Low-Income families were not eligible for ‘basic assistance’ except 
‘temporary price subsidy’. 
 
In contrast, the UMLSG families were not only qualified for all ‘specified assistance’, including 
a reimbursement as 14% of the UMLSG threshold for ‘basic medical assistance’; they were also 
able to receive ‘basic assistance’ mainly in terms of the UMLSG subsidy. Furthermore, other 
additional cash transfers would be dispensed to children in education, elderly couples without 
children, three nos, patients of serious ill health, or disabled people since 2006. 
 Figure 7.1: Comprehensive System of Assistance for the UMLSG and the Low-Income Families 
Item UMLSG Low-Income 
UMLSG Subsidy Conditions： 
9 Per-capita income lower than 410 yuan in family. 
9 For those families relying on pension for subsistence, 580 yuan per month will 
be deducted for the pensioner’s living costs. The rest of the pension will be 
averaged for other members. The family excluding the pensioner will be 
guaranteed if this averaged income for other members is lower than the 
threshold.  
Entitlements：  
9 The  UMLSG subsidy as the difference between the UMLSG threshold and the 
per-capita income in family  
9 In order to encourage employment, 610 yuan per month will be deducted for the 
living costs of the re-employed member in the UMLSG families. The rest of the 
wage will be averaged for other members. The family excluding the wage earner 












Education Subsidy Conditions: students of the UMLSG families in primary, middle, senior or vocational 
school. 




Subsidy   
Conditions: elderly couple (men over 60 and women over 55) in the UMLSG 
families without children.  
Entitlements: extra benefits of 20% of the UMLSG threshold. 
Not 
applicable. 
Three-No Subsidy Conditions: Three-no targets. 
Entitlements: extra benefits of 20% of the UMLSG threshold. 
Not 
applicable. 
Health Subsidy Conditions: patient of serious ill health in the UMLSG families. 
Entitlements: extra benefits of 20% of the UMLSG threshold. 
Not 
applicable. 
Disability Subsidy Conditions: assessed and administered by the Disabled Persons’ Federation.  
Entitlement: 144 yuan per month for Grade One and Two; 72 yuan per month for 





























E.g. The UMLSG families received an allowance of 50 yuan per person per month in November and 






Reduced Costs of 
Public Services 
Conditions: The UMLSG and the Low-Income families. 
Entitlements: 
9 reduced costs of cleaning, water bills, digital TV maintenance, telephone and broadband;  
9 exempted expenses for public security, domestic wastes disposal, electricity meter, sewage 
treatment and funeral expenses. 
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Housing Assistance Conditions: The UMLSG and the Low-Income families whose per-capita living space lower than 10 
square meters. 
Entitlements:  
9 low-rent apartment: 1 yuan per square meter or; 
9 subsidy= (normative per-capita living space - current per-capita living space)*persons in 
family*subsidy (23 yuan per square meter)*100% (coefficient related to income) 
Education Assistance Conditions: children of the UMLSG and the Low-Income families. 
Entitlements:  
9 exemption of other incident costs in compulsory education  
9 subsidy for the students in board school 
9 one-off subsidy for students admitted to university or college 
Pension for Urban 
Residents at Old Age 
(2008) 
Conditions: old-age people (men over 60 and women over 55) without any pension and more than 10 
years of urban household registration. 
Entitlements: full exemption of individual contribution (225 yuan per month) and receive a pension 
of 450 yuan per month. 
Basic Medical 
Assistance (1999) 
Conditions: those UMLSG families not covered by medical insurance for urban 
employees or the charitable out-patient service. 
Entitlements: reimbursement of 14% of the UMLSG threshold for out-patient service
Not 
applicable 
Medical Insurance for 
Urban Residents 
(2008) 
Conditions: The UMLSG and the LI families 
Entitlements: The individual contribution to this kind of medical insurance will be fully paid by a 
specific public funding. With a cap each year, medical costs occurring in hospitalisation and out-
patient services of clinical and some particular chronic diseases will be mostly covered. Moreover, 
most of the self-paid proportion of the medical costs will be further covered by another public 
funding (2009).  
Charitable Out-
Patient Service  
(2005) 
Conditions: Successful application by the UMLSG or the LI families to Guangzhou Municipal 
Charity Organisation 





















Charity Supermarket Conditions: the UMLSG or the Low-Income families  
Entitlements: some vouchers per month for daily necessities  
 It is unquestionable that, influenced by the refreshed ideologies of ‘social China’, the 
establishment of the comprehensive assistance improved the living standards of the beneficiaries. 
The minimum standard of the UMLSG thresholds, such as in Guangzhou, is substantially 
augmented by additional benefits and provisions in health service, housing, education or other 
necessities. Consequently, the identity of the UMLSG has become an integrated and critical pass 
for both income maintenance and social programs.  
 
However, the evolution of the UMLSG scheme is producing a paradox for potential and current 
beneficiaries. On the one hand, due to the minimum standard, it is not until potential 
beneficiaries can prove the reduction in their family incomes to an extreme extent - mainly in 
terms of food poverty - that they are eligible to apply. In addition, the level of the UMLSG 
thresholds determines the UMLSG subsidy for current beneficiaries and other cash transfers for 
specific kinds of targets. In brief, the minimum standard not only restricts the access of the 
UMLSG but also produces very limited effects of income maintenance.    
 
On the other hand, this comprehensive system of assistance, which should be seen as a 
tremendous improvement, can lead to ‘welfare dependency’. The possible ‘welfare dependency’ 
in the Chinese context does not refer to ‘raise lazy people’ or ‘moral decadency’. This can be 
demonstrated by the very limited effects of income maintenance produced by the minimum 
standard. Meanwhile, it is evident in interviews that most of the UMLSG families have at least 
one person usually working as casual worker but with earnings less than minimum wage 
(‘Employment Status’ in Figure 3.3). 
  
However, what current beneficiaries are most concerned about is related to the relatively 
generous social programs in ‘specific assistance’. According to the analysis of current welfare 
mix in Chapter Six, even though normal urban residents can rely on their job incomes, social 
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 insurance and family support, they are still enduring enormous risks without sufficient social 
protection. For example, normal older people without any source of pension in Guangzhou will 
receive a monthly pension of 450 yuan if they contribute 225 yuan per month to the pension for 
urban residents at old age. By contrast, the UMLSG or the Low-Income beneficiaries at old age 
are entitled to the same amount of pension without any self-contribution. 
 
Moreover, the working population in cities is facing a dramatic marketisation of housing, health 
service and other personal services. Under this circumstance, the poor people in interviews are 
worried that if they leave state protection and are left with only a slightly higher income, the loss 
of the other benefits would make their life more difficult.   
If my twin daughters are going to university later, I can’t imagine how we can make it 
without the UMLSG assistance (Mr. Li). 
As long as we are recognised as the Low-Income families, we can live in this low-rent 
apartment. This apartment is what I want. I will feel that my life is better than before 
once we can live here forever (Mr. Zhao). 
Due to the situation of my daughter with cerebral palsy, I think I have to rely on the 
UMLSG for my whole life. Besides, I hope I can succeed in applying to low-rent 
apartments very soon, so that I don’t need to pay for the high rent now. Then I don’t 
even need to work that hard in the market for selling Ganoderma (Ms. Zhao). 
We only need to pay one yuan per square meter for our current apartment. However, we 
could not find such a cheap apartment once we leave the UMLSG (Ms. Zhuo). 
 
The experiences of Ms. Xian and Ms. Zhang can be used to show more of the concerns after 
beneficiaries left the UMLSG. Having been claiming the UMLSG subsidy for more than seven 
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 years, Ms. Xian’s family finally escaped from the UMLSG in early 2010. The reason was 
because Ms. Xian and her husband began to receive their pensions totalling of 2,000 yuan per 
month. Moreover, Ms. Xian returned to her original position as an hourly-paid cleaner after 
retirement, which enables her to earn an extra income about 600 yuan per month. Consequently, 
she was also about to disqualify for the Low-Income status in the coming reassessment. 
Although Ms. Xian admitted that ‘life is apparently better now’, she was still worrying about the 
future accommodation: 
What I’m worrying is about where my family can live after we lose the Low-Income 
status one day. We still don’t quite understand whether we will be kicked out of the 
current apartment or we will keep living here even after we get out of poverty. We 
sincerely hope that the state can go on helping us. Otherwise, our situation will not turn 
better even though we have more incomes than it was as the UMLSG or Low-Income 
families (Ms. Xian).  
 
The other example is related to Ms. Zhang’s family. In early 2010, Ms. Zhang’s husband became 
a pensioner with about 2,000 yuan per month and her daughter found a job with a salary about 
1,000 yuan. In addition to Ms. Zhang’s stable monthly income about 800 yuan, this family 
finally managed to leave the UMLSG. However, Ms. Zhang started to worry about her future 
pension and housing:  
I have contributed to pension for three years, but I don’t have that kind of money for 
covering the remaining years⑧. Hence, I probably can’t receive a pension when I’m 55. 
If we only rely on my husband’s pension, I will feel so stressed because he is often sick. 
Moreover, the rent for our low-rent apartment will be increasing every year since we 
disqualified the UMLSG. It can reach more than 1,000 yuan per month at most. We are 
so honest to leave the UMLSG once our poverty has been relieved. But we may be as 
poor as before if I don’t have the pension and the low-rent apartment. This means that 
we actually never manage to get out of poverty. I hope that the government can allow us 
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 to stay in this apartment and keep the rent frozen (Ms. Zhang). 
 
Lastly, although the improvement of the UMLSG assistance was supposed to guarantee a better 
satisfaction of needs for poor people, it is ironical to find that in return, it strengthens the image 
of the UMLSG beneficiaries as ‘lazy people’. Working in the Residents’ Committee, Mr. Gan 
believed that the beneficiaries would try harder to seek after UMLSG assistance since the 
improvement: 
Other than money, the UMLSG contains additional welfare provisions, such as health 
service. Low-rent apartment becomes the most important assistance nowadays. The 
UMLSG beneficiaries will think that they have rights and entitlement to theses 
provisions. Instead of self reliance, they will try every means to seek after the UMLSG 
assistance as the government is currently providing them.     
 
Conclusion 
As demonstrated by this chapter, the necessity of the UMLSG is determined by the discourse of 
‘legitimacy of the CPC’; while the adoption of the UMLSG thresholds are deeply affected by the 
one of ‘subordination of social system to economic system’, which has been posited and 
reproduced by authorities and academics. By comparing the UMLSG thresholds with four 
indicators, it is found that the UMLSG thresholds only aim at the minimal effect of de-
commodification and ignore human needs other than survival.   
 
Due to the refreshed ideologies from 2002, the UMLSG evolved to a comprehensive system of 
assistance and the complementary assistance in housing, education and health service 
substantially compensates the minimum levels of thresholds. However, there is a paradox for 
potential and current beneficiaries. On the one hand, the minimum thresholds still restrict the 
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 access and benefits of the UMLSG. On the other hand, if put into the broader context of the 
welfare system, the relative generosity of the social programs guaranteed by the UMLSG does 
cause certain hesitation or concern of beneficiaries about leaving the UMLSG. Rather than the 
lack of the motive to work, the reason is related to the incomplete protection to the low-income 
group by the whole welfare system. This paradox is discerned by local bureaucrats, but they try 
to solve it by tightening the access to the UMLSG scheme. This will be discussed in the next 

















c The basic formula is: UMLSG Subsidy = (Local UMLSG Threshold - Average Family 
Income)*Family Members in the Application. 
d These seven poorest countries were: India, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Nepal, Kenya, Tanzania 
and Morocco. 
e These 15 countries were: Malawi, Mali, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Niger, Uganda, Gambia, 
Rwanda, Guinea-Bissau, Tanzania, Tajikistan, Mozambique, Chad, Nepal and Ghana.  
f The value of ‘$1.25 a day’ using 2005 PPP at the 2003 prices is calculated by the researcher: 
$1.25*4.09 (2005 PPP)*365 (days)*0.934 (Rural CPI during 2003-2005)*1.265 (Urban-Rural 
Cost of Living Differential in 2003) ≈2,205 yuan. The figures of 2005 PPP and the Urban-Rural 
Cost of Living Differential in 2003 are retrieved from World Bank (2009, p5). The Rural CPI is 
calculated by the researcher based on the National Bureau of Statistics (2010e) 
g Tang asked these two questions for testing ‘public perception’ and ‘actual perception’: ‘Which 
indicators in the list can best explain the poverty of Changzhou/Yancheng?’ & ‘Which indicators 
in the list are in compliance to your situation?’ 
h This was because the survival line of 95 yuan per person per month was nearly the same as 
the average income (93 yuan) of ‘the poor’ already identified by the ‘relative deprivation’ stage. 
At the same time, there were 11% households below this average income. 
i This deduction is the same as that of Yiyang. The subsistence line of Beijing was 190 yuan per 
person per month and the average income of the identified poor was 189.65 yuan. 
j Since Ms. Zhang did not work in any danwei before, she had not any seniority that can be 
seen as years of contribution. Therefore, in order to entitle to future pension, she still needed to 
pay twelve years of contribution before retirement. 
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 Chapter Eight  
Eligibility of the Urban Minimu m Living Standard Guarantee 
 
Introduction   
It was argued in Chapter Seven that the authorities prefer to adopt a minimum level for the 
UMLSG thresholds, which leads to a narrow focus on food costs. Based on the experiences of 
applying for the UMLSG and living as the beneficiaries, Chapters Eight and Nine will continue 
to reveal strong evidence to point out the discrepancy between the official ideologies and the 
actual practice. Regardless of the controversies in measurement and the preference for the lowest 
levels, this chapter is aimed to address the following question related to the administration: Is it 
true in reality that poverty-stricken families can be covered by the UMLSG once they are 
qualified by the income threshold? The first part of the findings will review the enormous efforts 
spent by the central government on the coverage of nominally eligible applicants. The other part, 
however, will introduce three unwritten principles that were practised by local bureaucrats in the 
fieldwork. These principles - the ability to work, family unit and street-level bureaucracy - can 
all be used to reflect the welfare outcomes of current China’s welfare regime.  
 
‘Covering whoever is eligible’  
According to the UMLSG regulation at the state level, there are only two conditions of 
entitlement: traditional three-no targets entitled to the full amount of benefits as local thresholds; 
while other families can receive the subsidies covering the difference between their per-capita 
income and local thresholds (State Council, 1999b). It is claimed that the UMLSG scheme 
demonstrates the rights of Chinese citizens to receive assistance from the state when they have 
any difficulty in livelihoods. As Duoji Cairang (2001, p84) maintained, ‘The UMLSG is neither 




Despite this bold claim, some ‘techniques’ can be identified in the early development of the 
UMLSG, which were widely used to minimise the number of beneficiaries at localities (Hong, 
2005; 2003; Tang and Wang, 2002). Firstly, some local governments in industrial areas, which 
were full of massive state-owned enterprises directly under provincial and central governments’ 
control, were not willing to provide the UMLSG assistance to laid-off or unemployed workers. 
They defended that these enterprises had already contributed most of their taxes to higher-level 
authorities before. As a result, the responsibility for protecting these disadvantaged workers 
should not reside with local governments.  
 
Secondly, beneficiaries in certain areas may not be able to claim their benefits once a month as 
required. Hong’s (2005) nationwide survey in 2002 showed that only 55.3% of the respondents 
could claim their benefits every month, while 30.1% received once a season and 3.5% even had 
to wait half a year. The main reason for this was because their local governments did not prepare 
their contribution for the UMLSG funding. They were just waiting for the supplementary 
funding from the central government. This common phenomenon was described as ‘waiting for 
rice to cook’ (deng mi xia guo ). 
 
Thirdly, whatever their financial situations were, applications submitted by able-bodied people of 
working age may be denied. It was claimed that the utilisation of this principle was intended to 
prevent ‘raising lazy person’. Also, there was a similar method of ‘regarded as the same’ (shi 
tong) possibly adopted in the calculation of applicants’ incomes. For example, able-bodied 
people of working age, laid-off or unemployed workers and retired personnel were all assumed 
to have claimed the minimum wage, basic living expense, unemployment insurance and pension, 
no matter whether they really succeeded in doing so or not in reality.     
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 Fourthly, instead of calculating nominal family income, local bureaucrats - those working in 
Residents’ Committees and Street Offices - also took other characteristics of applicants into 
consideration. For example, actual family income may be estimated higher as ‘virtual income’ 
( xuni shouru) based on applicants’ age and employ ment status. Furthermore, additional 
indicators such as housing conditions, possession of consumption goods or even ownership of 
pets were very likely to be considered in practical assessment by local bureaucrats.  
 
In order to rectify these problems, the Ministry of Civil Affairs (2004; 2003a; 2003b; 2003c; 
2001) had issued various instructions and warnings. It required localities and local bureaucrats of 
assessing applications in accordance to the conditions in the regulation, covering whoever is 
eligible in local jurisdiction, consistently increasing fiscal funding, dispensing the benefits 
punctually, providing enough training to local bureaucrats and fighting against the tendency of 
bureaucracy. Because of all these efforts, it was announced in 2003 that whoever was eligible for 
the UMLSG had been covered (Zhu, 2003).  Unlike previous years, the number of beneficiaries 
during 2003-2009 was rather stable and only had a very small increase from 22.468 to 23.456 
million (See Table 7.1 & 7.2). 
 
Due to the announcement of ‘covering whoever is eligible’ and a stable number of beneficiaries 
thereafter, the focus of scholary work seems to shift from the problem of eligibility to other 
issues, such as work incentives. This can be illustrated by a frequentely quoted study about the 
UMLSG scheme in the English literature. After outlining the historical development of the 
UMLSG, especially the expansion of the scheme, Leung (2006: 195) drew such a conclusion that:  
 
Since the majority of the recipients are ablebodied and have the ability to work, the 
priority of the social assistance programme should be to facilitate and motivate their 
re-employment and re-entry into the labour market. 
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 However, there still exists a suspicion about the eligibility of the UMLSG. On the one hand, as a 
highly decentralised policy, it is very common for local governments to add extra conditions. In 
this regard, Guagzhou is no exception. Its current regulations list four more types of targets who 
will be disqualified for application: 1) actual living standards of the household significantly 
higher than normal; 2) owning non-necessary and luxury goods of consumption; or possessing 
estates for profits or larger than the household’s need; 3) unjustified refusals of job offers by 
able-bodied member; 4) violation of one-child policy without paying off penalty. These extra 
conditions are very typical and they can be found in other localities too. On the other hand, even 
the higher authorities themselves also raise concern about the under-coverage rate. For instance, 
National Bureau of Statistics (2006) reveals a finding from a survey covering 290,000 urban 
households in 35 cities in 2004. Although there were 2.65% of the households which fell below 
local thresholds could receive support from the UMLSG, as many as 5.48% of the eligible 
families were not entitled to it at all. 
 
However, the following sections will argue that it would be too hasty to reach the conclucion of 
‘covering whoever is eligible’ or ‘the majority of the recipients are ablebodied’ (Leung, 2006: 
195). The fieldwork of this study reveals the unwritten principles that are used by local 
bureaucrats in Guangzhou. Instead of the conditions listed in state regulation or even those added 
by Guangzhou locality, it is these unwritten principles that are playing the most important role in 
decision making by local bureaucrats. Probably because of the official reassurance of ‘covering 
whoever is eligible’, these unwritten principles in assessment have not yet stimulated the interest 
of Chinese scholars. Ironically, one of the unwritten principles - the ability to work - was recently 
reported by non-Chinese scholars in the English literature (Cho, 2010; Solinger, 2010). Thus, this 
consisting but covert problem about the eligibility of the UMLSG undermine the efforts spent on 
the goal of ‘covering whoever is eligible’ and ultimately contradict the discursive system of 
‘social China’.    
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 The ability to work 
Real targets 
The first unwritten principle of eligibility is related to ‘the ability to work’. According to the 
propaganda of the authorities, the milestone significance of the UMLSG rests on change of the 
assessment from ‘employment status or occupational category’, ‘sex or age’ to ‘actual living 
standards’. However, it is indicated from all the interviews with poor people and local 
bureaucrats that ‘the ability to work’ is the crucial criterion after the income of the applicant is 
qualified. In other words, eligible beneficiaries defined by local bureaucrats are those applicants 
or those with family members who are old, weak in health, and physically or mentally disabled. 
There is a ruler in our minds: only men over 50 or women over 45 can have the chance 
to succeed in their application (Mr. Hao). 
Poverty-stricken families refer to those people over 40 or 50. It is hard for them to be 
re-employed because employers always prefer young workers. They are usually 
unhealthy too (Ms. Xie).    
The beneficiaries are mainly mentally ill, handicapped or physically unfit for    work 
(Ms. Tang).  
We will not approve applications from couples capable of working, young or healthy. 
We will not consider unless they are over 50, disabled or sick (Ms. Fan).           
Applications from those households with members who are disabled or terribly sick 
will be considered (Mr. Gan). 
The twenty-five UMLSG households administered by my Residents’ Committee are 
nearly all widows, orphans or disabled. Regarding patients, proof must be issued by 
doctors to explain why they cannot work (Ms. Mo).   
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 Grounds for rejection 
If there is not a condition called ‘the ability to work’ in the regulation, how can local bureaucrats 
deter those applicants capable of working? Firstly, local bureaucrats will inform the applicant 
misleadingly that the UMLSG is mainly designed for people without the ability to work. 
Therefore, they will strongly advise applicants to look for a job first.  
Although the condition written in the regulation is only related to per-capita income in 
family, it can be changed. From our perspective, if a couple has the ability to work, we 
will try to sort out the problem of employment first. We will also advise them that the 
difficult situation cannot be solved even if they get into the UMLSG (Ms. Mo). 
Generally, I will ask them to try to find a job first. After that, they will normally not 
come back any more (Ms. Tang).  
 
The assumption in the bureaucrats’ minds is that ordinary people are definitely able to find a job 
for subsistence, no matter what kind of job or its wage is.  
Ordinary people, who are healthy, able-bodied, clear thinking, are definitely able to 
find a job, even if it is only a door guard or the salary is lower than minimum wage 
(Mr. Gan).  
The UMLSG threshold is too low now. A couple must not qualify if they are both 
working. After all, wage of any job will be around 600 yuan per month (Ms. Xie).   
 
If the applicant still returns to the Residents’ Committee and report their failures in finding a job, 
the second step of the bureaucrats is to present some jobs for them. This is a very ‘effective’ way 
to turn down the application. On the one hand, since the UMLSG threshold is set at a very low 
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 level, the applicant is very likely to be disqualified for the income criterion once accepting the 
job. One the other hand, according to the extra condition added by Guangzhou officials, able-
bodied applicants must provide justification about their reluctance to accept job offers. In the 
bureaucrats’ view, the acceptable justification only refers to be rejected by employers. Therefore, 
they use this term to disapprove the application if it is the applicant who decides not to attend the 
interview or take the job offer. This can be supported by the words from two bureaucrats:    
We would have an excuse to refuse the application if the applicant with the ability to 
work did not accept our referral (Mr. Hao).        
The job interviews are of high success for the applicant if they are referred by the 
Residents’ Committee. Their wages will not be low, at least 800 yuan per month. 
Therefore, the unwillingness of the applicant to work can be proved once they do not 
take the job (Mr. Shen). 
    
Generally, the jobs referred by the Residents’ Committee are mainly low-paid, temporary and 
intensive labour, such as ‘household helpers, door guards, car guards, newspaperman, milkman’ 
(Ms. Tang) or ‘security guards and kitchen helpers’ (Mr. Gan). Nevertheless, according to Mr. 
Gan, these jobs are not always available or secured in reality. As a result, the job referral actually 
serves more as a means of deterring applicants.      
The practice of spreading job information by the Street Office is only for propaganda 
and it usually becomes formalistic. After the applicants fail one, two or three 
interviews, they will give up their applications as they think it is too difficult to apply 
for the UMLSG (Mr. Gan).       
 
Thirdly, local bureaucrats will not approve the application until proof explaining why the 
applicant is not accepted has been issued by employers.   
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 Those applicants, who are able to work and have tried hard to find a job, must show a 
proof from employers to explain the failure of the interview. For example, ‘they are 
over 50 years old’ or something like that (Mr. Shen).  
 
The last point to make is that, except the justification of unsuccessful interviews, there is no 
lawful reference for the above grounds used by the bureaucrats for rejection. For example, Ms. 
Tang and Ms. Mo said that this procedure was shared by supervisors or other staff. Mr. Gan 
believed that what he did had been in accordance to the UMLSG regulation. Furthermore, Ms. 
Fan, who has been working for the Residents’ Committee for ten years, confidently asserted that:  
It is written in the regulation that beneficiaries should be over the age of 60 for males 
and 50 for females. We do not have to refer to the documents and we assess by this 
standard every year. We learned it from previous documents and we insist on doing 
this even though the regulation is always changing now (Ms. Fan).  
 
In short, departing from the primary purpose of the UMLSG scheme, ‘the ability to work’ is 
strictly implemented in assessment, though its legal basis can hardly be found. The relation 
between ‘the ability to work’, ‘job market’ and ‘the UMLSG assistance’ in the bureaucrats’ belief 
can be summarised as: The applicant should go and find a job in the market if he or she is able to 
work; the applicant must take it whatever it is. The applicant are not expected to reject it unless 
you are rejected; only when the applicant has been proven to lose the ability to work can he or 
she apply for the UMLSG.  
 
Concern about welfare dependency 
The principle of ‘the ability to work’ grounded in the assessment is connected to local 
bureaucrats’ concern about welfare dependency. They are wary that the conditions of the 
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 assessment on paper tend to ‘raise lazy people’. In their logic, firstly, the system would be easily 
abused if only based on documents.  
It is very easy to forge the proofs required by the application. Everyone would be 
qualified in their application if it were only based on documents (Mr. Gan).          
We do know that in order not to work, many people just exploit the system by making 
up documents. Their accommodations are nice and they own all the household 
appliances such as the air conditioner (Ms. Xie).   
 
Secondly, the bureaucrats worry that the system may be abused by ‘lazy people’ who are capable 
of working but do not go to work. 
They must be lazy if we introduce jobs to them several times and they do not take the 
offers (Ms. Tang).   
 
You can be proved as lazy and unwilling to work if you refuse the job interview 
referred by the Residents’ Committee (Ms. Fan).   
Some people’s thinking is rather old fashioned. They prefer to claim the subsidies 
rather than earn 800 yuan per month being exposed to the sun and the rain (Mr. Gan). 
The government does not want to give money to lazy people. Thus, it favours 
employment for people except when they are sick. This is to eliminate the belief that 
you can get the same amount of money no matter whether you work or not (Ms. Xie).  
 
Thirdly, it is ironic to find that the beneficiaries who are willing to work will also be suspected of 
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 cheating by local bureaucrats. 
Since it is impossible for people only relying on the UMLSG subsidy, we cannot be 
sure about whether they go to work or not when claiming the subsidy. Some people 
will be working as well as taking advantage of the government (Ms. Tang). 
Even though many people work and earn money more than the UMLSG criterion, they 
still ask their employers to provide a proof of a much lower income. Meanwhile, they 
collude together before we call the employers for a check (Ms. Xie).   
 
It can be seen from the above logic that able-bodied applicants will be described as ‘lazy’ if they 
do not have a job. By contrast, they will be considered as ‘taking advantage’ if they struggle to 
work for subsistence. Therefore, the fundamental consideration of ‘the ability to work’ criterion 
is more related to the preventing dependence on the government rather than any moral concern 
about people’s unwillingness to work. This echos the ‘burden’ discourse.  
We cannot give up assessing ‘the ability to work’. More people would come without 
this (Mr. Hao).  
If everyone with the ability to work can make an application, there will be many 
beneficiaries and this will add a great burden to the government. These people will 
choose not to work because they can receive money by just staying at home (Ms. 
Tang).   
As the UMLSG subsidy cannot help much, the most important thing is to get a job. It 
will be unfair for the government, society and tax payers if you need the UMLSG 
support simply because you have to take care of children or older people (Ms. Mo).  
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 Voices from the poor 
Mr. Zhao, who is currently 56 and is not eligible for any pension in the future, expressed 
opinions about the principle of ‘the ability to work’. After his wife was laid off in 2004, he 
attempted to seek for assistance from the Residents’ Committee. The staff there told him, ‘The 
UMLSG is designed for those people of no resources for living, physical disability or severe 
illness. Thus, the application will not be successful until he reaches around 60.’ The staff also 
questioned him, ‘Why do you not go to work since your body functions well?’ At last, Mr. 
Zhao’s family could only be recognised as Low-Income Family even if their income was lower 
than the UMLSG threshold. Mr. Zhao felt ridiculous and offensive about this result. He pointed 
out that being ‘able-bodied’ did not necessarily secure a job position in market. 
I know that ‘the ability to work’ is not shown in any policy document. It is just added 
by the Street Office and the Residents’ Committee. They turned down my application 
because I am healthy and my wife is working as a household helper. But our income is 
really lower than required. What can I say to their reply ‘you are able to work’? I have 
not been to the Residents’ Committee since then. Why? People there do not trust you 
and suspect that you don’t have the motive to work. They do not understand what age, 
physicality and education are needed nowadays in society. Some employers even fire 
you after the three-month probation and only give you 500 yuan in total (Mr. Zhao).  
 
In some cases, ‘the ability to work’ is implemented in such a harsh way that even the real 
disabled targets may be excluded in the assessment. Ms. Zhuo was unemployed in 2002 and her 
husband has lost his job in 1999. Despite blindness in one eye, her application was not approved 
seven years ago because she was assessed as ‘fully functioning in limbs’ and ‘as young as only 
40’. Regarding this, Ms. Zhuo said in a resentful tone: 
It is unreasonable to behave like this. You should assess according to the actual 
situation. People who are strong and young can find a job. Instead, it is impossible for 
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 employers to hire someone disabled and short like me (about 140 CM; Ms. Zhuo)  
 
Moreover, the principle of ‘the ability to work’ is so widely used that it has deeply rooted in the 
public’s minds. Accordingly, the ‘mildly’ disabled people are probably not seen as deserving by 
others residents. Ms. Chi was 68 years old without any pension and her son was a former mental 
patient because of a brain injury. Although he was as young as 35 and he looked strong in 
appearance, no one in the community wished to offer him a position. Therefore, the subsistence 
of the family relied on the unstable income from Ms. Chi’s daughter-in-law. In order to prevent 
complaints from other residents, the staff Ms. Fan decided to put Ms. Chi’s name as the applicant 
instead of her son. However, Ms. Chi was quite depressed about claiming the UMLSG benefits, 
especially when she still hears gossip from other residents: 
It is embarrassing to become an UMLSG beneficiary. Many people talk behind our 
back and they say we should be disqualified. They think that my son can work and 
should go to work. They do not understand that we are compelled to do it because of 
my son’s circumstance. We will not take the money if we can make a living on our 
own (Ms. Chi).  
 
In summary, ‘the ability to work’ has become the imperative principle in practical assessment. 
Relevant obstacles are constructed by local bureaucrats to deter potential beneficiaries. One of 
the major reasons is the worry about welfare dependency on the government. As a result, the 
experiences of poor people indicate that ‘the ability to work’ is implemented in a very strict sense. 
People with a mild disability may even be assessed as ‘fully functioning in limbs’ and not be 




 Family unit 
The second principle in practical assessment is ‘family unit’. According to the regulation, the 
eligibility of the UMLSG is determined by the ‘average income of family members living 
together’. Furthermore, the application for the UMLSG should be based on the whole family as a 
unit and it should be submitted by the householder to the Street Office where the household 
registration of the family is affiliated. Consequently, there are two elements for the definition of 
‘family’: 1) the members ‘living together’ must be indicated by the Household Registration 
Record; 2) these ‘members’ must satisfy one of the three legal relationships with the householder: 
partnership (e.g. husband or wife), supported (e.g. parents) or reared (e.g. dependent children).  
 
Nevertheless, the types of ‘family unit’ are very complicated in reality. For example, except the 
three-no targets (Mr. Chang, Mr. Wang & Ms. Shu) in the interviews, the most common category 
was nuclear family which included the householder, his or her partner or dependent children (Mr. 
Li, Mr. Zhao, Mr. Lao, Ms. Zhou, Ms. Lei, Ms. Zhuo, Ms. Xian & Ms. Cui). Meanwhile, there 
were some traditional extended families with three generations living together (Mr. Chen, Ms. 
Zhang, Ms. Chi & Ms. Cai). Moreover, one family (Mr. Dong) in this classification had other 
adult children whose household records were registered in a different Street Office. Lastly, it was 
possible for ‘family unit’ to include the relationship of ‘next of kin’ (Ms. Pan). The following 
discussion mainly focuses on two different patterns in extended family, which often stimulate 
controversies in assessment.   
 
TypeⅠhousehold 
In practice, there tends to be many controversies for local bureaucrats to define the ‘family unit’ 
of extended family. Named as ‘TypeⅠhousehold’ by this study, this kind of extended family 
refers to the situation that: it is the second generation and their children in the household that 
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 need the UMLSG support. However, the first generation (the older people) should be counted in 
the assessment unless they are not living together. Particularly, in 2006 the authority of 
Guangzhou instructed a formula for assessing TypeⅠ household which contains the first 
generation with an income source of pension. As the standard in August 2010, 580 yuan per 
month will be deducted for the living costs of the pensioner. The rest of the pension and the 
incomes of other family members will be added together. The sum will be seen as the actual 
income for the second generation and their children if they submit an application to the UMLSG.  
 
This formula assumes that as living together in the same household, the first generation would be 
capable of relieving the difficult situation of the household to some extent. However, as will be 
discussed in later analysis, the problem for TypeⅠhouseholds is not only about the optional 
adoption of this formula by local bureaucrats, but also related to the possible tension in the inter-
generational relationship, which is caused by the false assumption that resources are shared in 
the household.   
 
Type Ⅱ household 
By contrast, Type Ⅱ household refers to such a circumstance that if the first generation (the 
older people) needs to apply for the UMLSG, their adult children must be included no matter 
whether they are living together or not. Local bureaucrats explain that according to traditional 
culture and previous practice of social relief, adult children are obliged to look after their parents. 
Therefore, they will only accept the application if the first generation’s children are also poverty-
stricken and fail to afford the allowances for support.  
Adult children should take care of their parents, such as in terms of money, unless 
their incomes are lower than the UMLSG threshold or their parents are very sick (Mr. 
Gan).   
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 In order to show how the application of Type Ⅱ households is normally processed, the staff Ms. 
Fan illustrated the example of Mr. Dong, one of the interviewees in the fieldwork. Mr. Dong and 
his wife were 76 and 70 years old respectively and neither of them had any pension. They were 
currently living with their 35 year old daughter, who usually earns about 600 yuan per month. 
The reason why Mr. Dong, as well as his wife and the daughter, could be seen as a legitimate 
UMLSG case was because three of his other daughters could provide proof of their low income. 
One was laid-off and was dependent on her husband; one died of cancer; another was a peasant 
in a poor suburb area.  
 
Moreover, the bureaucrats may even demand that adult children should take care of their parents 
by practical support even if they do not have the financial ability. In other words, it is not 
acceptable for adult children to provide little support to their parents. In regard to this, the 
bureaucrats will condemn them or even suggest a law suit.  
The children should look after their parents. It is not right to place the responsibility 
on society. It is absolutely inappropriate to abandon your fathers and mothers and this 
cannot be made the reason for the older people to apply for the UMLSG. Definitely 
not! Every child should pay their share for the allowance and you cannot say ‘no’ even 
if you do not have the money. If this happens, we will educate the child and even ask 
the older people to go to court (Ms. Fan).  
The presumption is that other members of the family, if the older people have any, 
should solve the problem. Children show their respect for their parents by supporting 
them when they aged. Sometimes, it is very simple to look after the old people as long 




 ‘Flexibility’ in measuring ‘family unit’ 
Considering the actual situation may differ from case to case, local bureaucrats admit that they 
will define ‘family unit’ with ‘flexibility’. It can be found that the ‘flexibility’, as they always 
mention, mainly depends on the ‘hard situation’ of the applicant, which is again closely related to 
‘the ability to work’. Mr. Shen usually sent the disabled person into the UMLSG as a single 
beneficiary even if his or her parent had a relatively generous pension. Similarly, Mr. Gan would 
consider only issuing the entitlement to the sick or disabled member in the household. Ms. Mo 
not only explained her ‘flexible’ standard of ‘family unit’, but also pointed out the underlying 
key of ‘flexibility’: ‘the ability to work’.  
It really depends. In one of my cases, the elderly couple is depending on their son. But 
their son and daughter-in-law are 50 and long-term unemployed too. Thus, I counted 
them into the UMLSG as a whole. However, I only considered the adult couple for 
another case, because their parents are pensioners and not living with them. Moreover, 
I also approved a mentally ill patient who is living with his parents and brother. His 
parents have a total pension of 5,000 yuan per month. But since his father became 
terribly sick, we asked this mentally-ill patient to apply independently, even though his 
brother is capable of working. In fact, ‘family unit’ is only an excuse for us. If we 
think he can work, we will tell him ‘your father has a pension and both of you belong 
to the same family unit as indicated by the Household Registration Record’. Otherwise, 
we will do it differently if it is really that difficult for life (Ms. Mo). 
 
Since the boundary of ‘family unit’ can be made elastic by local bureaucrats, it can serve as an 
excuse to deter potential beneficiaries away. For example, the specific formula for TypeⅠ
household in Guangzhou may not be used as required. Instead of initiating the assessment, Mr. 
Gan preferred to persuade TypeⅠhousehold to terminate the application process. Likewise, as a 
supervisor of the UMLSG in the Street Office, Mr. Hao observed that the staff members in 
Residents’ Committees seldom followed the formula in assessment.  
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 Voices from the poor 
Two stories can be used to expose the myth of the TypeⅠhousehold, the false assumption of 
which claims that resources can be distributed between generations only because they are living 
in the same household. Mr. Chen, aged 40, was highly impaired in sight and long-term 
unemployed. The possible income of the family came from his wife as a casual household helper. 
Meanwhile, he had two dependent children. Mr. Chen’s old mother had been living with Mr. 
Chen because he was the oldest son. His mother was receiving pension while the couple would 
not have it in the future. As a result of their low income, Mr. Chen’s household had been covered 
by the UMLSG since 2001.  
 
During this period, Mr. Chen’s relationship between his mother and four other younger brothers 
had been worsening. Since they were living together, Mr. Chen was expected to be the primary 
carer for his mother with long-term illness. However, this was not easy for him to manage 
because of his economic situation. Although the other four brothers looked after the mother by 
giving her allowances directly, it did not mean that the mother would share her income with Mr. 
Chen. At first, Mr. Chen thought positively that his mother may have needed the revenues for her 
health costs: ‘It is compassionate for her if she gives me money, while it is unfilial for me if I ask 
her for money.’ But it was when he found his mother supported the youngest brother secretly by 
her pension that he could not tolerate any more. Much worse, their UMLSG subsidy was 
becoming less and less because his mother’s pension was being enhanced every year. Due to this, 
he was very worried that his household may be disqualified soon while his actual income did not 
improve at all. Despite having complained to the Residents’ Committee many times, Mr. Chen’s 
mother was not separated from the household in assessment until 2009. 
 
Ms. Zhang was admitted to the UMLSG in 2007 and left in early 2010. The reason why her 
entitlement was terminated was because her husband started to claim his pension about 2,000 
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 yuan per month and her daughter also began to work with a salary about 1,000 yuan per month. 
However, this household had a longer history of hard livings than only those three years in the 
UMLSG. Ms. Zhang described the application process as ‘unbelievably miserable’; she was 
‘crying in the Street Office every time’. Before being admitted to the UMLSG, she was employed 
as a temporary worker; while her husband was laid off in 1997 and he was disadvantaged in re-
employment because of height (less than 150 CM). Meanwhile, her husband could not go to 
work because he had to look after his 90 years’ old mother, with whom he was living. Therefore, 
the couple constantly appealed to the Residents’ Committee for help. It turned out that their 
application had always been turned down, because the staff believed that the couple was fit for 
work. At the same time, the pension of the old mother also raised the total household income.  
 
Regarding the imposition of ‘living together as a family unit’ in assessment, Ms. Zhang 
considered it as ‘absolutely irrational’ and ‘it is only a trick to make the application process more 
difficult than it is in regulation’. More importantly, as she stated, ‘Living together is different 
from sharing life together.’ ‘We cannot ask her for money because, after all, she is our senior.’ 
I can’t figure out why they do not want to help even us in this difficult situation. The 
idea of counting my mother-in-law in my family is absolutely irrational. It was not 
necessary for her to support us even though we were living together. We cooked 
separately. Living together is different from sharing life together. In addition, she was 
so old and needed to save the pension and the allowance from her daughter for herself. 
I understand this. To help us or not depends on her conscience. In reverse, we cannot 
ask her for money as, after all, she is our senior (Ms. Zhang).  
 
Elderly poverty, which could be hidden by the mask of Type Ⅱ household, can be uncovered by 
the case of Ms. Cai. While the third older brother was in jail, there were six people in Ms. Cai’s 
household including her mother, second older brother and the oldest brother’s family. They were 
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 all living in an old, crowded and messy accommodation. As the age of 73 now, Ms. Cai’s mother 
could not receive any pension. Referred by the Residents’ Committee, Ms. Cai’s oldest brother 
was a door guard in the community with a salary about 800 yuan per month. His wife and 
daughter also depended on this meagre income. The second older brother is a casual worker 
earning about 500 yuan per month. Ms. Cai was currently unemployed and joining her mother in 
street to gather and sell dumped papers or cans for living. She tried to initiate the application for 
her mother many times. According to the reply from the Residents’ Committee, Ms. Cai’s mother 
was disqualified because she could be looked after by her four children. Furthermore, these four 
children were all healthy and able to work. In relation to this result, Ms. Cai felt angry and 
desperate, because what she requested was only to put her mother in the UMLSG rather than 
other members in the household: 
I am speechless about their reply. It is unreasonable. How can they say we do not want 
to care for our mother? Our mother is the one who gave our birth! But you can see 
from our accommodation and financial situation that we cannot afford to look after our 
mother (Ms. Cai).   
 
In summary, the definition of ‘family unit’ by local bureaucrats can cause controversies in 
practical assessments. On the one hand, when the second generation in the household 
experiences poverty, these TypeⅠhouseholds may not be qualified because the income of the 
first generation will be calculated. On the other hand, it is nearly impossible for older people 
with able-bodied children - Type Ⅱ household - to successfully apply for the UMLSG. However, 
it must be pointed out that the definition of ‘family unit’ is quite flexible in local bureaucrats’ 
hands; it is closely related to the first unwritten principle of ‘the ability to work’. In reality, the 
stories of poor people show that resources in the household may not be shared between 
generations as expected.   
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 Street-level bureaucracy  
None-intervention 
Originally, staff in the Residents’ Committee are expected to have a primary assessment for the 
applicant; while in reference to the suggestions from the Resident Committee, the power of 
approving the application rests on the supervisor in the Street Office. In fact, the supervisor 
usually does not have a different opinion from the staff, because it is believed that as working at 
the grass-root level, the staff should have frequent contacts with residents. However, it has been 
shown in the previous sections that the staff in the Residents’ Committee is quite likely to turn 
down the application by ‘flexibly’ adopting the principles of ‘the ability to work’ and ‘family 
unit’. Other than these two principles, there is a third rule so called ‘ignore it if possible’.   
 
On the one hand, due to more emphasis on the UMLSG by the central government, the local 
government of Guangzhou and the bureaus of Civil Affairs at district level are encouraging 
Street Offices and Residents’ Committees to enrol potential beneficiaries into the UMLSG 
provided they are able to submit required documents.  
The power of sanction is generally in the hands of the Residents’ Committee. I will 
just approve if they agree. And the District Bureaus of Civil Affairs will dispense the 
subsidy immediately after we approve the application (Mr. Hao).   
The District Bureaus of Civil Affairs gives the power to the Street Office and 
distribute the funding as long as the Street Office confirms the cases. To speak frankly, 
all the supervisors in all kinds of meetings emphasize: ‘Please don’t be too strict for 
the UMLSG. The funding is “public”. Just approve the application as long as all 
required documents are provided.’ (Mr. Gan)     
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 On the other hand, acting as the real assessors, staff members from the Residents’ Committee 
provide an alternative view. They are alarmed that more approved cases will cause greater 
workloads in future administration, including reassessment every six months, regular family 
visits or reimbursement of all kinds of costs. Much worse, the UMLSG workload is only one of 
the many tasks in the Residents’ Committee. Accordingly, the staff tends to set up various 
barriers for the application, especially utilising ‘the ability to work’ and ‘family unit’.  
The inspection of birth control is the key work in the Residents’ Committee, while 
Civil Affairs is shit and no one cares. I only have a salary of 2,000 yuan per month. I 
will ignore it as long as my performance reaches the minimum standard (Ms. Tan).  
The principles of ‘the ability to work’ and ‘family unit’ used by the Residents’ 
Committee is aimed to reduce the work load. To grant an approval is easy. The more 
tiring thing to do is the future re-assessment, home visits and distribution of goods (Mr. 
Hao). 
Although the supervisors instruct us to grant entitlement to qualified applicants, work 
load increases correspondingly to the number of beneficiaries. For example, there have 
been at least thirty UMLSG households in each Resident’s Committee in our street. It 
would be absolutely fine if there were ten staff in each Resident’s Committee. So I feel 
pressured and will not guide the applicant with all my heart (Mr. Gan). 
 
In order to illustrate the hostility to the heavy work load produced by the UMLSG, Ms. Mo 
shared her upset and depressing feelings in details.  
Having accepted a case to the UMLSG, it is only a start for us. We have to open a file 
for recording and arrange voluntary labour for them. Where can I find so many 
placements for so many people, given that I am not only responsible for the UMLSG? 
Therefore, we are busy making up statistics every month. The purpose of the leaders at 
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 the district level may focus on helping more of the people in need. But from our 
viewpoint from the grass-root level, we will not follow it because the district is 
shifting a lot of work load to the Street Office and finally to the Residents’ Committee. 
For example, when the district dispenses rice to the UMLSG families before the 
Spring Festival, we have to join other Residents’ Committees and hire a tricycle for 
moving bags of rice back. After that, we also have to call and inform every UMLSG 
household. Another example is about claiming the health costs. We need to collect the 
receipts from beneficiaries, fill in the form and submit all the stuff to the Street Office. 
The worst of all is reassessment. Beneficiaries are required to resubmit all kinds of 
proofs and they have to be reviewed again. How can it be finished only by me? I even 
heard that another staff has to administer sixty cases. Therefore, I am quite bored 
about the UMLSG work. I feel upset once I know that someone is coming to apply for 
it. The instruction from the district requires that qualified applicants must be 
guaranteed. But our practice is to ignore it if possible. The instruction is ‘dead’ and 
depends on the person of how to carry out it (Ms. Mo). 
 
Patron-client 
Due to the apathetic attitude of the bureaucrats, one of the common solutions for the applicant is 
to develop an informal relationship of ‘patron-client’ with the staff. For example, when 
discussing ‘family unit’, Mr. Shen suggested a compromising solution. He implied that he could 
communicate with the police station to reach a tacit understanding. By doing this, adult children 
and their parents can be separated into two independent pieces of Household Registration Record. 
However, he would only show this to those applicants of ‘right’ attitudes, such as respectful or 
flattering to him. Similarly, Mr. Gan agreed that he would try to figure out a solution if the 
applicant developed a good relationsip with him. Especially, he would assess with flexible 
standards if he received special notice from other leaders. More evidence about the operation of 
‘patron-client’ will be shown by the voices of poor people later.      
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 Complaints 
The other solution emerging from the interviews is whether the applicant can summon up enough 
courage to complain to a higher level. Local bureaucrats express their aversion to the people 
defending their rights. However, since ‘complaints’ may cause pressures to their supervisors, the 
bureaucrats prefer to concede for avoiding further troubles. 
Some vogues could go to the Street Office for complaints, when they feel the jobs we 
present are long working hours and tiring for them. ‘First crying, second quarrelling 
and third threatening.’ Moreover, they are devious enough to collect all the necessary 
documents, including the proof justifying their failure in job interviews. By doing this, 
our principle of ‘the ability to work’ is invalid even though we know he or she can 
work. Take an example of a four-people household. The parents do not have any 
pension; while both of their two sons allege to be unable to find a job. But they are 
only around 30 and fit for work. Obviously, there is no reason for me to accept their 
application. But I had to do this after they repeatedly went to the Street Office to 
complain. Babies who can cry can be fed. Our supervisor does not support us in 
complaints, even though these people quarrel as if they were acting a drama. They tell 
us not to question the authenticity of the documents anymore and harmony in society 
is the most important. Anyway, there is no difference to enrol one more, because the 
resources of the UMLSG are not capped (Mr. Gan).   
 
Voices from the poor 
The following stories are intended to display poor people’s reactions when they meet 
bureaucratic barriers during the application process. Developing a ‘patron-client’ relationship 
may be a ‘soft’ way. As mentioned in the previous section of ‘the ability to work’, Ms. Zhuo was 
assessed as ‘fully functioning in limbs’ and ‘too young’ despite blindness in one of her eyes. 
Then she was volunteered in helping the Residents’ Committee for a year. According to her 
 218
 words, ‘The Residents’ Committee finally issued me the UMLSG because they thought I was 
working hard for them.’ Ms. Zhuo did the cleaning for the offices in the Street Office three times 
a week. She was also responsible for publishing the propaganda board of the Residents’ 
Committee. Furthermore, she was always ready for handing out leaflets and picking up litter in 
street once informed.  
 
Likewise, Ms. Pan, who was 45 years old with mental health problems, had to work voluntarily 
for the Residents’ Committee in exchange of the UMLSG support. Although she had been 
unemployed for many years, her application was rejected at first. The reason was because her 
brother was expected to look after her when they were once living together. However, Ms. Pan 
believed that she could gain trust from the bureaucrats. She was volunteered in directing traffic 
two days a week. She said that she expressed the ‘right’ attitudes: ‘I was just working without 
complaints and never said “no” and “why” to the staff.’ Eventually, Ms. Pan’s application was 
‘flexibly’ treated after her brother and his family moved away from the accommodation.  
 
Instead of the ‘soft’ solution, the ‘hard’ way is to complain over local bureaucrats. Mr. Chang, 46 
years old, became unemployed as he was blinded in 2004. However, his application was declined 
at first because he had been sharing accommodations with his ex-wife after their divorce. This 
was perceived by the staff as ‘cheating by pretending divorce’. He was raged about the reply and 
spent two months complaining in the District Government. In the end, Mr. Chang did not have 
the opportunity of reassessment until he seriously threatened to the Residents’ Committee: 
I could not believe that I was disqualified. I had lost all sources of income, become 
disabled and was officially divorced. The reason why we still lived together was 
because my ex-wife could not afford other accommodations. I know their principle 
about the UMLSG: ignore it if possible. So, I was very angry at the Residents’ 
Committee then and I told them I would light up a gas tank in front of the District 
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 Government if they did not accept my case. 
 
Mr. Wang, aged 75, had lost his children in 1996. Although he was admitted to the UMLSG in 
2005, he was not recognised as a ‘three-no’ target who would otherwise receive an extra 
allowance. Mr. Wang’s Residents’ Committee and Street Office stuck to the original result even 
after his enormous attempts of complaining. Facing his query, the public servants from the 
District Bureau of Civil Affairs even attacked him as ‘greedy for money’. It was only when Mr. 
Wang turned to the Provincial Government in 2009 that he succeeded in reassessment. Recalling 
this memory, Mr. Wang felt ‘aggrieved and insulted at being seriously bullied’.  
 
Ms. Zhang, the case of which was mentioned earlier as a TypeⅠhousehold, was constantly 
rejected because of her mother-in-law’s pension. Regarding this, her mother-in-law decided to 
move to her daughter in 2005, so that Ms. Zhang’s husband could be free to work as a door guard 
earning about 600 yuan per month. However, he was suffered from an acute disease at the end of 
2006 and it cost him more than ten thousand yuan to stay in hospital for twenty days. Therefore, 
Ms. Zhang reported to the Residents’ Committee again and had a fierce quarrel with the staff 
there. She was so desperate at that time that she threatened to complain to the District Bureau of 
Civil Affairs. Finally, her family passed the reassessment based on the grounds that her mother-
in-law was no longer living with them and her husband was too sick to work. Now Ms. Zhang 
still condemned indignantly about the reply of the Residents’ Committee: 
It is impossible for the staff to identify your problems by themselves. I reported after 
my husband’s illness and they just looked like they coincidently overlooked my case. 
In addition, the staff said everyone would make it if it was so easy to apply for the 
UMLSG. They would have to be responsible for this. They supplemented, ‘Your 
mother-in-law said that she was living comfortably with you before. Despite claiming 
as poor, you may have a lot of savings which we did not know.’ What they suggested 
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 was we can’t be approved until we are at the brink of dying. 
 
Without flattering or complaining, it is very hard for applicants to overcome the ‘non-
intervention’ attitude of local bureaucrats. As a ‘three-no’ target and a former staff member in the 
Residents’ Committee in the 1980s, 80 years’ old Ms. Shu had a deep feeling about the change in 
local bureaucrats’ attitudes. She often criticised that they were irresponsible for work and ignore 
poor people in order to lessen their work loads. In her application process, she had given up 
when she coincidently met a familiar senior officer in the District Government. With his 
generous help, Ms. Shu’s application was processed in the end.  
I knew everything happening in street when I worked in the Residents’ Committee; 
while the current staff will not only say ‘I don’t know about the UMLSG regulation’. 
They just want to push off their responsibilities and prevent increasing their workloads 
(Ms. Shu).  
 
Illustrated as the problem of elderly poverty in the Type Ⅱ household, Ms. Cai’s mother had not 
yet succeeded in application until the interview. Ms. Cai pleaded to the Residents’ Committee 
repeatedly for reviewing the assessment. The staff first told her that District Bureau of Civil 
Affairs would reject their application even if the Residents’ Committee approved it (This is most 
unlikely to happen according to the previous analysis about the actual process of policy 
implementation.) Then, after Ms. Cai insisted, the staff pointed out ‘mistakes’ in the application 
form every time Ms. Cai submitted it. For example, instead of referring to the evidence, the staff 
arbitrarily judged the incomes of the four adult children in the household as ‘false report’ because 
they all had the ability to work. Consequently, Ms. Cai was disappointed and withdrew the 
application after being rejected by the Residents’ Committee for more than three times.  
Some people advise me to quarrel in the Street Office. It would be useless. Shouldn’t I 
take a knife there if they don’t want to issue me the entitlement (Ms. Cai)?  
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 Lastly, Ms. Cui’s experience elaborately shows how the bureaucrats manipulate the assessment 
and how poor people are affected in their help-seeking process. Ms. Cui had lost her regular 
income when laid off in 2003, while her 58 year old husband was made redundant in 1990 
because of his mental retardation. Ms. Cui tried her first attempt to the UMLSG in the normal 
process:  
I asked the staff about the UMLSG after I was unemployed, but staff answered, ‘You 
have full limbs, so why should we issue you?’ I expressed my view that I did not want 
the benefit if the Residents’ Committee could introduce me or my husband a job, even 
as low as 400 yuan. They told me to wait for their arrangement and I thus waited year 
after year. Yes, we are able-bodied, but how could we make ends meet if we were not 
offered a job?  
 
During 2003 to 2006, Ms. Cui suffered from serious heart attacks and several operations. Also, 
her husband still could not find any job. Therefore, she had a dramatic quarrel in the Street 
Office in 2006. Ironically, this worked immediately. She was informed while on her way back 
home that her husband was offered a door-guard job with 600 yuan per month. Soon afterwards, 
her household was also recognised as the Low-Income family for six months. However, Ms. Cui 
terminated the reassessment as she perceived ‘it was so tiring to ask a favour from the staff’: 
I did not re-apply to the Low-Income family as it was so tiring to ask a favour from 
the staff. It was apparent that we did not have any income, but they just kept telling us 
to write a figure in the form. I could not figure out why they could ask me to do this. 
Moreover, they not only asked us to submit different pieces of proofs, but also always 
considered the documents as flawed or incomplete. I was quite sick for collecting 
documents then and decided to give up the application.   
 
At the beginning of 2010, Ms. Cui’s husband was unfortunately fired again. Ms. Cui went to the 
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 Residents’ Committee for the UMLSG and job referral, but her queries were put aside like before. 
Finally, she could not hold down the anger and scolded the staff in face about the unfair 
treatment: 
I shouted at her, ‘Why could my neighbour receive the benefits even though he is a 
pensioner and working as a vendor in street? I also saw you dining in other 
beneficiaries’ homes and receiving their gifts. Isn’t it because I did not give you 
something?’ She kept silent and promised to deal with my issue. But I did not hear any 
message after that. Maybe the point is: I don’t have that kind of money to flatter her.  
 
Luckily, Ms. Cui was going to receive the pension later in 2010 when she reached 50. Also, her 
son was newly graduated and earning about 1,000 yuan per month. Therefore, she did not have 
any expectations about the UMLSG assistance anymore. She concluded her experience about the 
UMLSG: ‘This is what happens in society. The rich are getting more while the poor are looked 
down upon by everyone.’ 
 
In summary, the tendency of non-intervention by local bureaucrats constitutes street-level 
bureaucracy, which in return embraces the flexible use of ‘the ability to work’ and the ‘family 
unit’. Consequently, it is demonstrated by the experiences of poor people that they have to either 
develop a patron-client relationship or fight against the wrong-doing of local bureaucrats. 
Otherwise, potential beneficiaries would not be entitled to the UMLSG assistance, even though it 
is claimed to base on the rights of Chinese citizens to receive assistance from the state.   
 
Conclusion 
Drawn from the interviews with local bureaucrats and poor people, this chapter demonstrated the 
reality of the application process of the UMLSG. As well as the means test of ‘average income of 
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 family members living together’ in the regulation, it is revealed by the fieldwork that three 
unwritten principles are widely adopted in practical assessment.  
 
‘The ability to work’ is the fundamental criterion to divide the deserving and non-deserving poor. 
This principle not only serves to identify the real targets in the bureaucrats’ eyes, but also to deter 
those people with ‘full limbs’ away from depending on the government. Despite its flexibility, 
the second principle of ‘family unit’ is based on two assumptions: resources can flow between 
generations and adult children are obliged to look after their older parents. The third principle of 
‘street-level bureaucracy’ refers to the apathetic tendency of non-intervention by local 
bureaucrats, when they are working at the interface between the UMLSG institution and 
beneficiaries. In order to prevent massive workloads, it is most likely for the bureaucrats to 
mobilise the principles of ‘the ability to work’ and ‘family unit’ as the excuses for rejection, even 
though more public resources are actually accessible nowadays. Consequently, this leaves two 
main choices for applicants to increase their chances of entitlement: either to develop a patron-
client relationship or to defend their rights by complaining at a higher level.  
 
In fact, these three unwritten principles can all be used to indicate the welfare outcomes of 
China’s welfare regime. By assessing the standards of the UMLSG thresholds, Chapter Seven 
has already demonstrated the minimal effect of de-commodification produced by the UMLSG 
scheme. According to the discussion about eligibility in this chapter, this argument can also be 
strongly supported by the finding ‘the ability to work’. In addition, it can be seen from the 
imposition of ‘family unit’ in assessment that family support is highly valued in the social 
assistance program by local bureaucrats. It is even assumed that resources can flow fluidly across 
generations. Finally, due to the unequal power relationship between local bureaucrats and poor 




c This sentence repeatedly appeared in the interviews. The original Chinese words for ‘ignore it 
if possible’ is ‘neng bu bao jiu bu bao ’. 
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 Chapter Nine 
Living on the Urban Minimum Living Standard Guarantee 
 
Introduction 
Unlike the international tendency (Narayan and Petesch, 2002; Narayan et al., 2000a; Narayan et 
al., 2000b), the poverty studies in China are not paying much attention to the research approach 
of presenting the voices of poor people. Tang Jun’s (2003) book in Chinese was a pioneer 
attempt to describe life experiences of living on the UMLSG in the early development; while 
Solinger’s (2008) paper on the same theme is a very rare study written in English. In order to 
further assess the welfare outcomes of China’s welfare regime and narrow the gap in the current 
literature, this chapter will continue to focus on other important life experiences after the 
application process of the UMLSG scheme. This will include: public review, information 
dissemination, welfare mix for the beneficiaries, voluntary labour, re-employment and solutions 
of leaving the UMLSG. The last section of this chapter is to show the consequence of the whole 
policy process: the stigma of being an UMLSG beneficiary.   
 
Public review 
After the application is approved by the Residents’ Committee and the Street Office, ‘public 
review’ (gongshi) is the last step in the application process. The aim of the public review, 
according to officials, is to prevent any possible fraud by applicants or corruption by bureaucrats. 
Basic details of the householder in the application are disclosed on the notice board of the 
Residents’ Committee. For example, a typical form used in Street One for public review 
comprises of these information: name, sex, date of birth, identity in the UMLSG category (e.g. 
three no targets, unemployed or casual workers), number of household members, the UMLSG 
subsidy for each month, valid period and address. Meanwhile, public review should be 
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 conducted for each reassessment which is usually conducted every six months.  
 
From the perspective of local bureaucrats, public review is necessary for ferreting out 
unqualified applicants.  
The purpose of public review is to put the UMLSG work under the people’s 
supervision. It is very effective as those whistle blowers always have convincing 
evidence. For example, one of my beneficiaries was disqualified immediately, because 
it was reported that he actually had two apartments for renting (Mr. Shen). 
 
Also, local bureaucrats admit that the process of public review will probably produce ‘face 
losing’ or stigmatised feelings in applicants. But they assume that applicants should have been 
prepared for this before they decide to apply.  
Applicants should have predicted the consequences of public review. We will ask them 
to prepare their mental conditions well. After all, we will not disclose all of their data 
(Ms. Tang).  
I don’t think it is a stigma. We won’t show all the data on the notice board. 
Furthermore, it’s just over there and maybe no one notices it at all (Mr. Shen). 
It is unavoidable that applicants will lose their faces in this process. But I don’t think 
many people have ever read it carefully because I didn’t receive any complaints during 
these two years. Moreover, you should prepare enough psychological for any result 
before you decide to apply. Even if there is no public review, everyone can know it, 
can’t they (Mr. Gan)? 
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 Voices from the poor 
The rationale for public review by local bureaucrats does not mean that poor people necessarily 
agree with this measure. Instead, most of the interviewees described their opinions by using a 
Cantonese saying: ‘You don’t want to be bold if you have hairs.’ This suggests that they just 
passively accepted the stigma imposed by the process of public review. 
I told myself at the time of public review, ‘You won’t be worse than now. Don’t think 
too much and just have the public review.’ However, I still felt inferior to others and 
couldn’t accept this fact (Mr. Chang).  
I think the bureaucrats should assess according to the documents. Public review is 
absolutely wrong. You can have a means test but not to disclose the result in the end. I 
had bad feelings about this, because I felt like being deprived of privacy and my 
poverty-stricken life was exposed to everyone in the community. Some people 
discussed behind me when I passed by. Don’t you think I was losing my face? Do you 
think I would be comfortable about this? There must be a small proportion of poor 
people in society, but it doesn’t mean they have to be bullied. In reverse, as rich people 
occupy a small number too, will you bully them by displaying their data. We are 
looked down upon by Street Office (Mr. Li). 
You don’t want to be bold if you have hairs. No one would like others to know they are 
poor as they will be discussed behind back. Although we are the disadvantaged group, 
we still have friends and need to gather together. When I went to restaurant with my 
friends, gossips and criticisms spread out: as an UMLSG beneficiary, she went to eat 
dim sum in restaurant (Ms. Zhuo). 
 
The asymmetry of information  
Although the UMLSG has evolved into a comprehensive system of assistance, this is not a 
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 guarantee that eligible beneficiaries will receive the additional benefits or services. This is due to 
the possible concealment of information by local bureaucrats. In the interviews of poor people, 
they were all unclear about the entitlements available to them in the UMLSG scheme. No matter 
whether they were current or potential beneficiaries, poor people only had a rough perception 
from media or friends that they should have some proper benefits, but they could not figure out 
what these benefits were and exactly how they worked. Consequently, The Residents’ Committee 
is the only reliable source of information for poor people to turn to for queries. The monopoly of 
information helps contribute to the non-intervention tendency of local bureaucrats.  
The Residents’ Committee will not tell you what you can get. For example, I found the 
information of low-rent apartment by myself. I coincidently met an inquiry spot run by 
the People’s Congress in street, providing consultancy to people living with difficulties. 
I told them my heavy burden of affording a private accommodation. They assured me 
that I was absolutely qualified to low-rent apartment. But the Residents’ Committee 
replied that they were not sure about this. They did not give me the application form 
until I asked over and over again. They even ‘comforted’ me that my application may 
be unsuccessful. I answered, ‘Yes, it must be unsuccessful if I didn’t submit.’ And 
finally I made it (Ms. Zhang). 
When I first attempted to apply for the low-rent apartment, the Residents’ Committee 
declined my request. They told me there was no such a thing and asked me to go the 
District Government for confirmation. Moreover, I tried to seek education assistance 
when my son went to university. The Residents’ Committee just asked me to fill in the 
form and said it must be submitted the next day. The assistance may be related to some 
kind of exemption, but I didn’t know what it actually was. And I didn’t hear of 




 Welfare mix 
The vulnerability of informal support 
‘Hard to take care of the long-term poor’ (changpin nangu) is a common view from poor people 
about their informal support, such as extended family and friends. On the one hand, the capacity 
of informal support is over-estimated for tackling the long-lasting nature of poverty. For example, 
Mr. Chen commented that his informal network was ‘unhelpful’. This is because he had 
borrowed money from each of his relatives or friends, but he could not manage to repay the debts. 
Consequently, he was gradually isolated from his connections and even from his own brothers. 
Mr. Chang’s words cut to the point of the limited resources embedded in informal network: 
The reason why relatives and friends would not like to help me is because they know 
you are unable to repay the money and this is just like throwing the money into water. 
Gradually, they are afraid of your contacting them and their contact numbers will 
disappear ultimately. For instance, my friends gave me a hi-fi and an air conditioner at 
one time, which they suggested as a one-off solution.   
 
On the other hand, poor people feel ‘ashamed’ (buhao yisi), ‘losing face’ (mei mianzi) or ‘favour 
debts’ (renqing zhai ) about depending on informal network. This is because they think they have 
little chance to return ‘favours’ (renqing). The stigmatisation constructed in social relations 
diminishes beneficiaries’ willingness of seeking for help.  
I am ashamed (buhao yisi) to ask relatives and friends for help. This is all related to 
‘favours’ (renqing) and ‘faces’ ( mianzi ). For instance, my friend treats me for Dim Sum 
because he knows I’m living in the UMLSG. But I will be ashamed (buhao yisi) if I’m 
treated like this every time. This is the same theory if they lend money to me but I will 
be unable to repay in the near future. Thus, I never try to borrow money from others 
(Mr. Li).   
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 We prefer to rely on ourselves. It is very hard to speak out ‘please do me a favour’ to 
relatives or friends as this will be looked down upon (Mr. Dong).  
Help from relatives or friends is a ‘favour’ (renqing ). ‘Favour debt’ (renqing zhai ) is 
the most difficult thing to repay in the world (Ms. Zhuo).  
 
The vulnerability of informal support can be elaborated by the following experiences of Ms. 
Zhang, Ms. Zhou and Ms. Lei. Also coming back to Ms. Zhang, who has been discussed 
previously in ‘Type Ⅰ household’. Her story did not end after Ms. Zhang’s family managed to 
the UMLSG payroll. Their relationship with her husband’s relatives deteriorated further. Ms. 
Zhang’s sister-in-law not only withdrew from support, but also despised and humiliated them 
when they asked her for help.  
 
We will not get to this situation unless my husband’s sister is so bad. She did not give 
any allowance to us while we were living with my mother-in-law. She even kept my 
mother-in-law’s pension and medical insurance account, in case that we would use her 
money. But I was the person responsible for taking my mother-in-law to hospital. In 
addition, we borrowed thousands of yuan from his sister when my husband was ill in 
hospital. However, she came for the debt immediately after my husband was released. 
How could I earn money when my husband was still too weak to sit up then? I can tell 
the other example. My husband once asked her for 20 yuan for allowance.  She scolded 
my husband as being ‘useless’ before giving him the money. Even the young people 
can’t find a job nowadays, let alone my old and short husband. As his own sister, she 
doesn’t show any sympathy to my husband. I am so raged that we don’t contact her 
any more.  
 
 231
 Ms. Zhou, 56 years old without a pension, had an 18 year old daughter with severe cerebral palsy 
since her brain tumour surgery at the age of nine. They used to depend on the husband’s pension 
until he died in 2008. In order to raise the costs for living and health services, Ms. Zhou decided 
to sell their apartment to her sister-in-law. However, the sister-in-law cut off all the contacts with 
Ms. Zhou once the deal was done. Moreover, other relatives of Ms. Zhou’s husband called before 
the Spring Festival and told her not to come for a visit in the New Year. When Ms. Zhou called 
them by phone, these relatives would just hang up. Ms. Zhou was so angry about their 
indifference that she burned all of their phone numbers and her address books.  
 
After her husband died five years ago, Ms. Lei had a worsening relationship with her mother-in-
law and sister-in-law when they were living together. Before their apartment was going to be 
demolished, her mother-in-law and sister-in-law showed reluctance to live with Ms. Lei and her 
daughter any more. Luckily, Ms. Lei met a kind-hearted staff member in the Residents’ 
Committee who helped them to find a cheap accommodation. Furthermore, although Ms. Lei’s 
household registration was placed in a village outside Guangzhou, that staff member still 
enrolled her daughter into the UMLSG. Recalling this experience, Ms. Lei commented: 
I don’t like depending on others because I feel ashamed about it. Favour (renqing ) is 
more than everything. Therefore I don’t want to owe anyone. To say the least of it, 
other people may not offer you help even if you ask (Ms. Lei).  
 
Fairly speaking, it cannot be ignored that informal support does play a critical role in the most 
urgent or demanding cases. Regarding Ms. Zhou, her sister came at 4pm every day and looked 
after her daughter for two hours. With her help, Ms. Zhou was set free to sell medicinal 
mushrooms in the market during this period. Likewise, Ms. Zhang raised the deposit for her 
husband’s admittance to the hospital from her brother. Informal support is never absent from real 
life; but what was questioned above was the role of informal network in providing long-term, 
effective and dignified support. Therefore, it will be more significant to ask this question: if both 
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 are available, what will poor people in China prefer, informal support or statutory assistance?   
 
The duality of statutory assistance 
It is no doubt that the UMLSG scheme is producing vital effects in legitimacy of the CPC. In 
general, beneficiaries show extraordinary gratitude to the UMLSG support which enables them 
to survive. Moreover, beneficiaries prefer to choose statutory assistance since it is much more 
secure and even less stigmatised in contrast to their experiences about informal support.   
I reported to the Street Office once I was blinded. Favours from friends or relatives are 
‘debts’; and you have to repay them ultimately. People will not lend money to the 
UMLSG beneficiaries because they don’t know when you will be able to return the 
money. On the contrary, it is the responsibility of the government to settle this social 
problem. It is its obligation to take care of the poor (Mr. Li). 
I know there is such an UMLSG policy available, but I had no idea it was that difficult 
for the application process before. As poor and blind, I nearly failed the application. 
The information is not transparent and the Residents’ Committee has never publicised 
its operation. Under this circumstance, people will have to turn to relatives or friends 
first. But the informal support is not always ready to help. If China is just like Western 
countries, democratic and transparent in governance, state welfare is definitely my 
priority. This is the responsibility of the state for a citizen. Anyway, I’m praising the 
Party. Someone like me would have died in the old days. Yes, I’m living an uneasy life: 
I don’t have meat to eat, just like being injected by glucose. Also, there’s a huge 
difference between the Western welfare state and China’s welfare system. But I’m still 
thankful to the Party. I’m not scared of being poor, as long as I do not starve to death 
(Mr. Chang). 
When we were in the extremely difficult situation, I had to ask help from my relatives 
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 because of the barriers for the UMLSG application. But my sisters and brothers were 
not rich, so they could only support us in emergency situations. This was the reason 
why I decided to quarrel with the staff in the Residents’ Committee and complained 
about their unreasonable operation. However, thanks to the Party after all, we could not 
have got over the difficulties without the assistance of the government and the state 
(Ms. Zhang).  
Our family is fortune enough to be cared by the Party. It is impossible for relatives to 
give you money all the time. If they can help, they will offer initiatively rather than 
wait until you ask. Therefore, this implies that they can do nothing. But the state is 
different (Mr. Dong).  
 
However, if seen from another angle, this overwhelming expression of gratefulness to the Party 
or the government indicates a fundamental drawback in China’s citizenship: the non-recognition 
of social rights. The UMLSG assistance is not seen as the entitlement; it is rather the 
benevolence or mercy from the authoritarian state. As it has already been ‘fortunate enough’ to 
receive state welfare, poor people hardly expect they could have a further ‘say’ about it. As Ms. 
Zhuo pointed out, ‘We would not be seen as the “vulnerable” if we have the right to say.’ 
We are the burden of the government, just like a pile of rubbish. It has been out of 
expectation that we can access the UMLSG welfare. I wish the UMLSG standard 
would increase every year, but we can’t make this demand. This is because we are 
neither public servants nor retired personnel, who have contributed to the state or 
society. How could people like me - poor, disabled and never worked in danwei - be 
confident to voice out our appeals that the government ought to help me? Although it is 
said that the UMLSG scheme is an entitlement for everyone, why can’t migrant 
workers or beggars have it? This shows that state welfare ultimately depends on 
whether the government would like to give it to you or not (Mr. Chang). 
 234
 How can the UMLSG beneficiaries be qualified to demand more? Our current 
condition only allows us to rely on the state. We have to accept whatever the 
government gives us. The vulnerable group is to be cared for. We are not supposed to 
say anything. We would not be seen as the ‘vulnerable’ if we have the right to speak 
out (Ms. Zhuo). 
 
The non-recognition of social rights leads to patronisation again. The ‘patron-client’ relationship 
not only exists in the process of application, but also persists during the experience in the 
UMLSG. Mr. Hao, officer in the Street Office, admitted that local bureaucrats tended to provide 
privileges (gifts or subsidies) to those beneficiaries who usually cooperated with the 
administrative work, such as attending voluntary labour. For example, with a daughter of 
cerebral palsy, Ms. Zhou was established as a model for her optimistic attitudes and self-reliant 
endeavours by selling medicinal mushrooms in market. The residents’ committee often 
distributed the limited donations (e.g. TV or clothes) to her. In return, they arranged all kinds of 
interviews in her home, including inspections from supervisors, researchers or media. Similarly, 
in order to repay the kind-hearted staff that enrolled her daughter in the UMLSG, Ms. Lei would 
commit to every labour session assigned by the Residents’ Committee. Again, she was currently 
in the priority list for receiving donated goods.  
 
In contrast to the gratitude to the Party or the government, some beneficiaries may have conflicts 
with the staff, especially when they choose not to develop a patron-client relationship. As 
illustrated in the discussion of Type Ⅰ  Household, Mr. Chen had been to the Residents’ 
Committee and required the exclusion of her mother from the ‘family unit’ for many times. The 
unpleasant experiences during this period left Mr. Chen with a negative impression about the 
staff in the Residents’ Committee. From Mr. Chen’s view, although they were not public servants, 
the staff had the arrogant attitudes as an ‘officer’ (guan). They deliberately raised difficulties for 
beneficiaries by concealing the policy information. Moreover, the staff often showed despised 
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 expressions and stereotyped beliefs that the UMLSG beneficiaries were gluttonous and lazy 
(haochi lanzuo ) people.   
 
Below, Mr. Changc provided a story about his conflicts with the bureaucrats:  
According to my experiences of living in the UMLSG these years, I find that the staff 
in the Residents’ Committee always has a much worse attitude than the officer in the 
Street Office. They seem to be powerful but they are not public servants at all. We have 
to flatter them because they are the interface between the government and the people. 
We have to get the UMLSG assistance through their hands. Moreover, they see 
themselves as ‘masters’ (daye) and they are so bureaucratic that you can’t imagine it. 
For example, they will never tell you about what documents are needed for the 
assessment at one time. They will tell you the information separately when you go to 
the Residents’ Committee each time. I will tell you my story of this year. The staff in 
this Residents’ Committee asked me to submit the documents for reassessment to my 
original one. This was obviously wrong. The staff ignored my queries and did not 
apologise at all after it turned out to be a wrong instruction. I was very angry about her 
attitudes and called the District Government to complain. From then on, she never 
smiled to me. And I know that I was not given the duvet one time, while other three-no 
targets all received it. She can’t just bully the new comer like this. She can’t just be 
good to those people who are respectful to her (Mr. Chang). 
 
The deprivation of social participation 
Due to material poverty, beneficiaries are severely constrained in their social lives. It has been 
demonstrated in Chapter Seven that poor people would avoid social costs, such as shopping or 
dining out (Mr. Li and Mr. Wang). Also, the section of ‘the vulnerability of informal support’ has 
 236
 shown that poor people were not only isolated by relatives or friends; they also withdrew from 
their informal network because of the stigma caused by their disadvantage in the reciprocal 
exchange. In terms of the inclusion at neighbourhood level, beneficiaries seldom have 
interactions with other residents, let alone so called ‘mutual help’ in community. The reason is 
mainly because they feel looked down upon (kanbuqi ).  
 
For example, Ms. Shu, former staff member of the Residents’ Committee, lived in an old two-
story building shared by ten households. She had unpleasant relations with other neighbours. She 
said that they were very cautious about their property because she was known as an UMLSG 
beneficiary. Once she wandered around the corridor, they would shut the doors in case she 
needed something from them. Ms. Shu said in a disappointed tone, ‘This is what we call jiefang  
(neighbour) now.’ Take the other story of Ms. Zhou. She had a hard time in finding private 
accommodation after she sold her apartment to sister-in-law. Landlords were always averse 
towards her daughter with cerebral palsy. Moreover, Ms. Zhou’s daughter once suffered from an 
epilepsy attack just near their home. At that time, no one came to help and they just passed by 
quickly. From then on, Ms. Zhou’s daughter never went out by herself. Ms. Zhou felt helpless 
about her daughter, ‘I understand why neighbours will not say hi to us. We know what we are.’  
 
Even if beneficiaries could have a chance to develop social relations with other residents, they 
probably fail to do so because of lack of resources. Mr. Chen got along well with a professional 
painter living upstairs. He was interested in painting and once considered to apprentice the 
painter. But he dismissed the idea immediately as he thought: 
I can’t afford any extra expenses on tuition fees and painting stuff, such as brushes and 
papers. More importantly, what will other people think when they know an UMLSG 
beneficiary is just staying at home and learning painting (Mr. Chen)?    
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 Considering a larger context of community organisation and empowerment, the voices of poor 
people are very muted and helpless. For example, the interviewees in Street One were all living 
in low-rent apartments and they only had to pay one yuan for every square metre per month. 
However, they also needed to pay the same rate to a private agency for property management in 
the community. As the rate was increasing in 2010, other normal residents in the area had 
organised a series of campaigns protesting the increase. The leaders of the campaign group tried 
to mobilise the UMLSG residents to stop paying the management fee together. Since the 
management fee was nearly the same as the rent, it was apparently a heavy burden to 
beneficiaries. But all of the interviewees kept silent and distanced away from these activists. The 
reason was that the beneficiaries would not be approved in the UMLSG reassessment and would 
be evicted from low-rent apartments if there was any overdue payment in the record. The 
interviewees expressed a consensual view about their helplessness in voicing their opinions:  
My good friend ‘painter’ called and asked me if I would join their campaign. 
Regarding our connection, I promised at first. But I paid off all the money just now 
because of the reassessment. After all, I don’t want to lose this apartment (Mr. Chen). 
This is so called ‘collusion between the government and businessmen’ (guanshang 
goujie ). I support those campaign leaders. They can resist because they own their 
apartments. But where can I find an apartment if I lose this one (Mr. Chang)?  
Just pay the money. Don’t make any trouble if you still want to receive the UMLSG 
subsidy (Mr. Li). 
Fair or not is not your say. Just give whatever they want (Mr. Wang). 
The management agency is the boss. We don’t have the power to influence. Just follow 
the rules (Ms. Zhang). 
 
 238
 Lastly, the lack of social participation in reality does not mean poor people place less value on 
social relations. The ‘dignity’ they desire is to ‘maintain a normal living standard as others’, 
‘return to mainstream society’ or regain a social belongingness by contributing to community. 
Dignified life is to maintain a normal living standard as others. I can do what they can 
do. I want to return to mainstream society (Mr. Li). 
I can’t see I have any dignity now. I feel dignified when I can fight for the well-being 
of the community. There was a charity activity last year. All the UMLSG beneficiaries 
can receive a bag of rice donated by the property management agency. However, 
someone in the proprietor committee planned not to publicise the message and cut 
short the money. I was informed of this by a kind-hearted committee member. 
Therefore, I spread the news to all the disabled people. I will not be happy if only I can 
get the rice. I like to share with others. I don’t hope that I can get lots of credit by 
doing this. What I want is someone will remind me when I am walking in street: 
‘Watch out! Walk away from the dustbin in front of you!’ (Mr. Chang) 
 
In short, the long-term nature of poverty and the stigmatisation produced in the help-seeking 
process leads to the vulnerability of informal support. Therefore, poor people would actually 
prefer statutory assistance if possible, though the non-recognition of social rights causes 
patronisation or conflicts. Lastly, in contrast to their emphasis on social relations, it is very likely 
for poor people to be deprived of the opportunity for social participation.  
 
Voluntary labour 
A new regulation about ‘voluntary labour’ (gongyi laodong) was issued at the end of 2005 in 
Guangzhou (Guangzhou Municipal Bureau of Civil Affairs, 2005). Able-bodied beneficiaries of 
working age (18 to 50 for females and 18 to 60 for males) are expected to attend labour sessions 
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 of no less than three and a half days or 10.5 hours every week. If they do not show up twice in a 
month without any justified reasons, the UMLSG entitlement will be terminated. The contents of 
voluntary labour are usually determined by each Street Office or Residents’ Committee. The 
typical tasks include patrolling in community, directing the traffic, cleaning up roads, handing 
out leaflets, picking up rubbish in street, or looking after the three-no people (Ms. Tang and Ms. 
Fan). 
 
Regarding the effects of voluntary labour, local bureaucrats claim that voluntary labour benefits 
both beneficiaries and the state. On the one hand, beneficiaries can be re-connected to society 
and their spirits of ‘independence’ can be aroused again.  
One of the effects is to make them not to depend on the public. They may also have 
their spiritual sustenance, because at least someone will talk to them (Ms. Tang). 
Although no one hires our beneficiaries for work, they are capable of doing these 
simple tasks. The purpose of asking beneficiaries to help in the Residents’ Committee 
is to keep an eye on them and prevent them staying alone at home (Ms. Fan). 
Everyone has their values of being. You can’t stay at home all the time. It would be 
better even if you just clean up streets, because you are contributing to the community 
(Mr. Gan). 
 
On the other hand, voluntary labour can be used to test whether beneficiaries are abusing the 
system by earning incomes secretly. Moreover, the bureaucrats hold a belief that able-bodied 
beneficiaries are obliged to work for the government since they receive state assistance.  
Since beneficiaries receive the UMLSG subsidy, they should show their gratitude. 
Moreover, voluntary labour can be used to check their employment status (Mr. Hao). 
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You should attend voluntary labour if you are receiving the Party’s relief (Mr. Shen).  
Voluntary labour is to indicate that the UMLSG subsidy is not free to beneficiaries. 
Meanwhile, they can be proven to have jobs if they refuse to come without acceptable 
reasons (Ms. Mo).  
 
However, it is important to note that voluntary labour is deficient at both the policy and practical 
levels. According to its requirement, beneficiaries can be exempted from labour sessions if they 
are older than the working age (above 50 and 60 for females and males respectively), full-time 
students, a father or mother of a child less than six years old, and carers of the seriously ill and 
sick patients. Nevertheless, as demonstrated by previous analysis, the unwritten principle of ‘the 
ability to work’ has been strictly carried out. The claim that there is a vast amount of people of 
working age that are qualified for voluntary labour remains unproven. Meanwhile, the 
bureaucrats realise that it is nearly impossible to implement compulsory labour sessions in reality. 
This failure causes enormous complaints from and resistance of local bureaucrats.  
It is stated that the UMLSG entitlement will be cancelled if beneficiaries don’t attend. 
However, where can I find so many sessions of voluntary labour each month? Some of 
them are so old that you can’t find any appropriate task for them. Some will not answer 
your call if they really have a job outside.  Therefore, we have to make up the figures 
every time (Ms. Mo). 
Beneficiaries will come for very few times or even not come at all. They often answer 
that they are ‘busy’ or ‘ill’. Therefore, most Residents’ Committees will only call them 
for voluntary labour when necessary. No staff will follow the instructions of penalty. 
This is because ‘voluntary’ doesn’t mean ‘compulsory’ and we will not force them if 
they refuse. In summary, it is ridiculous to have this rule (Mr. Gan). 
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 Voices from the poor 
In general, beneficiaries are not ‘lazy’ or ‘dependent on the government’ as imagined. On the 
contrary, they will prefer to attend labour sessions, especially when they internalise the official 
view that state welfare required ‘contributions’.   
As an UMLSG beneficiary who is capable of working, I should try my best to help the 
government. They offered me such a cheap flat. Without it, I would have to find 
another accommodation (Mr. Wang).  
Although my husband is a long-term patient, he used to patrol in the community before. 
He said he liked it because it was similar to his previous door-guard job. After he 
became too sick to attend, I substituted him for a while. The UMLSG subsidy is not 
claimed without costs. It is an obligation to do the labour sessions once you’re entitled 
to the UMLSG (Ms. Zhang).  
Although I’m as old as 80, I like patrolling in street. It reminds me of the days when I 
was working in the Residents’ Committee. In addition, as the government is looking 
after me, I’m obliged to help the community (Ms. Shu). 
I bear a rule in mind that ‘one should take up the consequences of the action after he 
does it’. Asking for other people’s money requires corresponding contributions (Ms. 
Zhuo).  
 
Moreover, beneficiaries may use voluntary labour to show their cooperation with local 
bureaucrats’ work. By doing this, they can develop a good patron-client relationship to secure the 
UMLSG assistance. As demonstrated before, for example, Ms. Lei would commit to every 
voluntary work request that was made of her. In return, the staff would prioritise the distribution 
of additional goods to her. 
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 However, beneficiaries oppose to the enforcement of voluntary labour. Interviewees pointed out 
that instead of being ‘voluntary’, attendance of the labour sessions were actually ‘compulsory’. 
Furthermore, these labour sessions not only had nothing to do in relation to gaining paid 
employment, but also prevented poor people from managing their livelihoods by casual jobs. 
Therefore, as summarised by Mr. Chen, ‘Voluntary labour is no more than discrimination. This is 
because poor people are always thought to be lazy and deceitful.’ 
When I got a casual job, I told the Residents’ Committee that I couldn’t make it. I want 
to earn some petty money to support our family’s living. Moreover, it would be worse 
if I worked too much and became ill too. I don’t have medical insurance. To tell the 
truth, if I’m not that poor, I also want to help others as a volunteer. I want to contribute 
to society because I was helped before. But how could I help others when I could not 
handle my own living pressure first (Ms. Zhang). 
Voluntary labour can’t help you to find a job at all. Its effect is only for surveillance 
and control. It makes you feel embarrassed and degraded. Thus, voluntary labour is no 
more than discrimination. This is because poor people are always thought to be lazy 
and deceitful (Mr. Chen). 
 
In short, the policy of voluntary labour is misleading. It is aimed to stimulate the motive to work, 
while in reality current beneficiaries are mostly those people who cannot work or who are 
willing to work but cannot find jobs. As a result, this policy may not be well implemented by 
local bureaucrats. It can be argued that voluntary labour for poor people may be just an 
opportunity to develop the patron-client relation, while for the state it is a device to discipline the 





It is revealed by the interviews reveal that the current UMLSG policy contribute very little to the 
promotion of re-employment. Due to the principle of ‘the ability to work’, the families with all 
work fit applicants have been eliminated at the stage of application. Therefore, it is very hard for 
the UMLSG beneficiaries who are mainly comprised of the older, disabled or sick people to find 
a job in the market without any external support.  
 
However, there are still some elements in the policy design to support the re-employment of the 
UMLSG beneficiaries. The most significant implementation may be a particular rule enacted in 
2006. It enables the UMLSG family to have more income if there is any member who is re-
employed. As long as the total income of the UMLSG family is under the threshold, a certain 
amount of money will be deducted every month for the living costs of the re-employed member. 
The rest of the total income will be averaged for the other members. The difference between this 
average income and the UMLSG threshold will be the subsidy of each member excluding the 
wage earner. 
 
Regarding the re-employment service in practice, the Street Office and the Residents’ Committee 
are perhaps the only official channels for poor people. For example, they may inform the 
appropriate beneficiaries of jobs which are indicated by the information system. Nevertheless, 
job information is not always available in the system. Consequently, as Mr. Gan said, ‘This kind 
of spreading the job information is only for propaganda and it usually becomes formalistic.’  
 
If local bureaucrats really know some job opportunities, they may ask the beneficiaries to join 
the interview. Generally, these jobs are mainly related to low-paid, temporary and intensive 
labour, such as ‘household helpers, door guards, car guards, newspaperman, milkman’ (Ms. Tang) 
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 or ‘security guards and kitchen helpers’ (Mr. Gan and Ms. Xie). It is usually believed that ‘these 
kinds of jobs are very easy to find in the market’ and ‘as long as beneficiaries would like to take 
the offer, they must get out of poverty’ (Ms. Tang, Mr. Gan and Ms. Xie). Therefore, although the 
bureaucrats admitted that the salaries of these jobs were always meagre and insecure, they still 
maintained that doing these jobs should be much better than claiming the UMLSG subsidy. This 
is simply because, as they believed, ‘They will make ends meet with their own efforts.’ 
The salaries from these jobs are far below the minimum wage in Guangzhou; and they 
are just casual jobs or work for private employers. However, beneficiaries will get 
money from the job; it will be better because it means that they will make ends meet 
with their own efforts. Therefore, I will require them to have an interview even if they 
aren’t interested in the job (Ms. Xie).  
    
Voices from the poor 
The significance of job referral by official channels is actually quite small in promoting re-
employment. Poor people usually rely on themselves more than the Residents’ Committee. Only 
Ms. Chi’s son was once introduced a job as a door-guard by the Residents’ Committee. The 
partners of Mr. Chen, Mr. Li, Mr. Zhao (LI), Mr. Lao (LI) or Ms. Zhang and Ms. Lei all found 
their jobs as household helpers by themselves. Moreover, the jobs they are doing are not only 
low-status and insecure, but also have limited potentials of helping poor people escape from 
poverty.   
 
Take the example of Ms. Zhou again. As established as a model by local bureaucrats, her story 
was well-known for her self-reliance in re-employment instead of ‘waiting and asking from the 
government’. Although Ms. Zhou needed to look after her disabled daughter all the time, she 
managed to earn some petty money by selling medicinal mushrooms. She went to the flea market 
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 nearby from four to six every afternoon when her sister came to take care of her daughter at 
home. Then she had to prepare medicinal mushrooms for the next day in the late evening after 
her daughter went to bed. Sometimes, in order to collect the medicinal mushrooms from her 
suppliers, she needs to go to the coach station in the early morning before her daughter woke up. 
However, this extra money could not enhance Ms. Zhou’s income beyond the UMLSG threshold. 
As Ms. Zhou realised, ‘This business is only to support my daughter’s medicines rather than 
replace the UMLSG subsidy.’ 
 
Before being successfully enrolled into the UMLSG, Ms. Zhang (a Type ⅠHousehold) was a 
casual household helper with an income about 600 yuan per month. Since she commented about 
herself that as ‘a person who does not care about face-saving’, she sold hairpins in street after 
work in order to earn a profit of 0.5 yuan for each. After getting into the UMLSG, Ms. Zhang 
found that it was impossible to live on the UMLSG subsidy, though it had increased from about 
300 to 600 yuan per month for her family. Luckily, she managed to find a full-time cleaner job 
with 700 yuan per month. In order to earn an extra of 100 or 200 yuan, Ms. Zhang would try to 
cover as many additional shifts as she could. Usually, she only had one day off in the whole 
month. Moreover, Ms. Zhang decided to only contribute to the pension from her salary, because 
she preferred to save more money for the medical and education costs for her husband and 
daughter. Despite Ms. Zhang’ hard work, it was when her husband’s pension started in the early 
2010 that pulled her family was able to leave the UMLSG. Summarised in her words, ‘How 
could people say we are living a comfortable life when we have to sustain a livelihood like this?’ 
 
The Low-Income beneficiary Mr. Zhao, who is 56 and healthy, offered his experiences in job 
hunting and explained why he chose to stay at home now: 
I stay at home now. You can say the UMLSG is raising lazy people. But the question is: 
who will hire us in reality? Who will say we are lazy people are those who don’t 
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 understand the difficulty of finding a job now. They are just looking down upon us. 
When I was 46 ten years ago, I rode two hours’ bicycle for an interview for a toilet 
cleaner. The chief told me, ‘You’re old and you should go back home to take care of 
your grandchild.’ I got used to this kind of reply and accepted the reality. I’m weak in 
height and education. After I successfully applied to the Low-Income family, I worked 
as a guard in a parking slot in 2007. A car owner complained that his car was scratched 
and demanded the compensation. Due to his great wrangle and quarrel, our boss placed 
responsibility on the guards on duty including me. He asked us to pay for the 
compensation. Although we know that no one approached the car during this period, 
we can’t prove it as there is no CCTV in this parking slot. I don’t have the money and 
thus I quitted the job. From then on, I won’t consider any guard job working in a non-
CCTV place, even if I was offered 600 or 800 yuan per month.  
Last year, I applied to a guard job in the community where I’m living. They rejected 
me first because they think I’m not tall enough. But they recruited me later because 
they couldn’t hire enough people. Why? The job required guards to take turn to do day 
shifts and night shifts. Moreover, guards are not allowed to sit down. They should 
either stand sentry or patrol. The absurd thing is that guards can’t leave their positions 
even for the toilet. After I knew the job requirement, I decided to give up the chance.  
I’m not lazy. I was concerned about what would happen if I become sick because of 
such a tiring job. The company doesn’t provide any insurance and the salary is lower 
than the minimum wage.  The medical costs will make my life more stressful.  
The ideal job for me is a salary close to the minimum wage and it doesn’t need to take 
the night shifts. Moreover, it is not very far away from my home so that I can ride my 
bicycle to get there. Otherwise, I would choose to stay at home. The reason is because I 
don’t need to spend any money. I do worry about the potential costs of medicines, 
transportation and meals caused by the job. These costs may take up a high proportion 
in a low-wage job.  
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 Leaving the UMLSG 
Regarding the question of ‘how to leave the UMLSG’, both beneficiaries and bureaucrats 
seemed to be baffled and helpless. Since most of the UMLSG beneficiaries had been proven to 
be unable to work, it was nearly impossible for them to quit the UMLSG by finding a proper job 
in the market. Instead, the most likely ways for beneficiaries out of the UMLSG were either 
some member receiving the pension or a child starting to work.  
The only thing that we can do to help leave the UMLSG is to secure a job. However, 
the chance of success is quite small as the majority of them are mentally retarded, 
severely sick or old in age. The frequent reason for leaving the UMLSG is that some 
one in the family is old enough for retirement (Ms. Tang).  
It is impossible for those people who are getting older to get a job. They can wait until 
their child grows up and starts to work. Otherwise, it depends on if they will be eligible 
for pension in the future (Ms. Fan).  
 
Voices from the poor 
Similar to local bureaucrats’ opinion, beneficiaries hold a very pessimistic view about leaving the 
UMLSG by their own efforts. Based on their predictions, the prospects of the eleven UMLSG 
families and the two Low-Income families can be categorised in four groups. The first is to wait 
until the child finishes their study and starts to work (Mr. Chen and Mr. Zhao). However, this 
will probably lead to the previous discussion about ‘Type Ⅱ household’: the problem of elderly 
poverty may be covered up because the responsibility for care shifts to their adult children.           
We may be disqualified for the UMLSG after our daughter finishes college and finds a 
job, but we will still have no income like now. Moreover, our children will ultimately 
have their own family one day. They can’t take care of us for ever. Without the 
UMLSG assistance in future, we would just add to our children’s burden. This is like a 
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 vicious cycle, isn’t it (Mr. Chen)? 
 
The second way is perhaps to wait until qualifying for receiving the pension, provided that they 
have the entitlement in future (Mr. Li, Mr. Lao and Ms. Zhuo). 
I will receive the pension once I’m 60. However, the pension will be far from enough 
for my twin daughters to go to university．I can’t imagine how we can make it 
without the UMLSG assistance (Mr. Li). 
 
Thirdly, due to their inability to work, those beneficiaries who are old, ill or crippled are 
expected to depend on the UMLSG (Mr. Chang, Mr. Wang, Ms. Shu, Ms. Zhou and Ms. Pan). 
It is very hard for me to quit the UMLSG. Common companies won’t hire blind people. 
I won’t have a pension. I will stay in the UMLSG until I become sick and die (Mr. 
Chang).  
 
Fourthly, although some UMLSG households may have relatively young and work fit members, 
their future remains unclear because of the competitive labour market (Ms. Lei, Mr. Dong and 
Ms. Chi).  
Our daughter is 40, very short and not beautiful. Therefore, she always works 
temporarily and no one knows when she will go to work again (Mr. Dong). 
 
Feelings about living on the UMLSG 
When asked about the impressions of the UMLSG beneficiaries, the bureaucrats perceived them 
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 as ‘cheating’, ‘comfortable in life’, ‘shameless’ (laipi) or ‘greedy’. 
Many UMLSG households are cheating because their expenditures exceed the incomes. 
How could it be possible? They must have other sources of incomes, such as working 
secretly. These people contribute nothing to the state. They should be satisfied as their 
subsistence is guaranteed by the UMLSG (Ms. Tan). 
The UMLSG beneficiaries are shameless. They try every means to get into the 
UMLSG and stay as long as they can. Moreover, they could be comfortable in life, 
because they can have cash subsidies, additional welfare and even salary by working 
secretly (Mr. Hao).  
Other than the subsidy, medical assistance and low-rent apartments are getting more 
and more important. People are greedy. They think they have rights to state welfare. 
They will try by every means as long as the government provides these kinds of 
assistance (Mr. Gan).  
 
Voices from the poor 
The following analysis will display the voices of poor people about their feelings of living in the 
UMLSG. As shown previously, poor people expressed their gratitude to the Party or the 
government. Given the vulnerability of informal network and the difficulty of re-employment, 
they all pointed out that the institutionalised state assistance has relieved their long-term poverty 
to a significant extent. For example, Ms. Zhou was very thankful to the state because she and her 
disabled daughter could not have any income from employment. Moreover, she thought the 
identity as an UMLSG beneficiary was less stigmatised especially compared to the humiliation 
imposed by her husband’s relatives. Therefore, she was glad to tell others about her life in the 
UMLSG and highly praised the benevolence of the state. Regarding the future, she was 
optimistic as long as they could still receive the ‘caring and support from the state’.  
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 However, poor people need to pay with their dignity for the ‘caring’ of the state. The most 
frequently used word by them to describe their feelings was kanbuqi  or ‘looked down upon’. 
Firstly, due to the emphasis on ‘the ability to work’, the identity as an UMLSG family displays a 
symbol of failure:  
To tell the truth, I don’t like being an UMLSG beneficiary. It feels like a distinction 
which makes you looked down upon. This is because if you have the ability to work, 
earn money and raise the family, you don’t have to claim the UMLSG subsidy. You 
must be happy about the money you earn rather than that you claim. You won’t be 
happy when you receive money from others, will you (Mr. Li)?  
 
The second source of stigma comes from local bureaucrats’ prejudice. According to Mr. Chen, 
the images of the UMLSG beneficiaries in the staff’s eyes are: ‘idling around all the day’; 
‘gluttonous and lazy’; ‘cheating by concealing financial and employment situation’. Therefore, 
as Mr. Chen commented, ‘We should be ready to be investigated at any time, and we are 
deserved to be looked down upon simply because we are claiming the UMLSG subsidy.’   
 
Thirdly, the inferior feeling is strengthened by actual UMLSG rules such as public review and 
voluntary labour, which disclose beneficiaries’ information and activate public surveillance.   
To be an UMLSG beneficiary is definitely to be inferior to others. When your data is 
put up outside the Residents’ Committee, everyone will discuss it behind you. They 
tend to be suspicious of your treating on the government and they start to see if your 
life style complies with a poor pattern (Mr. Li).  
I felt ashamed of myself as neighbours all knew I was in the UMLSG then. Facing to 
the difficulty in my family, I was more and more pressured and unhappy. I was so 
depressed that I needed to see a psychiatrist (Ms. Xian).  
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 I feel looked down upon. Everyone knows it because of public review. Some people 
will whisper that we aren’t deserving of the UMLSG entitlement, even though they 
don’t really know what our life is. This only adds to our psychological pressure. Thus, 
it is better not to have the public review and our information should be kept 
confidential in the Residents’ Committee. Moreover, voluntary labour also produces 
stigmatised feelings. If I do some voluntary work because I have a lot of time, this 
means a ‘glory’. But we are instructed to attend the labour sessions now. In essence, 
the UMLSG beneficiaries are assumed to be lazy. However, according to my 
observation, those people including me who come to this Residents’ Committee to do 
some cleaning are not lazy at all. We think we should contribute to the state when we're 
receiving state welfare. By doing this, we will feel a little more comfortable. And I 
don’t want to offend the staff either. But if I could have an alterative, I would prefer to 
work. I don’t even mind if the salary is a bit lower than the minimum wage, such as 
800 yuan. This is because living on my labour is better than being scrutinised by public 
labour. People will gossip once you don’t show the preferred behaviours. You will also 
feel ashamed because it appears that you receive the UMLSG subsidy without doing 
anything (Ms. Zhuo).  
 
Finally, poor people gradually feel helpless of changing their life; they are forced to accept their 
fates of being trapped at the UMLSG stratum.   
I feel more and more broken down. I’m apathetic to what is happening in my daily life. 
No one cares about you. I just have to stay in the UMLSG and to obey what I’m told to 
do. My life is over (Mr. Chen). 
 
Does it matter that I feel looked down upon? As we are poor, we have to take it. We 
can’t change the environment. We can only accept the fact (Mr. Zhao). 
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 Conclusion 
By investigating the experiences of poor people living on the UMLSG, this chapter demonstrated 
the functions of daily administration of the UMLSG. It must be acknowledged that the UMLSG 
assistance relieves the poverty of beneficiaries to a significant extent. Compared to the 
vulnerability and the stigma of informal support, poor people prefer to statutory assistance and 
show extraordinary gratitude to the Party. However, since the function of the UMLSG over-
emphasizes legitimacy rather than the actualisation of social rights, beneficiaries have to endure 
the stigmatisation of the UMLSG status and the institutional rejection of their voices.    
 
For example, by exposing beneficiaries to the community, both public review and voluntary 
labour are imposed to activate public surveillance to eliminate unqualified beneficiaries. Again, 
the criterion of unqualified beneficiaries is closely related to the principle of ‘the ability to work’. 
In addition, the phenomenon of clientelization is not uniquely found in the application process. 
In order to exchange relevant information and guarantee the UMLSG assistance, beneficiaries 
may have to maintain a patron-client relationship with local bureaucrats, such as actively 
attending voluntary labour sessions. Otherwise, conflicts with local bureaucrats would be 
intensified as in the application process. Lastly, the over-emphasis on legitimacy of the UMLSG 
can also be demonstrated by the fact that there are insufficient policies to promote social 
participation and re-employment.   
 
As a result, there is a very slim prospect for these beneficiaries - who are old, physically ill or 
disabled - to escape from the UMLSG stratum by their own efforts. Being looked down upon is 





c Mr. Chang was primarily assessed as ‘cheating’ as he was suspicious of pretending divorce 







 Chapter Ten  
Conclusion 
 
The central question of this study focuses on the nature of China’s welfare regime. In relation to 
this topic, Chapter Two reviewed three streams of theories about welfare regime: Esping-
Andersen’s welfare state regimes, East Asian welfare regimes and informal security regimes. 
After a careful examination, Chapter Two proposed a theoretical framework for studying China’s 
welfare regime, which embodied three dimensions of research questions. They were: welfare mix, 
welfare outcomes and historical development. Moreover, research questions were developed 
based on the principles in each dimension. The first dimension of welfare mix concerned the 
principle of domestic domains in the welfare mix of China. The second dimension synthesised 
the principles of de-commodificaton, social programs, de-familialization, de-clientelization and 
stratification. The last dimension is related to the principle of authoritarianism. As a result, the 
research questions of this study were listed as follows:      
A. Welfare mix (domestic domains of the state, market, family and community) 
• What is the arrangement within the welfare mix in China?  
B. Welfare outcomes (de-commodification and social programs, de-familialization, de-
clientelization, stratification) 
• In reference to the UMLSG beneficiaries in this study, how do their living standards 
deviate from the normal standards of ordinary residents? 
• How significant is the family unit in welfare support? 
• Could personal patronage be found in China’s welfare regime? 
• What is the effect of stratification produced by China’s welfare regime? 
C. Historical development (authoritarianism) 
• How have the intentions of the CPC determined the development of China’s welfare 
system?   
• Especially, what political ideologies have been upheld during the development of China’s 
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 welfare system? 
 
In order to answer these questions, this study employed three kinds of methods: case study, 
document analysis and interviews. Based on the analysis of Chapter Four, Five and Six, three 
distinctive periods of the welfare regime can be identified since the foundation of the P.R.C. in 
1949. They were: communist China (1949-1978), economic China (1978-2002) and social China 
(2002-2011). 
 
Communist China (1949-1978 ) 
Chapter Four placed the assessment of the welfare system during 1949-1978 into the context of 
the dominant political economy and political ideologies. As the first phase of China’s welfare 
regime, the legacies of ‘communist China’ generated huge impacts on the later periods. After the 
Party quickly succeeded in consolidating its regime after 1949, it proclaimed an overriding 
strategy of modernisation in 1953, which prioritised the development of heavy industry relative 
to agriculture and light industry. The two tasks embodied in the industrialisation-led strategy, 
socialist industrialisation and socialist transformation, were aimed at extracting and centralising 
maximum resources for the state. As a result of this overriding intention, the Party advocated that 
the living standards of people should be greatly restrained.  
 
Against this background, there were two critical institutions established in urban and rural areas. 
In cities most of the population with an urban household registration was employed by danwei - 
national enterprises or government agencies (Table 4.1). Although their wage was generally low 
and the life necessities were strictly rationed, workers were still privileged in receiving a wide 
range of benefits, goods and services from their danwei. 
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 By contrast, the movement of agricultural co-operation in rural areas was used to support the 
industrialisation-led strategy. The imposition of rural collectives and the state monopoly of 
purchasing and marketing grain mostly influenced the livelihoods of peasants. Compared to 
danwei welfare, however, welfare provision by rural collectives were far less comprehensive and 
generous.  
 
As the other player in the welfare mix, the burden of family was lessened by the collective units 
to a certain extent. For instance, danwei was also responsible for the protection to the dependents 
of workers, such as medical credits, benefits for funeral and death compensation (State Council, 
1951), or even subsidies when they were leading a hard life (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 1962). 
Similarly, as all the rural households attended communes, every dependent member such as 
children or older people could be at least guaranteed a basic amount of grain (Huang, 1990).   
 
Due to the primacy of collective units and family, the state was rather marginalised in the welfare 
mix and consequently, there were few numbers of people on relief (Table 4.2 and Table 4.3). 
Institutionalised relief (jiuji ) was mainly provided to those people temporarily suffering from 
natural disasters or permanently losing the ability to work and family support. In cities, the group 
of ‘three nos’ was the key target for the government body of Civil Affairs, who were constituted 
of the most disadvantaged which included the elderly, the disabled and orphans with no source of 
income, no ability to work and no family to support. They were not only entitled to cash support 
but also eligible for ‘social welfare’ (shehui fuli), the major personal service of which was 
residential care. 
 
By comparison, the intervention of the state was much less significant in the regular poverty-
relief scheme in rural areas. Five-Guarantee Household (wu bao hu) usually referred to those 
commune members without family support, such as widowers, widows, orphans or older people 
without children (gu gua guan du). Their basic living standards were normally guaranteed by 
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 collective welfare funds of production teams, the lowest level in the commune system.  
 
In short, the welfare mix in the phase of ‘communist China’ can be summarised as: despite the 
significant difference in available resources, danwei and rural collectives were respectively the 
main providers of welfare for most of the population in urban and rural areas. Because of the 
extremely high coverage of collective units, the relief of the state or rural collectives would be 
the last resort for people after they exhausted their collective protection and family support.  
 
The second aim of Chapter Four was to explore the outcomes caused by danwei welfare. 
Although it was generally believed that danwei performed well in income equality, it was 
discovered that danwei welfare was rather conditioned and stratified. There may be variations 
existing in the external and internal distributions of danwei. The factors that could influence the 
capacity of enterprises for holding danwei welfare were related to the nature of ownership (Table 
4.9), administrative rank (Table 4.10) and gender differences (Table 4.11).  
 
Meanwhile, there were at least four factors determining the individual differences within danwei. 
Other than the job nature (permanent or temporary), political capital (e.g. party membership or 
administrative position) or gender differences, it was more significant to note the patron-client 
relationship in the distribution of danwei welfare. As a material reward, danwei welfare 
motivated those workers with better work performances and commitment to political ideologies. 
However, since local cadres in danwei were responsible for the discretion, it was very likely for 
the formal function of danwei welfare to deform into clientelization. Benefits available to 
ordinary workers could be influenced on the presence or absence of reciprocal favours, petty 
corruption or emotional attachment. According to the fieldwork of this study, the patron-client 
relationship was also discovered in the assessment and administration of the UMLSG. This 
suggests that demonstrated by China’s welfare system, the contradiction of welfare outcomes to 
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 political ideologies has existed throughout different phases.  
 
In summary, the welfare outcomes generated by danwei welfare were characterised by 
stratification and clientalization. An advantageous profile of the worker for retrieving danwei 
welfare would be: a permanent worker in a state-owned enterprise of a higher administrative 
rank. He, preferably as a Party member and a cadre, should display the moral-political standards 
required by the Party. It can be inferred that the stratification of danwei welfare was attached to 
their respective importance in the strategy of industrialisation. Lastly, in order to successfully 
guarantee danwei welfare, it is very likely for urban workers to develop an informal relationship 
with leaders and cadres. In short, instead of egalitarianism, danwei welfare could be rather 
regressive and informalised based on personalised power and network. 
 
The third task of Chapter Four was to explain the large disparity between urban and rural areas. 
Although it seemed that both danwei and rural collectives provided similar welfare programs 
(Figure 4.1), they were quite varied in funding and scope. This can be demonstrated by the 
discrepancy between a much smaller welfare fund in communes (Table 4.4) and a significant 
greater population in rural areas. The fiscal constraints of collective welfare funds in rural 
collectives can be traced in every important document during the movement of agricultural co-
operation.  
 
Due to such limited funding, it is not surprising that the efforts of establishing comprehensive 
welfare programs by rural collectives soon turned out to be a failure. The supply system had been 
substantially diminished since the re-adjustment of communes in 1962. The retrenchment of 
collective welfare, however, did not impact on a particular scheme of Five-Guarantee Household. 
First institutionalised in 1956, this poverty-relief scheme had been upheld throughout the pre-
reform period and it was aimed at those vulnerable households with insufficient working forces 
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 (Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3). 
 
So far, there are two questions that need to be answered. The first one is: if danwei welfare 
functioned to motivate workers but without changing the austere life style, what role did Five-
Guarantee Household play as it could remain intact in spite of the limited funding? The second 
one looks to a broader picture: why would peasants surrender to the imposition of rural 
collectives, while their welfare provision was far worse than urban workers?  
 
Regarding the first question, it was argued that Five-Guarantee Household was used to legitimate 
the establishment of rural collectives. As discussed before, the impositions of rural collectives 
and the state monopoly of purchasing and marketing were of vital importance to support the 
centralisation of resources by the state. However, the establishment of rural collectives required 
the confiscation of crop lands and instruments. Meanwhile, the distribution of rural collectives 
was mostly dependent on members’ actual contribution to work. This created resistance from 
those households who had insufficient work forces and relied on the rents from their crop lands. 
As a result, the implementation of Five-Guarantee Household effectively eliminated the worries 
of these targets and reinforced the confidence of other members to embrace rural collectives.  
 
In relation to the second question, other than the strong policy enforcement, the Party mobilised 
an effective propaganda of ideologies to justify the urban-rural disparity in the welfare system. 
The first group of political ideologies referred to ‘developmentalism’, which included two 
elements: ‘localised disparity’ and ‘self-reliance’. The privileged position of urban workers in 
terms of comprehensive danwei welfare was explained as a dichotomy based on two different 
institutions in urban and rural areas. In addition, since the Party was relevant to put much 
investment into rural areas, the value of self-reliance was exhorted for peasants to justify their 
inferiority. 
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 The second cluster of political rhetoric advocated by the Party was ‘to coordinate the relation 
between the state, collectives and individuals’. This can be analysed from the following two sub-
titles: ‘thrift’ and ‘to increase individual’s income’. Collective welfare was targeted by the Party 
as an impediment to the increase of members’ incomes, because it was often criticised as 
extravagant or wasteful. By doing this, the fundamental problem of the state extracting resources 
from peasants, such as by the means of the state monopoly of purchasing and marketing grain, 
could be cleverly obscured. 
 
The accordance of the last two sets of political ideologies could be broadened to include a third 
principle: the contradiction between capitalism and socialism. It has been revealed that in every 
critical crisis of the movement of agricultural co-operation, the Party would seek help from the 
mobilisation of ideological education. Any opposition to rural collectives could be seen as the 
restoration of capitalism. In other words, the support to rural collectives was equated with the 
adherence to the Party and socialism.  
 
Lastly, the Party laid some significance on the rhetoric of familism. The most obvious example is 
the legislation of family care. However, because of the stronger influence from collective 
protection, familism was not more heavily utilised than the next phase. 
  
In conclusion, during the phase of ‘communist China’ (1949-1978), collective units (danwei and 
rural collectives) and family were the two most important domains of welfare provision for their 
members; while the state was rather marginalised in the welfare mix. In relation to welfare 
outcomes, the comprehensive danwei welfare (especially in terms of collective consumption) not 
only guaranteed basic need-satisfaction of workers, but also created the clientelization of 
workers. By contrast, rural collectives failed to raise similar welfare programs and could only 
regularly sustain a scheme of Five-Guarantee Household. Due to differential treatment, 
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 ‘communist China’ produced an influential division between urban and rural populations. The 
welfare mix and the welfare outcomes were subordinate to the Party’s pursuit of socialist 
industrialisation. Also, the justification of the whole welfare system was heavily dependent on 
certain political ideologies mobilised by the Party.  
 
Economic China (1978-200 2 ) 
The analysis of Chapter Five focused on the fundamental changes in the phase of ‘economic 
China’ during 1978-2002. These changes were related to the transition of the political economy, 
the corresponding development of the welfare system and the re-adjustment of political 
ideologies. ‘Four modernisations’ (industry, agriculture, national defence, and science and 
technology) was proposed in the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee 
in 1978. Therefore, material incentives were perceived as the most important means to motivate 
people for production and ultimately enhance their livelihoods.  
 
The emphasis on economic development required the Party to loosen its control by 
decentralising power to local production units. Firstly, special economic zones along the coast 
lines (e.g. Guangdong Province) were opened up to attract foreign capital. This created a huge 
number of migrant workers mainly working in the manufacturing sector, who were decisive to 
the incredible economic growth in this phase.  
 
Secondly, since the household responsibility system replaced agricultural co-operation as the 
mode of production in rural areas, the institution of communes was abolished by the end of 1984. 
Instead, county ( xiang ) government and Villagers’ Committee were in charge of local affairs. 
There is no doubt that the decentralisation of production units in rural areas largely stimulated 
the motivation of peasants and substantially increased their living standards. However, the 
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 function of collective protection was weakened as well, especially when the state intervention 
remained remote as before.  
 
Thirdly, the restructuring of national enterprises had always been the key during the economic 
reform in urban areas. Due to the proposal ‘to establish a modern enterprise system’ at The 
Fourteenth National Congress of the CPC, it was required that large- and medium-size national 
enterprises should get rid of losses by the means of bankruptcy, merger and redundancy of 
employees. The radical reform produced a huge number of laid-off workers and the problem of 
urban poverty. As a result, the restructuring of national enterprises required the complementation 
of the social security system.  
 
Finally, the significance of the market mechanism in the economic institution was acknowledged. 
The ‘socialist market economy’ was established as the ultimate goal of the economic 
restructuring (Jiang, 1992). One of the consequences of introducing the market was the 
privatisation (‘socialisation’) of some welfare programs, such as housing or social welfare.  
 
Because of these fundamental changes to China’s economic base, the original political 
mechanisms of totalitarian control by danwei or rural collectives was considered to be impeding 
the establishment of the socialist market economy. Similar topics were repeatedly mentioned in 
the political reforms in 1988, 1993, or 1998, which included transformation of government 
functions to regulation, improvement of its administrative efficiency and decentralisation some 
of its power to enterprises and social organisations. 
 
The reform of the government body, however, did not suggest any possibility of questioning one-
party rule. Four Cardinal Principles were the highest guidance in the political institution during 
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 the drive for socialist modernisation and the idea of Western-style democracy had been rejected 
by the highest-level leaders of the Party. The concern about the legitimacy of one-party rule 
determined the importance attached to the social security system by the Party during the 
economic reform.    
 
In short, the key elements of political economy in the phase of ‘economic China’ can be 
summarised by ‘one centre and two basics’ in the theory of the primary stage of socialism in 
China: centring on economic development, sticking to the Four Cardinal Principles and pressing 
ahead with reform and opening-up (Zhao 1987, p9-13). 
 
Corresponding to the transition of political economy, the welfare system in the phase of 
‘economic China’ was constantly being restructured. The term ‘social security’ (shehui baozhang)  
appeared in the highest-level documents for the first time in 1985, the system of which should be 
established based on ‘diversified types, different programs and varied standards’. This suggested 
that according to the actual situation of China, the responsibility for contributing welfare 
programs should be shared by the state, enterprises, individuals and family (The CPC Central 
Committee, 1985).  
 
Furthermore, the contents of the social security system were outlined in 1993, which consisted of 
social insurance, social relief, social welfare, preferential treatment and settlement (for veteran 
soldiers), social mutual help and personal savings. Meanwhile, respective welfare systems in 
urban and rural areas were kept dichotomised. On the one hand, social insurance based on 
mutual contributions by employees and employers were made compulsory. On the other hand, 
the support of peasants remained in family and local collective-raising funds (The Fourteenth 
CPC Central Committee, 1993). 
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 In relation to the legacy of urban-rural disparity, there were differences between urban residents, 
migrant workers and peasants in the welfare mix. Although peasants with rural household 
registration were in the majority in the country (903. 01 million by 2002), they were apparently 
not the focus of the newly emerging social security system. Consequently, welfare provision in 
rural areas still had to rely heavily on local collective-raised funds. However, the decentralisation 
of power undermined the collective function of localities as the main welfare provider to a large 
extent. This can be illustrated by the unsuccessful attempt of a rural pension scheme from 1991 
and the high turnover rates of co-operative medical care. 
 
Despite the weakening collective functions, the state was still reluctant to intervene in the 
welfare system in rural areas. This resulted in the primary importance of self-reliance and family 
support for peasants in the welfare mix. For example, the criteria of Five-Guarantee Household 
became very strict and stigmatised when they existed out of the context of agricultural co-
operation. Without regular protection from rural collectives as before, peasants would only be 
eligible for poverty relief when they lost their own ability to work as well as all the informal 
support.  
 
When peasants temporarily moved to cities as migrant workers, their access to the welfare 
system in urban areas was denied. They were only entitled to the welfare programs based on their 
household registrations. This meant that, despite a huge floating population (estimated 100 
million in 2002), migrant workers were not eligible for the UMLSG, elderly service or nine-year 
compulsory education in cities simply because of the status of their household registration. 
Furthermore, it was very unlikely for employers to contribute social insurance for them. 




 Regarding urban residents (349.34 million by 2002), the privileged danwei welfare was only 
preserved for public servants and government employees. By 2002, there were 27.31 million and 
10.73 million employees respectively working in public organisations and government bodies. 
They were all covered by independent systems of pension and health care, the structures of 
which were similar to danwei welfare (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, 2010: 
1069).  
 
Despite the loss of danwei welfare for most of the urban population, they were still better 
protected compared to peasants and migrant workers. Children with urban household registration 
were universally provided with nine-year compulsory education. Urban residents were eligible to 
apply for the UMLSG. It was ensured that all the laid-off workers could receive the full amount 
of basic living expenses or pensions on time. A dramatically increasing proportion of the 
working population was covered by social insurance and the expansion of coverage was always a 
top priority. 
 
However, the dismantling of danwei led to the radical privatisation of welfare. Previous 
provision of personal services by danwei was transferred to the market, community and family. 
This can be illustrated by the privatisation of housing and ‘socialisation of social welfare’. 
Moreover, as social insurance targeted only the working population, this would force people 
without regular occupations or dependents of working population to depend more on the market 
and family for welfare.  
 
In summary, due to the vanishing of danwei and rural collectives, the market, family and 
community were all increasingly important in the welfare mix for peasants, migrant workers and 
urban residents in the phase of ‘economic China’. However, there were continuities from the last 
phase of ‘communist China’. The urban-rural disparity was maintained by differential treatment 
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 exerted by the state. The intervention of the state in rural areas remained remote, while the 
restructuring of the welfare system in urban areas was the focus during the economic reform. As 
a result, there were five main welfare divisions during 1978-2002: peasants, migrant workers, 
urban working population, urban residents with difficult living, and public servants and 
government employees. 
 
Related to the evolution of the welfare system and the five stratified groups it produced, the 
Party needed to provide justifications to the new characteristics of ‘economic China’: 
preservation of collective-based welfare for peasants, lack of protection to migrant workers, 
damage of the privilege of urban workers and a new means-test scheme for income maintenance 
in cities. The first group of political ideologies referred to ‘superiority of socialism’, which was 
utilised to justify the economic reform and the enlarging income disparity. As Deng Xiao-ping 
(1978b, 128) argued, it was ‘superiority of socialism’ that drove the pragmatic turn of 
emphasizing ‘the development of social productive forces’ and ‘the improvement of people’s 
material and cultural life’. Moreover, the reason why the economic reform would not contradict 
the ideology of socialism in China was interpreted as: ‘superiority of socialism’ could prevent 
polarisation and ultimately achieve ‘common prosperity’ by ‘distribution to one’s work’ and state 
redistribution.   
 
Secondly, the priority of efficiency to fairness was supported by the idea of ‘subordination of 
social system to economic system’. Danwei welfare was re-constructed as a barrier of motive to 
work and ‘social burden’ of national enterprises in the market competition. Consequently, the 
innovation of the welfare system was considered as ‘the complementation to economic 
restructuring’, taking up the functions of danwei welfare. This pushed social insurance and the 
UMLSG as the highlights, but their standards were severely constrained by the claim of ‘proceed 
from actual conditions of the country’. By contrast, other personal services shifted from danwei 
were guided by the rhetoric of ‘socialisation of social welfare’ to family, the market or 
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 community organisations. Lastly, ‘familism’ was especially mobilised in the rural welfare system 
to justify the weakening collective support and the paucity of state intervention. 
 
The last group of political ideologies was related to ‘legitimacy of the CPC’. Since the promise 
of common prosperity was the legitimacy source of the CPC, the threats to social stability caused 
by laid-off or unemployed workers determined the importance of social insurance and the 
UMLSG again.    
 
In conclusion, the transition of political economy in the phase of ‘economic China’ (1979-2002) 
resulted in the corresponding changes in the welfare system. The market, family and community 
were increasingly important in the welfare mix, but there were still differences in the welfare 
divisions between peasants, migrant workers, urban working population, urban residents with 
difficult living, and public servants and government employees. In order to justify the 
continuities and discontinuities in the welfare system, three groups of political ideologies can be 
identified: ‘superiority of socialism’, ‘subordination of social system to economic system’ and 
‘legitimacy of the CPC’. 
 
Social China (2002-2 0 11 ) 
Similar to Chapter Five, Chapter Six focused on the interactions between the political economy, 
welfare system and political ideologies in the phase of ‘social China’ (2002-2011). After more 
than two decades of the economic reform, the promises of ‘prevention of polarisation’ and 
‘common prosperity’ were undergoing serious challenges. Despite a tracked record of poverty 
reduction at absolute level, it was becoming more difficult for the poorest deciles to benefit from 
economic development. This produced a growing inequality in post-reform China, which in 
return offset the significance of economic growth on poverty reduction. In addition, urban 
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 poverty became a newly-emerging problem caused by the restructuring of national enterprises 
and massive numbers of unemployed workers. Lastly, increasing income disparities and a 
growing population of urban poverty seriously restricted domestic consumption (Diagram 6.1), 
which again, contradicted the Party’s vision of improving people’s living standards at the launch 
of the economic reform.  
 
Against this background, the Party had re-organised its approach of development since the 
Sixteenth National Congress of the CPC (2002-2007). After it was announced that a moderate 
level of people’s living standards was generally realised, an intermediate stage of ‘building a 
moderately prosperous society ( xiaokang shehui ) in an all-round way’ was proposed. The 
specific objectives of ‘an all-round way’ not only mentioned economic growth as before, but also 
focused on social development (Jiang, 2002). Also, the Party offered a more progressive view 
towards the role of state redistribution in narrowing income gaps (Jiang, 2002).  
 
In order to reverse the growing income disparity, the Party reinforced ‘fairness’ in both primary 
distribution and redistribution in the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC (2007-2011). 
Also, it is significant to note the announcement ‘to accelerate the establishment of a social 
security system covering both urban and rural residents’. A sound social security system was 
further clarified as the one ‘based on social insurance, social assistance and social welfare, with 
basic old-age pension, basic medical insurance and the MLSG as the backbone, and 
supplemented by charity and commercial insurance’. In short, the main themes of the Sixteenth 
and the Seventeenth National Congress of the CPC rested on the initiation of social development, 
especially the improvement of the welfare system in rural areas. 
 
During these years, the most significant breakthrough in the welfare mix referred to the 
revitalisation of the state. In rural areas, traditional collective-based schemes of Five-Guarantee 
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 Household and respect homes for the aged were renewed as state-sponsor schemes. Thanks to 
increasing state funding (Diagram 6.2), the beneficiaries of the RMLSG increased from 8.25 
million in 2005 to 47.6 million in 2009 (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2010b). Similarly, 91.5% of 
the rural population had joined the new-type scheme of co-operative medical care by 2008 (Wen, 
2009a) while in the first year, the new-type scheme of rural pension had already covered 72.77 
million peasants in 2009 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010d). Finally, it was maintained that 
compulsory education in rural areas had been fully implemented by 2007 (Wen, 2008). 
 
Similarly, in urban areas it is evident that ‘socialisation of social welfare’ was more than rhetoric. 
Community services had been activated by the state since the Seventeenth National Congress of 
the CPC. Moreover, the population excluded by work-based social insurance could be sponsored 
by the state to attend specific schemes, such as pension or medical insurance for urban residents. 
Last but not least, the UMLSG evolved from simply income maintenance to comprehensive 
protection. Due to the goal of ‘covering whoever is eligible’ and the guaranteed funding by the 
state, the figure of 23.46 million claimants in 2009 was almost ten times as many as in 1999 
when the UMLSG was institutionalised (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2010a). 
 
Despite the significant intervention by the state, the functions of the market and family should 
not be underestimated. This is because peasants were also partially responsible for contributions 
to pension or co-operative medical care. In terms of the RMLSG, state intervention would not be 
valid until the family unit broke down. Furthermore, there was not much significant 
improvement when peasants resided in cities as migrant workers. Last but not least, the UMLSG 
was the last choice for the poor people in the welfare mix unless occupational units, community 
and family all failed.   
 
The stratifications produced by ‘social China’ after 2002 were related to peasants, migrant 
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 workers, working urban residents, urban and rural residents with difficult living, and public 
servants. In comparison to the previous phase of ‘economic China’, there were similarities in 
under-protection of migrant workers, primacy of social insurance for working urban residents, 
‘socialisation’ of personal services, and privilege of public servants and government employees. 
On the contrary, there appeared to be a growing division of the poverty group covered by 
comprehensive social assistance. For example, this consisted of 47.6 million RMLSG 
beneficiaries and 23.46 million UMLSG beneficiaries by 2009 (Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2010b). 
 
In relation to state protection for the disadvantaged group and massive development of welfare 
programs (especially in rural areas), political ideologies in the phase of ‘social China’ were 
distinctive from those of ‘economic China’. The first group referred to ‘Three Represents, 
Scientific Outlook on Development and harmonious socialist society’. They all supported a 
much stronger emphasis attached to social development than ever before. Also, the 
representation of ‘the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people’ required 
the Party to ‘exercise governance for the people’. As a result, ‘co-ordination of economic and 
social development’ as well as the balance between efficiency and fairness ultimately aimed to 
improve people’s livelihoods.    
 
Secondly, ‘Three Represents, Scientific Outlook on Development and harmonious socialist 
society’ were all linked to ‘legitimacy of the CPC’. The Party believed that its power could still 
be legitimate as long as the ideology of Three Represents could be carried out in every aspect of 
its work. Likewise, the intention of Scientific Outlook on Development was to eliminate negative 
consequences during the process of modernisation. Regarding a harmonious society, ‘fairness 
and justice is seen as the essential nature of socialism and the foundation of social stability as 
well’ (Wen, 2011). 
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 Thirdly, it cannot be ignored that the ideology of ‘primary stage of socialism’ was still espoused 
to constrain the over-rapid development of social programs, though it appeared to be not as 
strong as in the phase of ‘economic China’. 
 
In conclusion, the consequences concerning the enlarging income gap and emerging urban 
poverty during the phase of ‘economic China’ prompted the Party to refresh its ideologies and 
strategy in ‘social China’ (2002-2011). The new discursive system of ‘Three Represents, 
Scientific Outlook on Development and harmonious socialist society’ backed up the 
revitalisation of the state in the welfare mix. Due to the improvement of social assistance, the 
MLSG became a vital part of the comprehensive system of state protection. This constituted a 
growing welfare division depending on state benefits in urban and rural areas.  
 
Welfare outcomes: a case study of the UMLSG  
According to Chapter Two, there were four principles that can be used to assess the welfare 
outcomes produced by China’s welfare regime. The first three principles - de-commodification 
and social programs, de-familialization, de-clientelization - were connected to the recognition of 
social rights; while the fourth principle of stratification was aimed to explore the relation 
between social rights and the division of beneficiaries. In order to demonstrate these four 
principles, a case study of the UMLSG scheme was selected.  
 
The first principle of assessment was about de-commodification and social programs. The 
minimum effect of de-commodification can be demonstrated by the assessment of the standards 
of the UMLSG in Chapter Seven. Since the UMLSG was institutionalised in the 1990s, its 
standard was deeply influenced by the political ideologies in ‘economic China’, such as 
‘subordination of social system to economic system’ (‘actual conditions of the country’ or 
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 ‘burden on economic development’). Meanwhile, the biased image of undeserving beneficiaries, 
such as ‘lazy people’ or ‘dependency’, had been constantly constructed and reinforced by both 
authorities and academia.  
 
Consequently, the thresholds of the UMLSG were required to remain lower than the minimum 
wage, basic living expenses for laid-off workers and unemployment benefit (Table 7.3). 
Furthermore, the authorities tended to arbitrarily choose the lowest standard of the UMLSG 
regardless of the needs of beneficiaries. As suggested by the State Councillor Li Gui-xian (1997, 
p278), ‘The standard of threshold must not be set too high; it is preferred to aim at a low rather 
than a high level at the beginning.’ In essence, the UMLSG was only seen as an instrument for 
maintaining social stability from the very beginning: 
This is a very effective implementation for social stability with remarkably good 
consequences, however, which cost less money (Li, 1997).  
 
After revealing the rationale of the choice about the UMLSG thresholds, Chapter Seven 
compared the UMLSG thresholds at national (mainly in 2003) and local levels (five particular 
cities) with both absolute and relative dimensions. They were: World Bank’s absolute standard, 
cost of basic needs, relative income and ‘comprehensive’ method. By comparison to these four 
indicators, it was shown that the most distinctive characteristic of the UMLSG thresholds in 
China referred to the narrow focus on food costs. As a result, the UMLSG beneficiaries can 
barely manage their food costs and they are leading a hard life:   
Is 410 yuan enough for living? Are you kidding me?! You can have a try for a month in 
Guangzhou and then tell me! I only spend 5 yuan for meals every day. I eat two eggs 
(1 yuan); vegetables (2 yuan); noodles for breakfast (0.5 yuan); rice for lunch and 
breakfast (1 yuan); oil and flavouring (0.5 yuan). You may find that there are a hi-fi 
and an air condition in the apartment. My friend gave them to me. But I never turn 
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 them on because the electricity bill will be too high for me (Ms. Xian). 
 
It seemed that the ignorance of social inclusion in the UMLSG had been remedied by the call of 
building a comprehensive system of social assistance. For example, such a system in Guangzhou 
included a variety of subsidies, exemptions and reimbursements in housing, education, health 
service and household costs (Figure 7.1). However, the evolution of the UMLSG created a 
paradox: the minimum thresholds restricted the access and benefits of the UMLSG, while due to 
tremendous risks out of state protection, social programs provided by the UMLSG caused some 
hesitation or concern of beneficiaries about leaving the UMLSG.    
 
Other than the eligibility, the minimum effect of de-commodification can also be shown by the 
extreme conditions imposed by local bureaucrats in the application process. Despite 
contradiction to the UMLSG regulation and the instructions of Civil Affairs, it was revealed in 
Chapter Eight that ‘the ability to work’ was the imperative condition in assessment. In the eyes of 
local bureaucrats, eligible beneficiaries in reality referred to those applicants or their family 
members who were old, weak in health, and physically or mentally disabled.  
The beneficiaries are mainly mentally ill, handicapped or physically unfit for work (Ms. 
Tang).  
 
The third piece of evidence to demonstrate the minimum effect of de-commodification, 
according to Chapter Nine, referred to two more practices in the UMLSG: public review and 
voluntary labour. Both of them strongly embraced the work ethic for poor people. By posting the 
information about an applicant’s household in front of the Residents’ Committee, public review 
should be conducted in each primary assessment and reassessment every six months. As Mr. 
Shen pointed out, ‘The effect of public review is to put the UMLSG work under people’s 
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 supervision.’ Similarly, voluntary labour - the Chinese version of workfare - was also designed to 
activate beneficiaries’ motive to work by public surveillance. 
 
The second principle of assessing the welfare outcomes of the UMLSG referred to de-
familialization. It was legislated that applications to the UMLSG should be based on family unit. 
However, controversies about the definition of ‘family unit’ arose in practical assessments. When 
the second generation and their children in the household were the applicants, the first generation 
would be counted in assessment unless they were not living together (‘TypeⅠhousehold’). This 
false assumption of resource sharing in the household was contradicted by the stories in Chapter 
Eight. For example:  
It was not necessary for her to support us even though we were living together. We 
cooked separately. Living together is different from sharing life together. In addition, 
she was so old and needed to save the pension and the allowance from her daughter for 
herself. I understand this. To help us or not depends on her conscience. In reverse, we 
cannot ask her for money as, after all, she is our senior (Ms. Zhang).   
 
By contrast, no matter whether they were living together or not, it is nearly impossible for older 
people with able-bodied children to successfully apply for the UMLSG. Elderly poverty, which 
could be hidden by the mask of this ‘Type Ⅱ household’, was uncovered by the case of Ms. Cai 
in Chapter Eight. 
 
The third principle was related to de-clientelization. As the main responsibilities of assessment 
and administration were laid down to the staff from the Residents’ Committee, a problem of 
street-level bureaucracy was produced in the daily practice of the UMLSG. Due to the concern 
about massive workload, local bureaucrats tended to establish various barriers for application, 
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 especially utilising ‘the ability to work’ and ‘family unit’ (see more about ‘ignore it if possible’ 
in Chapter Eight). Moreover, it was quite possible for local bureaucrats to withhold the 
information about the comprehensive assistance of the UMLSG from beneficiaries. Therefore, in 
order to derive the ‘flexibility’ and guarantee the UMLSG assistance, it was of use for poor 
people to develop a patron-client relationship and cooperate with the administrative work of the 
staff, such as actively attending voluntary labour (see more about ‘the duality of statutory 
assistance’ in Chapter Nine). 
 
Fourthly, a stratum of the UMLSG beneficiaries had been constituted because there was little 
chance for them to escape from poverty. Rather than simply attributed to ‘lazy people’ or 
‘welfare dependency’, the reasons for this division could be quite complicated. Due to the 
imposition of ‘the ability to work’ by local bureaucrats, current UMLSG families had been 
proven as unfit for work. Also, the level of incomes probably failed to cover non-food costs if 
they lost the entitlements of the UMLSG or Low-Income family. Moreover, as pointed out by 
Chapter Nine, the UMLSG institution provided little significance of promoting re-employment. 
Therefore, the most common solution for beneficiaries to leave the UMLSG was either to wait 
for the age for retirement or for their children to become old enough to work. However, as shown 
by Chapter Seven, the excess of the UMLSG threshold did not necessarily mean a living 
standard with need satisfaction, because the UMLSG threshold is targeting at a ‘minimum’ or 
‘survival’ level.  
 
Regarding the four principles above, the last point made in Chapter Nine was the stigmatisation 
effects caused by the welfare outcomes of current China’s welfare regime. Due to the emphasis 
on ‘the ability to work’ and ‘family unit’, the identity as an UMLSG family displayed a failure 
for beneficiaries. Moreover, the inferior feeling was strengthened by local bureaucrats’ prejudice 
and other UMLSG rules. For example, although opposed to public review, they could only 
comfort themselves like this:  
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 We have to accept whatever the government gives to you. The vulnerable group is to 
be cared. We are not supposed to say anything. We would not be seen as the 
‘vulnerable’ if we have the right to say (Ms. Zhuo). 
 
Similarly, dependency on informal network was not only insecure (‘hard to take care of the long-
term poor’; changpin nangu), but was also very likely to damage social relations.  
We prefer to rely on ourselves. It is very hard to speak out ‘please do me a favour’ to 
relatives or friends as this will be looked down upon (Mr. Dong).  
 
The instability and stigmatisation of informal networks were so significant that beneficiaries 
would prefer to choose statutory assistance, even though they had to pay the prices of being 
clientelized or coerced by local bureaucrats.  
The information is not transparent and the Residents’ Committee has never publicised 
its operation. Under this circumstance, people will have to turn to relatives or friends 
first. But the informal support is not always ready to help. If China is just like Western 
countries, democratic and transparent in governance, state welfare is definitely my 
priority. This is the responsibility of the state for a citizen (Mr. Chang). 
 
In addition, the status of poverty excluded the UMLSG beneficiaries from social participation, 
because there was a lack of necessary resources as well as being ‘looked down upon’ (kanbuqi ). 
This reality was quite far away from the ‘dignity’ they desired: ‘maintain a normal living 
standard as others’, ‘return to mainstream society’ (Mr. Li) or regain a social belongingness by 
contributing to community (Mr. Chang).  
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 Finally, beneficiaries gradually felt helpless about changing their life; they were forced to accept 
their fate of being trapped at the UMLSG stratum.   
I feel more and more broken down. I’m apathetic to what is happening in my daily life. 
No one cares about you. I just have to stay in the UMLSG and to obey what I’m told to 
do. My life is over (Mr. Chen). 
 
In conclusion, demonstrated by the performance in terms of de-commodification and social 
programs, de-familialization and de-clientelization, social rights in the current phase of ‘social 
China’ were still far from being actualised. In particular, other than vital reliance on the market 
and family, China’s welfare regime was also characterised by the patron-client relationship 
between poor people and street-level bureaucrats. This tradition of clientelization could even be 
traced back to danwei before the economic reform. Due to non-recognition of social rights and 
over-emphasis on legitimacy, the policies of the UMLSG could only maintain a ‘survival’ living 
standard for some urban residents with living difficulties. However, they provided of little use to 
change the impoverished livelihoods of the UMLSG beneficiaries. As a result, a rather stable 
division of the UMLSG beneficiaries was constituted. 
 
According to the previous discussions, ‘social China’ proposed refreshed ideologies of ‘Three 
Represents, The Scientific Outlook on Development and harmonious socialist society’ to achieve 
the goal of ‘common prosperity’. Correspondingly in practice, the role of the state had been 
largely activated in the welfare system to narrow income gap, such as the intervention in rural 
areas or protection to the disadvantaged people. However, the finding of street-level bureaucracy 
in this study clearly suggests that these efforts may be counteracted by policy actors in reality. 
Coercion or irresponsibility of bureaucrats is the problem which the CPC always tried to rectify 
by its internal channels, but failed to accomplish. Therefore, street-level bureaucracy (e.g. non-
intervention attitude, clientelism or conflicts with poor people) is the main threat to the 
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 improvement of the welfare system and ultimately to the consolidation of the legitimacy of the 
CPC.  
 
Contributions to theory and methodology 
This study has made the following contributions to theory and methodology. Firstly, although 
there are several well-known books describing China’s welfare system (e.g. Leung, 1995; Wong, 
1998; Chan et al., 2008), they do not following the approach of welfare regime. Although Sharkh 
and Gough’s (2006) study - as a rare example in the literature - does classify China into a type of 
informal security regimes, this broad classification cannot provide any detailed insights into 
China’s welfare regime. After all, it is not enough to describe China’s welfare regime as 
‘relatively good welfare outcomes and social services outputs with remarkably low levels of state 
spending and low levels of external flows (aid and remittances)’ (Sharkh and Gough 2006, p47). 
Furthermore, it is also admitted that the ‘degree of variation within the cluster is rather high, and 
culturally and historically it is a disparate group’ (Sharkh and Gough, 2006: 48). Therefore, by 
treating China as an independent case, this study helps to fill the gap with regard to China’s 
welfare regime in the current literature. For example, three phases of China’ welfare regime 
(communist, economic and social China) during 1949-2011 with respective characteristics were 
identified by this study. Furthermore, the welfare outcomes of China’s welfare regime were 
shown by the case of the UMLSG shceme. 
 
As a single case study, it is not the task of this study to compare China’s welfare regime with 
other categories. After describing the characteristics of China’s welfare regime, however, this 
study can be used as a reference for future comparative research. When compared to the 
conservative regime in terms of the Bismarckian model (Palier, 2010; Palier, 2007; Daly, 2001), 
China appears to share similarities in highlighting work-based protection. In fact, there are 
significant differences after a further examination. For example: 
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 y From ‘communist China’ to ‘social China’ there has been an obvious division between 
urban and rural populations in the welfare system. In terms of danwei or social 
insurance, work-based protection in China was always targeted at the minority of the 
working population. Danwei welfare was only applied to those ‘privileged’ workers in 
national enterprises, public organisations and government bodies (Table 4.5). Likewise, 
the current schemes of social insurance are just aimed at the population who are 
working in cities. Moreover, it is very likely for migrant workers in cities to be excluded 
from social insurance.  
y Rather than based on the market mechanism, the danwei institutuion was subordinate to 
the central planning. Therefore, there was very little possibility of job mobilisation 
within different danwei. Also, there was no obligation for workers to contribute to the 
expenses of insurance and welfare. Furthermore, instead of outputs or profits, the 
retrieval of danwei welfare was related to the importance of workers to the socialist 
industrialisation in ‘communist China’ (see Chapter Four). 
y The role of danwei has been hugely weakened after the economic reform. It was 
replaced by social insurance except in public organisations and government bodies. The 
preservation of danwei welfare for government employees should be the most 
comparable feature to the Bismarckian model or some of the East Asian welfare regimes. 
However, the sustainablity of this feature will depend on the ongoing reform of danwei 
welfare in government bodies. For example, it was reported that 14.93 out of 40.02 
million government employees had already joined the normal pension scheme by 2007 
(Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, 2010: 1069). 
y In the Bismarckian model, there can be different kinds of social insurance based on job 
categories. The management of these social insurance funds rests on independent 
organisations led by representatives of employees and employers. In contrast, both 
employees and employers in China are compelled to contribute to the state schems of 
social insurance whatever their jobs categories are (Figure 6.1). The rates of the 
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 contributions may have a small difference among localities, but the funds are all 
managed by a specific government department.  
 
It may be more reasonable to compare China’s case with the East Asian welfare regimes. The 
following discussion provides a concise comparision for future research:  
y The independence of the category ‘East Asian welfare regimes’ is determined by their 
more significant elements of productivism or developmentalism (see ‘Premise’ in 
Chapter Two). The Chinese authorities have shown their strong determination in 
pursuing the prime goal of economic development. This can be demonstrated by the 
subordination of the social system to the economic system in ‘communist China’ and 
‘economic China’. Consequently, it is not surprising to find that after the economic 
reform, China’s welfare regime has heavily relied on the providers of family, the market 
and community as the East Asian welfare models usually do. Also, the Chinese 
authorities preferred to regulate private channels for welfare provision, which is a 
common role of other states in East Asia. The current program of social insurance is 
such an example, in terms of state management and contributions from employees and 
employers. 
y However, there are at least two characteristics that show the departure of China’s 
development stragegy from other East Asian models. Unlike Hong Kong, for example, 
China’s welfare regime does not consisit of a universal provision of housing, education 
and health service, which are usually considered beneficial for human capital and labour 
reproduction in East Asia. These social programs in China are currently run on a market 
basis and they are discriminated to the rural population. The second point refers to the 
refreshed ideologies in ‘social China’, which initiated the intervention of the state in the 
rural welfare system and the redistribution to people in difficult living situations. By 
comparison, the welfare model of Hong Kong is still hostile to state redistribution even 
though the problem of inequality has been growing. The new characteristics in ‘social 
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 China’ may suggest a more balanced relationship between the economic and the social 
systems in future. 
y Based on the principle of de-clientalization in the welfare outcomes, this study has 
discovered ‘patron-client relationship’ and ‘street-level bureaucracy’ in the 
administration of the UMLSG scheme. There appears to be no parallel research in East 
Asia reporting the same finding from the delivery of state welfare. In fact, de-
clientalization is a promising indicator for studying the East Asian welfare regimes, 
especially when they all place a primary importance on informal support. 
 
Secondly, in relation to the assessment of welfare outcomes, Esping-Andersen’s narrow 
focus on de-commodification has been under attack. The reason is because, from a 
comparative perspective, low state spending or dependency on informal network (family or 
community) could also generate relatively good outcomes in human development, such as 
education or health. However, this conclusion seems to over-estimate the outcomes of the 
East Asian welfare regimes by ignoring the inequality of power embedded in these regimes. 
With a holistic framework containing welfare mix, welfare outcomes and historical 
development, this study is not only valid in describing the nature of China’s welfare regime, 
but also reveals two distinctive characteristics in relation to power inequality.   
 
The historical development of China’s welfare regime is determined by the CPC which has 
enacted one-party rule since the foundation of the P.R.C. This means that, on the one hand, the 
Party always used the welfare system to co-operate its intentions in economy and politics. This 
can be demonstrated by Five-Guarantee Household in ‘communist China’, the UMLSG scheme 
in ‘economic China’ or state intervention in the rural areas in ‘social China’. On the other hand, 
certain political ideologies had been functioning as hegemony to facilitate the acceptance of 
people to the intentions of the Party. In other words, the public did not have much power to 
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 influence the development of the welfare system. In addition, due to the non-recognition of 
social rights, local bureaucrats can easily manipulate the information about the UMLSG, flexibly 
handle the application and even impose additional conditions in assessment. As a result, poor 
people may need to develop a patron-client relationship with the bureaucrats. Otherwise, the 
UMLSG assistance would not be fully secured for them even if they qualified the eligibility.  
 
Thirdly, there is a different emphasis of de-clientelization between informal security regimes and 
China’s welfare regime in this study. The former one is mainly derived from less developed 
countries in South Asia, where ‘markets are imperfect, communities clientelist, households 
patriarchal and states marketised, patrimonial and clientelist’ (Wood 2004, p58). In other words, 
this refers to a circumstance in which the lack of state protection forces poor people to seek for 
security through informal network. In return, they need to succumb to personalised power of 
their patrons, gender inequality in household or patriarchal relations in community.  
 
By contrast, the clientelization depicted in this study is confined to urban China. It is situated in 
such a social context that state intervention is being revitalised. However, this pro-welfare 
background still cannot guarantee the delivery of the UMLSG assistance to its targets. In order to 
increase the possibility of a successful application, poor people may have to develop a patron-
client relationship with local bureaucrats. The informalisation of welfare distribution in the 
formal setting is not new in the development of China’s welfare regime. When danwei welfare 
was once vital to the livelihoods of urban working population, workers also needed to show 
loyalty to their supervisors and leaders. In short, the root of clientelization in both informal 
security regimes and China’s welfare regime originates from the non-recognition of social rights; 
while the actualisation of social rights in China may even be worse because clientelization has 
always been found in the formal institution of the welfare system.   
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 Fourthly, as pointed out by Chapter Two, it has been argued in the current literature that the 
overriding focus on development by the state and the selective use of Confucianism as rhetoric 
are the two common factors to explain the East Asian welfare regimes (e.g. Walker and Wong, 
2005; Gough, 2004; Goodman et al., 1998). In addition, the implication of seeing Confucianism 
as dominant political ideologies seems to be generalised to the analysis in China. For example, 
the latest edited book about East Asian welfare systems (including China) was entitled as East 
Asian Welfare Regimes in Transition: From Confucianism to Globalisation (Walker and Wong, 
2005).  
 
After fully reviewing the historical development of China’s welfare regime and political 
ideologies from 1949 to 2011, this study endorses the primary influence of ‘developmentalism’ 
on China’s welfare regime. Also, it acknowledges the important role of ‘familism’ in its 
rhetorical use. This can be illustrated by the legislation of family care in ‘communist China’, the 
mobilisation of familism for the rural welfare system in ‘economic China’ and the controversy 
about family unit in the UMLSG application in ‘social China’. However, this study poses the 
other important stream of political ideologies: socialism. The adherence to the socialist road and 
the leadership of the CPC has never been abandoned, even in post-reform China. From the 
consideration of legitimacy, it had been of vital importance for the Party to ensure that the 
transitions of political economy and the welfare system were compatible to socialism.  
 
For example, in ‘communist China’ when the Party failed to provide comprehensive welfare 
programs to rural collectives as danwei welfare, any opposition to agricultural co-operation 
could be seen as ‘contradiction between capitalism and socialism’. Every crisis of rural 
collectives definitely came with a new round of ideological education about socialism. At the 
beginning of ‘economic China’, ‘superiority of socialism’ was used to justify the initiation of the 
economic reform. ‘Prevention of polarisation’ and ‘common prosperity’ were the two promises 
made by the Party to exchange people’s consent to ‘allow some people to prosper first’. After 
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 more than two decades of the economic reform, the failure to fulfil these promises forced the 
Party to activate the political ideologies of ‘Three Represents, Scientific Outlook on 
Development and harmonious socialist society’. It even reinstated that ‘fairness and justice is the 
essential nature of socialism and the foundation of social stability as well’ (Wen, 2011). In short, 
without considering the continuity of socialism in China, the single focus on ‘familism’ in 
ideological analysis could not provide a full understanding of the development of China’s 
welfare regime. Especially, it will fail to explain the revitalisation of state intervention in the 
current phase of ‘social China’.  
 
Fifthly, it would be reckoned that quantitative study is the dominant method of welfare regime 
analysis, such as the milestone work about advanced capitalism by Esping-Andersen’s (1990) or 
the latest analysis of global regimes by Sharkh and Gough (2006). However, without a similar 
database to that in the OECD countries, it is very difficult for social scientists to retrieve data 
from other less developed parts of the world, such as China. Therefore, the adoption of 
qualitative method in this study not only sidesteps the problem of collecting statistical data in 
China; it can also be seen as an attempt to fully study the welfare regime of a particular country 
by the methods of document analysis and interviews.  
 
Sixthly, it is more likely that the qualitative method will discover new characteristics of a welfare 
regime than the quantitative method. There are some principles for the assessment of welfare 
regime that are nearly impossible to be operationalised, especially on a worldwide scale. For 
example, Gough (2004a) and Sharkh and Gough (2006) mapped the world only by the data on 
welfare mix and social programs in welfare outcomes. Meanwhile, the concept of de-
clientelization proposed by Gough et al. (2004) in welfare outcomes was entirely derived by the 
ethnographic method. Regarding this study, without documentary analysis and interviews, the 
features of ‘authoritarianism’, ‘clientelization’ and ‘street-level bureaucracy’ in China’s welfare 
regime could easily have been ignored. 
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 Seventhly, as pointed out by Chapter Three, the strength of the anti-oppressive approach is to 
connect the marginalised group with material social structure in a specific historical context. 
Moreover, by revealing dominant ideologies and presenting bottom-up voices, this approach is 
aimed to deconstruct the stigmatised image attached to the oppressed group and ultimately 
advocate social changes (Strier, 2007; Clifford, 1992). This study is the pioneer research on 
China that is designed to address these tasks. Despite certain difficulties in the research process 
(Chapter Three), this study demonstrated the possibility of accessing a marginalised group 
without relying on official channels in China and this was of great use indeed to facilitate their 
valuable but under-represented opinions. Their voices not only displayed how power in 
substance or in ideology impacts on their daily life, but also suggested an action-oriented 
direction. For example, instead of clientelization, defending one’s own social rights by overt 
‘complaint’ could be an effective solution to fight against street-level bureaucracy (Chapter 
Eight). In short, the anti-oppressive approach is an ideal research practice for studying the 
welfare regime in characteristics of power inequality. 
 
Implications for research, policy making and practice  
Corresponding to the findings, this study provides the following implications for research, policy 
making and practice. Firstly, along with the dismantling of danwei welfare and rural collectives, 
family and community in China’s welfare mix have been increasingly important since ‘economic 
China’. However, the sustainablity of their functions is becoming questionable. The family unit 
is being exposed to various social risks in current China. Illustrated by Ms. Zhang and Ms. Cai’s 
stories (see ‘Family unit’ in Chapter Eight), the imposition of family care without any external 
support not only intensifies the conflicts in the household, but also contributes little to poverty 
relief.  
 
Furthermore, the impact of one-child policy may be a potential threat to family care. In reality, 
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 the one-child policy varies in different localities. In accordance to law, there are two conditions 
when two children are actually allowed in a family: 1) if the couples both are only children in 
their original families; 2) if the first child of the couple in rural areas is not a boy. It was reported 
that only 20% of the whole population were regulated by one-child policy, while as high as 75% 
could have two children on conditions. However, one of the possible consequences of these 
birth-conctrol policies was that: the estimated ratio of ‘one-child families’ to ‘two-children 
families’ across China would be about 6:4 in future (Guo et al., 2003). Similarly, it was estimated 
that the proportion of older couples subordinate to the one-child policy in rural areas was only 
0.2% in the whole rural population in 2005. Nevertheless, this figure will climb to 5% by 2030 
and ultimately reach the peak of 8% by 2050 (Guo et al., 2005). As a result, it would be too hasty 
to draw a conclusion that familism is breaking down in China simply because of the 
demographic factor, but it is worthwhile to see how ‘social China’ will respond to the future 
challenge from demographic changes to the rhetoric of ‘familism’.  
 
Community is the other controversial player in China’s welfare mix. As early as in the Thirteenth 
National Congress of the CPC, it was proposed that community organisations should be used to 
facilitate the transformation of government functions (Zhao 1987, p39). In order to justify the 
reluctance to undertake the welfare responsibilities released from danwei, the Civil Affairs 
authorities promoted the initiative of the ‘socialisation of social welfare’. This policy was aimed 
to encourage community organisations to carry out the care of older people but without state 
funding. However, after the experiment in ‘economic China’, even the authorities discerned that 
the capacity of civil society was overestimated. Therefore, the sponsorship of community 
organisations was seen as a state responsibility in ‘social China’.  
 
The fieldwork of the UMLSG can be used as the other example to show the vulnerability of 
informal networks in the community. Again, mutual help at the neighbourhood level did not 
work for poor people as expected. The long-term nature of poverty, inability to return favours 
 287
 and deprivation of social participation are the three main causes for poor people to be 
disconnected from their informal network. Much worse, power inequality embedded in the 
informal network could be overlooked. The Residents’ Committee was supposed to monitor and 
relieve poverty at the grass-root level, but this formal support could be informalised and 
deformed into clientalization.  
 
In short, it is a misperception to consider community as an alternative to the state as 
demonstrated by the experiment in ‘economic China’. In the foreseeable future it is very 
optimistic to predict the activation of civil society by the Chinese authorities to support the 
vulnerable group. The key in this course, however, is how to guarantee the dignity of welfare 
users.  
 
Secondly, in relation to urban poverty, the top priority for research is to reassess the UMLSG 
thresholds. This reassessment should not only be carried out by academia; it should also involve 
the public especially the beneficiaries of the UMLSG. In addition, the rationale behind different 
methodologies should be revealed to the public. It is only with such informed choices that the 
public can have a thorough debate and ultimately reach a consensus about the poverty line. In 
short, rather than monopolised knowledge by academia, research on designing the UMLSG 
thresholds ought to be a democratic process by all stakeholders.    
 
Thirdly, this study implies the importance of conducting ideological analysis about social policy 
in China. The current gap of ideological analysis in the literature is because non-Chinese scholars 
may not be able to read the source documents in Chinese; while for Chinese scholars it is a 
massive job to translate them into English. After ideological analysis, the next step to do is to 
identify realistic evidence and publish them to contrast the rhetoric. However, both steps are not 
easy tasks in China and it will depend on the improvement of freedom of speech in the future.  
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 Fourthly, it is inspiring to see the appearance of pro-welfare ideologies and revitalisation of state 
support in the phase of ‘social China’. It is unquestionable that the tremendous improvement of 
the welfare system, especially the extension in rural areas and the protection to poor people by 
the MLSG schemes, is substantially consolidating the legitimacy of the Party. However, as 
shown by case study of the UMLSG, the top-down approach by the Party over-emphasizes the 
function in social stability rather than need satisfaction. For example, the UMLSG thresholds had 
been focusing on a ‘survival’ living standard which ignored the costs of social inclusion. 
Similarly, there was also little significance of current policies in helping beneficiaries to leave 
the UMLSG. Therefore, it is predictable that the future tension in social policy making will rest 
between top-down demand for stability and bottom-up focus on well-being.      
 
Fifthly, since the effect of legitimacy may be offset by the conflicts between poor people and 
local bureaucrats, there is an urgent need to reform street-level bureaucracy in the delivery of the 
UMLSG assistance. The unwritten principle of ‘the ability to work’ should be entirely abolished 
in assessments and a clear definition of ‘family unit’ is required to be clarified by authorities at 
least at the local level. Considering the experiences from ‘TypeⅠ household’ and ‘Type Ⅱ 
household’, this study suggests that the first generation and their adult children should be seen as 
two different households, no matter which side is the applicant or whether they are living 
together or not.  
 
Meanwhile, information about the criteria of application as well as entitlements to 
comprehensive assistance also needs to be made transparent to potential and current beneficiaries. 
In addition, the primary purpose of laying the daily work of the UMLSG on the Residents’ 
Committee was to save administrative resources. However, the findings of this study indicated 
that the massive workloads had led to the formation of street-level bureaucracy. Therefore, it is 
necessary to take the administration of the UMLSG scheme away from the Residents’ Committee 
and pass it to an independent agency with sufficient staff and resources.  
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 Sixthly, since beneficiaries are either unable to work or willing to work but without job 
opportunity, the effect of public review and voluntary labour is quite mild in ‘motivating’ 
beneficiaries. Instead of relying on public surveillance and stigmatisation effects, there should be 
more positive functions of current policies to help beneficiaries escape from poverty. It would be 
better for the independent agency (see the fourth point above) to hire specific staff (e.g. social 
workers) to deal the issue of re-employment. The ideal promotion of re-employment should not 
only include job training and referral, but also contain endeavours to create positions in the 
community.  
 
Moreover, rather than the UMLSG subsidy, the main concern of beneficiaries about leaving the 
UMLSG is related to the loss of the entitlements to social programs. Therefore, a mid-way stage 
could be considered in policy design. For example, when their income exceeds the threshold and 
the UMLSG subsidy is suspended, beneficiaries could still be entitled to certain items of specific 
assistance according to their need assessment by social workers. These entitlements will not be 
terminated until their income exceeds a basic level of living standard which is based on the 
reassessment of the UMLSG thresholds (see the first point above).  
 
Last but not least, since the employment of grown-up children in the household is a common 
way for beneficiaries to leave the UMLSG, more emphasis in current policies should be laid on 
addressing child poverty. For example, conditions of supporting equal opportunities of education 
should be created, such as allowance for books, internet or interest class etc.       
 
Seventhly, although it is very optimistic to foresee increasing attention and funding paid by the 
Party to the welfare system, the authoritarian role of the Party should not be ignored in the course 
of development. Due to its prime goal of developmentalism, it will hardly be a spontaneous 
action for the Party to enhance the UMLSG thresholds, the move of which has always been 
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 considered as ‘burden on economic development’. Similarly, the one-party rule of China’s 
politics is probably unable to lead to more concern about people’s well-being than the demand of 
stability. Perhaps as the most convincing example, internal efforts by the government still fail to 
correct the problem of street-level bureaucracy in the UMLSG.  
 
Alternatively, this study suggests that, against the thriving background of social policy, 
democratic participation (especially user involvement) is the key to actualise social rights in 
China. The voices of the UMLSG users about living standards and policy implementation should 
be facilitated and presented to other social members and the government. The purpose of doing 
this is to deconstruct the biased image of beneficiaries and ideological hegemony constructed by 
the Party and academia. More importantly, poor people should be empowered to defend their 
entitlements and fight against any coercion by bureaucrats. All in all, working with poor people, 
academia and community activists could be the important direction for finding out action-
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